The Pursuit of Truth and the justification in legal fact-finding. A Comparative Analysis of Bentham, Laudan, and Damaška

• Pages: 157-185
• Date: 01 January 2026
• Published date: 01 January 2026
• Author: Eunseol Lee
• Subject Matter: Derecho Internacional

Quaestio facti. Revista Internacional sobre Razonamiento Probatorio / International Journal on Evidential Legal Reasoning

Año 2025 10 pp. 157-185 DOI: 10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i10.23152

Quaestio facti. Revista Internacional sobre Razonamiento Probatorio

Quaestio facti. International Journal on Evidential Legal Reasoning

Sección: Homenaje a Larry Laudan

2025 l 10 pp. 157-185

Madrid, 2025

DOI: 10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i10.23152

Marcial Pons Ediciones Jurídicas y Sociales

© Eunseol Lee

ISSN: 2604-6202

Recibido: 13/05/2025 | Aceptado: 03/11/2025 | Publicado online: 19/12/2025

Editado bajo licencia Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional de Creative Commons

THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH AND THE JUSTIFICATION

IN LEGAL FACT-FINDING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

OF BENTHAM, LAUDAN, AND DAMAŠKA

Eunseol Lee

Université Libre de Bruxelles

eunseol.lee@ulb.be

Université Toulouse Capitole

eunseol.lee@ut-capitole.fr

ABSTRACT: is paper examines the philosophical and legal foundations of the principle of free proof

in criminal adjudication through a critical analysis of the theories of Jeremy Bentham, Larry Lau-

dan and Mirjan Damaška. While Bentham and Laudan support the broadest possible inclusion

of evidence to promote truth-seeking and reduce judicial error, Damaška emphasizes the institu-

tional, structure and cognitive constraints that limit evidentiary reasoning. rough comparative

legal and epistemological inquiry, the paper challenges the assumption that admitting more evi-

dence necessarily advances to discovery of truth. It argues that, although conceptually aligned with

the truth-seeking, the free use of evidence is constrained in practice by human biases, procedural

safeguards, and epistemic limitations. e study advocates a shift from the uncritical expansion

of admissible evidence toward a standard of justied fact-nding where factual conclusions are

rationally and legally grounded within a procedurally legitimate framework. Ultimately, the papers

calls for a reorientation of evidentiary theory that integrates epistemic justication with the institu-

tional design, ensuring both fairness and the responsible approximation of truth in criminal trials.

KEYWORDS: free evaluation of evidence; admission of evidence; Judicial epistemology; justication

of the fact-nding; rules of evidentiary evaluation and judgment rules; exclusionary rules.

SUMMARY: 1. INTRODUCTION.— 2. THE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS AND EVOLU-

TION OF EVIDENTIARY RULES.— 3. BEYOND RATIONAL OPTIMISM: COMPETING

158 EUNSEOL LEE

Quaestio facti. Revista Internacional sobre Razonamiento Probatorio / International Journal on Evidential Legal Reasoning

Año 2025 10 pp. 157-185 DOI: 10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i10.23152

CONCEPTIONS OF TRUTH IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY: 3.1. Bentham’s Reform: Ra-

tional Evaluation as a Substitute for Certainty; 3.2. Laudan’s error-reduction pragmatism and the

problem of justication; 3.3. Damaška’s institutional epistemology as a response to both; 3.4.

Comparative synthesis: from truth-seeking to justication-seeking; 3.4. Comparative synthesis:

from truth-seeking to justication-seeking.— 4. THE DUAL AIMS OF LEGAL EPISTEMOLO-

GY: FROM TRUTH TO JUSTIFICATION: 4.1. Truth and the Ideal of Free Proof; 4.2. Strict

rules of evidence: a non-determining factor in fact-nding.— 5. FURTHER DIRECTIONS:

FROM INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY TO INTERSUBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION: 5.1.

From Objective to Intersubjective Propositional Justication; 5.2. Explanatory Coherence and

the Discursive Norm of Assertion; 5.3. Conclusion: Intersubjectivity as an Epistemic and Civic

Norm.— 6. CONCLUSION.— REFERENCES

1. INTRODUCTION

e pursuit of truth is widely acknowledged as a central aim of criminal adjudi-

cation. Among the mechanisms that serve this objective, the principle of free proof,

allowing fact-nders to consider nearly all relevant and lawfully obtained evidence,

has gained renewed attention, particularly in inquisitorial systems where judges play

a central role in evaluating evidence. In contrast, the principle of regulated proof,

which restricts admissibility to protect procedural fairness and prevent bias, reects

a more cautious understanding of rational adjudication. e tension between these

two models encapsulates a broader philosophical question: whether truth is better

pursued through freedom or through regulation.

is paper revisits the principle of free proof, exclusionary rules, and evidentiary

admissibility through the perspectives of Jeremy Bentham, Larry Laudan, and Mir-

jan Damaška. Bentham, the philosophical founder of free proof, maintained that

broad evidentiary inclusion maximizes rational inquiry and aligns adjudication with

the discovery of truth. Laudan, a contemporary epistemologist, reformulates this

pursuit as an institutional problem of minimizing errors, seeking to design procedu-

ral systems that optimally balance wrongful conviction and acquittal. Damaška, in

turn, highlights the structural, psychological and epistemological limits that shape

how truth is constructed and interpreted within adjudicative institutions.

Despite their shared commitment to truth, a central question remains unresol-

ved: does admitting more evidence necessarily bring us closer to it? Comparative

analysis suggests that while the principle of free proof broadens the evidentiary lands-

cape, it does not, by itself, ensure epistemic accuracy or procedural legitimacy. Even

in systems where all evidence is freely considered, truth may be reached only by

chance or distorted through epistemic and institutional constraints. e problem,

therefore, lies not merely in what evidence is admitted, but in how factual conclu-

sions are justied.

Accordingly, this paper argues that the debate on the law of evidence must move

beyond the question of admissibility toward a more fundamental inquiry into the