The Merkel years: for the first time, the Chancellor's leadership is in serious question.
Author | Engelen, Klaus C. |
At the end of October, as almost ten thousand refugees each day were crossing the Austrian border into Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel informed her European counterparts that her country this year will have to cope with a million refugees.
This brought back memories of what happened to Merkel's predecessor, Gerhard Schroder, after he put forward his bold Agenda 2010 reforms. Some in Germany's political and media establishment point out that by insisting on far-reaching economic and social reforms, the former Social Democratic Party chancellor lost a large portion of SPD voters and eventually his chancellorship. Will something similar happen to Merkel and her open-border agenda because her voters revolt against the flood of refugees? There is a big difference, some argue sarcastically, because unlike Schroder and his reform agenda, "Merkel doesn't have a plan."
The Financial Times has already run the headlines, "The end of the Merkel era is within sight" and "Merkel opens door to her opponents," arguing: "The chancellor surprised the EU with her 'Welcome Syrians' approach to the migration crisis. But with dissent rising among her backers and voter support shrinking, is she sowing the seeds of her own political demise?"
Let's recall events. On March 14, 2003, Schroder, leading the coalition government of the SPD and the Greens, gave a speech in the German Bundestag outlining far-reaching reforms such as cuts in social security and unemployment payments. That upset his voters and caused an uproar among Germany's trade unions who had fought to put him in power. Schroder's reform agenda also included a radical reform of the welfare system (Hartz IV) a year later. Millions of workers who retired early in the major company restructuring lost their expected higher unemployment support, and instead had to line up with those who had never worked to get basic welfare payments. Most of these SPD members never again voted for the SPD.
As The Economist observed at the time, "The leader of the opposition, a little-known physicist from east Germany called Angela Merkel, derided [the reforms] as unambitious. But it soon became clear that the agenda would transform Germany's labor market." These reforms also brought about a major reduction in unemployment and made the German economy much more competitive.
WHAT A DIFFERENCE A DAY MAKES
Only a few months ago, Merkel, 62, could claim the undisputed title of Europe's dominant political figure. She had an important role in negotiating the Minsk deal to defuse the disastrous military conflict in the Ukraine after President Vladimir Putin's Russia annexed the Crimea in a blunt disregard of international treaties. As central player in months of turbulent negotiations with highly indebted Greece, she had succeeded in keeping the euro monetary union together and avoiding a risky Greek "exit" by supporting a third 86 [euro] billion rescue operation. Having been re-elected twice as Germany's leader and playing a key role not only in Europe but also in the G-7 and G-20, she was considered one of the most influential world leaders.
As a pragmatic, cautious, middle-of-the-road decision maker, she made sure to stay at the top in three coalition governments by adopting essential parts of her partners' agendas or by adjusting to shifting trends. For example, after battling the introduction of a minimum wage for years, she now heads a coalition with the SPD that enacted a minimum wage law. Some CDU/CSU party members are alarmed that she is "social democratizing" her conservative political base.
Merkel's prospects for a fourth term in 2017 looked bright until recently. There was talk of "Merkel forever." The chances for the SPD rival, Vice Chancellor and SPD party leader Sigmar Gabriel, by contrast looked so bleak that Torsten Albig, the SPD state governor of Schleswig-Holstein, stunned the political scene when he suggested: "His party might be better off campaigning in 2017 to remain Merkel's junior partner rather than to replace her since Merkel is doing an excellent job."
All may have changed on September 4, 2015, when Merkel--apparently following her humanitarian impulses--gave the signal to open the borders for Syrian and other asylum seekers that were massing on the way from Austria to the German entry points. After telephone calls with Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann on "the present emergency situation on the Hungarian border," Merkel made the historic decision that thousands of migrants traveling by bus, train, or foot across Austria could continue their journey into Germany. Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz warned that "the migrants' plight and the growing human cost was a 'wake-up call' for Europe to resolve its biggest refugee crisis since World War II." But soon the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel would publish the headline: "Mother Angela: Merkel's Refugee Policy Divides Europe."
Merkel had indeed made a momentous decision with enormous collateral damage. Her move affected not only Germany but all twenty-eight member states of the European Union with their 509 million citizens, since people can travel freely within the European Union. She made this decision without consulting her political allies and coalition partners. She did not even get a green light from Horst Seehofer, leader of the strongly conservative Christian Social Union, who governs the state of Bavaria that is bearing the brunt of the migration inflow.
Even worse, she did not consult with the European authorities. They act as guardians of the Schengen Agreement, watching over the borderless Schengen area and the Dublin III Regulation that determines the responsibility of EU members to examine the applications of asylum seekers asking for international protection under the Geneva Convention and the EU Qualification Directive. Changing the EU asylum policy to an open-border policy without Brussels' backing was a strategic blunder. Berlin's unilateral action has now been used by other European governments as an excuse to stay on the sidelines and to oppose the Brussels plans to distribute the refugee masses within the European Union, especially out of border countries such as Greece and Italy and into other EU members with small refugee numbers.
Merkel's bold decision came after her Berlin government for years practiced a policy of "benign neglect," sticking to EU immigration policies that exposed border countries such as Italy and Greece where the refugees landed from sea and--under Dublin III rules--had to be registered at these external EU border points. Merkel as head of a coalition government not only cut the financing of Operation Mare Nostrum--the Italian-led marine rescue program that after...
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