Trustee board diversity, governance mechanisms, capital structure and performance in UK charities

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/CG-08-2017-0185
Pages478-508
Published date07 February 2018
Date07 February 2018
AuthorMohamed H. Elmagrhi,Collins G. Ntim,John Malagila,Samuel Fosu,Abongeh A. Tunyi
Subject MatterCorporate governance,Strategy
Trustee board diversity, governance
mechanisms, capital structure and
performance in UK charities
Mohamed H. Elmagrhi, Collins G. Ntim, John Malagila, Samuel Fosu and Abongeh A. Tunyi
Abstract
Purpose This paper aims to investigate the association among trustee board diversity (TBD), corporate
governance (CG), capital structure (CS) and financial performance (FP) by using a sample of UK
charities. Specifically, the authors investigate the effect of TBD on CS and ascertain whether CG quality
moderates the TBD–CS nexus. Additionally, the authors examine the impact of CS on FP and ascertain
whether the CS–FP nexus is moderated by TBD and CG quality.
Design/methodology/approach The authors use a number of multivariate regression techniques,
including ordinary least squares, fixed-effects, lagged-effects and two-stage least squares, to rigorously
analyse the data and test the hypotheses.
Findings First, the authors find that trustee board gender diversity has a negative effect on CS, but this
relationship holds only up to the point of having three women trustees. The authors find similar, but
relatively weak, results for the presence of black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) trustees. Second, the
authors find that the TBD–CS nexus depends on the quality of CG, with the relationship being stronger in
charities with higher frequency of meetings, independent CG committee and larger trustee and audit firm
size. Third, the authors find that CS structure has a positive effect on FP, but this is moderated by TBD
and CG quality. The evidence is robust to different econometric models that adjust for alternative
measures and endogeneities. The authors interpret the findings within explanations of a theoretical
perspective that captures insights from different CG and CS theories.
Originality/value Existing studies that explore TBD, CG, CS and FP in charities are rare. This study
distinctively attempts to address this empirical lacuna within the extant literature by providing four new
insights with specific focus on UK charities. First, the authors provide new evidence on the relationship
between TBD and CS. Second, the authors offer new evidence on the moderating effect of CG on the
TBD-CS nexus. Third, the authors provide new evidence on the effect of CS on FP. Finally, the authors
offer new evidence on the moderating effect of TBD and CG on the CS–FP nexus.
Keywords UK, Charities, Governance mechanisms, Capital structure and performance,
Trustee board diversity, Women and ethnic minority trustees
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
In this paper, we examine the relationship among trustee board diversity (TBD), corporate
governance (CG), capital structure (CS) and financial performance (FP) in small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with specific focus on a sample of UK charities. The non-
profit sector is economically vital worldwide. In the UK, as at 31 March 2017, the number of
charities registered was 165,277, with a total yearly income of £70.93bn and creating over a
million jobs (Charity Commission, 2017). Charities in the UK also continue to receive a large
amount of donations and grants from the general public/central government to support their
services, despite severe public-sector budget cuts following the recent global financial
crisis. Thus, failure of charities can lead to significant reputational damage to the sector in
Mohamed H. Elmagrhi is
based at the Department of
Accountancy, Finance and
Economics, Huddersfield
Business School, University
of Huddersfield,
Huddersfield, UK.
Collins G. Ntim is based at
Centre for Research in
Accounting, Accountability
and Governance,
Department of Accounting,
Southampton Business
School, University
of Southampton,
Southampton, UK.
John Malagila is Lecturer in
Accounting at Centre for
Research in Accounting,
Accountability and
Governance, Department
of Accounting,
Southampton Business
School, University
of Southampton,
Southampton, UK. Samuel
Fosu is Lecturer in Finance
at the Department of
Finance, Birmingham
Business School, University
of Birmingham,
Birmingham, UK.
Abongeh A. Tunyi is based
at Accounting and Financial
Management Group,
Sheffield University
Management School,
University of Sheffield,
Sheffield, UK.
