The history and potential future of the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict.

• Author: Silverbrand, Ian J.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT WATER REGIMES III. THE RELEVANT WATER FRAMEWORKS A. Major Negotiations, Agreements, and Plans that Affect the Israeli-Palestinian Water Allocation 1. The United Nations and Tennessee Valley Authority Plan, the Arab Technical Plan and the Cotton Plan 2. Johnston's Unified Water Plan 3. The Declaration of Principles 4. Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 5. The Interim Agreement B. Domestic Water Laws C. Traditional Religious Frameworks IV. ELEMENTS OF THE REGION'S WATER PROBLEM AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE A. Fixed Elements of the Region's Water Problem B. Structural Flaws with the Current Resolution of the Resolution of the Water Dilemma C. Potential Solutions to these Problems V. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION

Security and sovereignty typically frame any substantive discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, one dimension of the conflict, the allocation of certain shared natural resources, could be peacefully and expediently resolved without resolution of the larger conflict. (1) Important freshwater resources, the Jordan River basin and certain aquifers, traverse Israel and the Palestinian territories. Israelis and Palestinians alike are overly dependent upon these sources. This dependence has contributed to an ecological catastrophe. (2) More than a decade ago, the Jordan River basin annually discharged 1.1 billion cubic meters of water. (3) Today the basin's natural discharge is significantly less. (4) Additionally, the West Bank Aquifer, which has a sustainable natural yield of approximately 300 million cubic meters ("MCM") of water annually, is being overdrawn by approximately twenty-five percent annually. (5) The Aquifer's natural yield will consequently decline. Because of this consistent over-consumption, (6) Israel faces an annual shortage of 475 MCM of water and the Palestinian territories face an annual deficit of 35 MCM. (7)

Since the Jordan River basin and the West Bank Aquifer are two of the few and most relied upon freshwater resources accessible to the Israelis and Palestinians, (8) the annual per capita water consumption in the region is low relative to that of other countries. (9) Israel is afforded only 350 cubic meters of water per year per capita, (10) and the Palestinian territories are afforded less than 250 cubic meters of water per year per capita. (11) The disparity in water allotments is at least in part a consequence of Palestinian economic underdevelopment and projections should assume that Palestinian water usage will increase.

Those figures suggest that given the region's significant dependence upon these resources and the inevitable increases in population and economic development, the potential for a catastrophic humanitarian disaster, beyond the violence that has marred the region for centuries, is great. (12) Limiting the extent of ecological devastation that has already resulted from the prolonged abuse of the freshwater resources should be reason enough to resolve the dispute. However, no such resolution has been made. Instead, decades of negotiations and agreements have produced little more than impotent legal infrastructure, ecological devastation, and continued accusations of discrimination.

This Article will consider how the problems of Israeli-Palestinian water resource management are the result of an iterative, protracted negotiating process. Among other factors, this process is hindered by the shortcomings of the domestic water regimes. In Part II, this Article will analyze the problems that have arisen under the current water regimes. This analysis will demonstrate that the current water regimes have not reached a comprehensive, ecologically viable solution. In Part III, this Article will analyze the background of the Israeli-Palestinian water problem. This part will describe some of the existing hydrological legal frameworks. Part IV will identify potential solutions that would change some of the structural and resource elements of the quandary. Part V provides a conclusion.

2. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT WATER REGIMES

   The geography of the relevant water resources is particularly complex. The Jordan River, which forms the eastern border of the West Bank, is formed by four principal tributaries: the Hasbani of Lebanon, the Dan of Israel, the Banias of Syria, and the Yarmuk. The Yarmuk originates in Syria, forms the boundary between Syria and Jordan, and later establishes the border between Jordan and Israel before flowing into the Lower Jordan. The Jordan River consists of the Upper and Lower Jordan. The Upper Jordan flows into Lake Tiberias, which flows into the Lower Jordan, which in turn discharges into the Dead Sea. (13) The West Bank Aquifer, providing approximately one-third of the water that Israel consumes, underlies the West Bank and Israel and is recharged by rainfall. The aquifer largely draws its water from the hills of the West Bank. (14)

