The Razian Response to Philosophical Anarchism: A Probe into the Authority‐Autonomy Tension

• Published date: 01 December 2024
• Author: Noam Gur
• Date: 01 December 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12419

© 2024 The Author(s). Ratio Juris published by University of Bologna and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Ratio Juris. Vol. 37 No. 4 December (274–292)

The Razian Response to Philosophical

Anarchism: A Probe into the Authority-

Autonomy Tension

NOAM GUR*

Abstract. This paper juxtaposes two conflicting positions on the justifiability of authority:

Robert Wolff’s philosophical anarchist argument and a response to Wolff consisting in Joseph

Raz’s service conception of authority. Following an introduction, I provide a brief exposition of

Wolff’s claim that authority is incompatible with moral autonomy (Section2). After presenting

the Razian response (Section3), I consider what implications follow from Raz’s service concep-

tion of authority assuming it is correct (Section4). I argue that, even if the service conception

successfully meets the anarchist challenge, it does so not by entirely dissolving the tension be-

tween authority and autonomy, but through a balancing act whereby one aspect of our au-

tonomy gives way to another aspect of our autonomy. Finally, I consider the service conception

of authority itself and point out certain vulnerabilities thereof (Section5).

GENERAL, YOUR TANK IS A POWERFUL VEHICLE

It smashes down forests and crushes a hundred men.

But it has one defect:

It needs a driver.

General, your bomber is powerful.

It flies faster than a storm and carries more than an elephant.

But it has one defect:

It needs a mechanic.

General, man is very useful.

He can fly and he can kill.

But he has one defect:

He can think.

—Bertolt Brecht(2000, 289; trans. L. Baxendall)

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution

and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

* I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their perceptive comments and suggestions.

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Ratio Juris, Vol. 37, No. 4 © 2024 The Author(s). Ratio Juris published by University of Bologna and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

The Razian Response to Philosophical Anarchism

1. Introduction

A notable strand of contemporary philosophical anarchism, championed by Robert

Wolff, consists in the claim that authority necessarily clashes with our duty to be

morally autonomous (Wolff1970, esp. 3–19).1 Whatever else can be said about

Wolff’s account, it is hardly deniable that the puzzle at its heart, namely, the relation

between authority and autonomy, poses an intriguing philosophical challenge.

Moreover, far from being a purely theoretical puzzle, it ties in with some of the

greatest real- life perils generated by hierarchical systems and their associated psy-

chology—perils that found an apt expression, for example, in Stanley Milgram’s(1974,

605) statement that “[t]he disappearance of a sense of responsibility is the most far-

reaching consequence of submission to authority.” Brecht’s poem in the epigraph

adverts to a practical context quintessentially liable to such perils—namely, military

settings—but there are multiple other contexts wherein such perils manifest.

Several years after the appearance of Wolff’s account, a prominent attempt to vin-

dicate authority as a justifiable notion began to take shape in the work of Joseph Raz.2

While Raz’s account of authority, for the most part, has not been framed specifically as

a response to Wolff’s argument, it nonetheless directly engages with the latter (see esp.

Raz2009, 26–7). Indeed, this engagement is head- on, because, in an important sense,

Raz responds to Wolff on Wolff’s own terms; that is, Raz does not deny the moral status

Wolff ascribes to autonomy, but instead argues that autonomy is reconcilable with

authority. The bone of contention between these two positions—i.e., the compatibility

or incompatibility of authority and autonomy—will be the primary focus of this paper.

Two preliminary clarifications are worth making. First, Wolff’s version of anar-

chism is predicated, at least primarily, on a priori reasoning, and contends that the

very notion of justified authority is morally unsound. This version of anarchism is

distinguishable from the stance of political theorists who, rather than denying a priori

the justifiability of authority, reject the justificatory arguments so far provided for an

obligation to obey the law (or, at least, a general obligation to obey it) as unconvinc-

ing.3 This latter stance is sometimes referred to as a posteriori anarchism.4 Raz, in turn,

is an opponent of a priori anarchism, but not necessarily of a posteriori anarchism.

Indeed, he can be classified as a proponent of a moderate version of a posteriori anar-

chism—one that is sceptical of there being a general obligation to obey the law, i.e., an

obligation as wide as the scope of a legal system (see esp. Raz1995, chap. 15). As in-

ferable from the above, the discussion in this paper will revolve around a priori anar-

chism, not a posteriori anarchism. A second clarification is that Wolff denies the

legitimacy of the state (and, particularly, rejects its authoritative standing) without

inferring from the state’s illegitimacy a moral requirement to actively oppose or

1 There are, of course, other important strands of philosophical anarchism, perhaps most nota-

bly William Godwin’s(1976) utilitarian version of philosophical anarchism.

2 The most directly pertinent texts are Raz2009 (originally published in 1979) and Raz1986,

though relevant aspects of Raz’s account of practical reason are expounded in Raz1999 (origi-

nally published in 1975).

3 Some of the most notable exponents of this position are A. John Simmons (see, e.g.,

Simmons1979) and M. B. E. Smith(1973).

4 See, e.g., Simmons2001, chap. 6, where the author discusses the distinction between a priori

anarchism and a posteriori anarchism.