Received 25 August 2017
Revised 2 December 2017
Accepted 3 January 2018
PAGE 478 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jVOL. 18 NO. 3 2018, pp. 478-508, © Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 1472-0701 DOI 10.1108/CG-08-2017-0185
particular, but the UK economy in general (Boateng et al., 2016). For example, it emerged
that “Kids Company”, a large UK charity that collapsed recently, received £3m UK
government grant following a ministerial direction despite advice that the grant was unlikely
to represent value for money for UK tax-payers only in the few weeks preceding its failure,
and in total, this charity received over £100m of UK tax-payers’ funds. Additionally, charities
in general are important as they provide a wide range of services to the local and
international community, including providing services to children and their families,
residential housing for the homeless and free services to victims of earthquakes and wars.
In spite of the importance of charities to local and the international community, CG
structures in the charity sector are often overlooked, leading to poor accountability and CG,
weak financial management and internal controls and lack of adequate transparency
(Newton, 2015). The weak monitoring and internal controls usually associated with charities
has often led to their ultimate collapse, and the recent collapse of the “Kids Company” in the
UK is a classic example. The UK Public Accounts Committee’s report into the failure of this
charity indicates that its insolvency was mainly caused by poor CG, CS and FP practices
(PACAC, 2016).
One way to strengthen CG quality in charities is to ensure that more trustees of women and
ethnic minority backgrounds are appointed to charity boards (Buse et al., 2016; Ntim,
2013a; Gyapong et al., 2016; Ntim, 2015). Indeed, recent global debate and public policy,
especially in the EU, UK and Scandinavian countries, has sought to affirmatively increase
diversity in corporate boards. It is argued that board gender and ethnic diversity can
enhance managerial monitoring and board independence by bringing diverse ideas,
perspectives and knowledge into board decision-making (Adams and Ferreira, 2009;
Carter et al., 2003, 2010; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Ntim, 2016; Gyapong et al., 2016; Loukil and
Yousfi, 2015; Triana et al., 2013). The increased monitoring and independence often
associated with diverse boards may enhance legitimacy and trustworthiness of the board
and consequently encourage stakeholders to provide support to charities, including finance
(Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Ntim, 2013c; Terjesen and Sealy, 2016). It is generally
accepted that board diversity, CG, CS and FP are interlinked with researchers suggesting
that boardroom diversity has a significant impact on critical corporate decisions, including
CG and CS choices (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005). However, there seems to be a lack of
empirical evidence relating to the impact of board gender and ethnic diversity on CS and
the influence of CS on FP in charities. Therefore, in this paper, we seek to make a number
of new contributions to prior studies by examining the link among TBD (i.e. gender and
ethnic), CG, CS and FP by using a sample of UK charities. Specifically, we investigate
the extent to which TBD drives CS and ascertain whether CG quality moderates the link
between TBD and CS. In addition, we examine the effect of charity CS on FP and
ascertain whether the charity CS–FP nexus is contingent on the quality of CG. A
theoretical perspective that captures insights from different CG and CS theories informs
our analysis.
Theoretically, agency theory (loosely incorporating signalling and perking order predictions)
suggests that there is often a potential conflict of interest (and related agency costs)
between the motives of principals (i.e. stakeholders, for example, donors) and agents (i.e.
enterprise management, for example, charity trustees) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Grossman and Hart, 1982; Fama and Jensen, 1983). According to Jensen (1986),
substantial free cash flows in enterprises, such as charities, could signal agency problems
(costs) to principals because of the risk of cash misappropriation by charity trustees. To
signal efficiency in the use of cash flows, Jensen (1986) suggests that charities can use
debt financing as a useful CG mechanism to reduce such agency conflicts. This is because
debt financing would effectively bond the trustees (a signal of agents’ commitment) to
operate efficiently to be able to pay the interest and the debt (i.e. future cash flows).
Consequently, the use of high levels of debt may result in reducing agency costs often
associated with having more free cash flows in the hands of trustees. In the same way,
VOL. 18 NO. 3 2018 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jPAGE 479

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