   The geographic complexity and the Israeli and Palestinian water regimes that govern many of the resources' allocation have created a myriad of problems that heavily impacts the condition of the Jordan River watershed, the West Bank Aquifer, and the economies of Israel and the Palestinian territories. The dominant cause of these problems has been overconsumption of the region's water resources. Particularly, Israel has been consuming its natural water resources at fifteen percent above the resources' natural replenishment rate. (15) Such overconsumption has significant deleterious effects upon the shared resources. (16)

   The present consumption of the area's freshwater resources has caused a problematic decline in available quantity. (17) As it is, the region has had difficulty with increasing demand for this limited resource. For example, Israel is coping with a shortage of 475 MCM of water annually and the Palestinian territories are struggling with a shortage of 35 MCM of water annually. (18) These shortages have worsened during the current conflict, in part due to increased security measures like the construction of the Security Fence. (19)

   Continued decline in quantity will contribute to a more dramatic failure with severe humanitarian repercussions. (20) Studies have concluded that the overexploitation of water resources has caused a decline in water quality. (21) This overexploitation has harmed water quality, in particular, within the Palestinian territories since, as the lower riparian, water resources are more significantly affected by upper riparians. (23) In particular, as the riparians pump from the aquifers at a rate exceeding the natural replenishment rate, the underground water table falls lower and "the dividing boundary between fresh and sea water rises higher, causing salinization." (24) Dan Zaslavski, a former Israeli Water Commissioner, has estimated that "60% of the water in the coastal aquifer is unpotable because of the high level of nitrates, industrial chemicals are polluting other aquifers, and pollution is generally so serious that chances of stopping it are doubtful." (25) Similar consumptive behavior has also contaminated the Jordan River watershed with chemical and biological pollutants. (26)

   Because the shared water resources are a source of the region's drinking water, (27) any associated decline in quality has an effect upon the health of the water's drinkers. (28) This association has already been evidenced with a recent study speculating that the quality of drinking water has been an underlying cause for the high incidence of diarrhea in Palestinian children. (29) A different study found that in one Palestinian community, sixty-one percent of Palestinian children were infected with intestinal parasites. (30) To combat these problems, Israel has shut down numerous wells because "they contain too much salt, nitrates from fertilizers, and heavy metals from sludge." (31)

   Overconsumption of Jordan River watershed resources has caused drastic degradation of the Dead Sea, the Jordan River's terminus. (32) More specifically, the water level and volume of the Dead Sea have both dramatically decreased. (33) In recent years, the water level of the Dead Sea has declined between eighty and a hundred centimeters per year. This decline has consequently resulted in the Dead Sea's surface area shrinking by nearly thirty percent and the length of the Dead Sea shrinking more than 20 kilometers between 1984 and 2004. (34) The cause of the decline is easily deduced. In addition to a decline in freshwater input into the Dead Sea due to "decreasing discharge from the River Jordan, increasing water use from natural springs and side wadis, and extensive use of aquifers that provide secondary water input ... [,] more than 200 MCM/yr of water are pumped out of the Dead Sea into evaporation ponds in the shallow southern basin." (35) That is, the Dead Sea's degradation can be linked to the increased consumption of the Sea's water sources and water from the Dead Sea itself.

   The degradation of the Dead Sea produces derivative problems. Besides the environmental repercussions of corrupting one of the world's natural treasures, the destruction of the Dead Sea can significantly affect economic development of the adjacent region. (36) The Dead Sea region is a vibrant area of tourism replete with vacation spas and hotels. However, if the Dead Sea continues to diminish in size, it is possible that the future of the Dead Sea tourist industry, upon which Israel, the Palestinian territories, and Jordan heavily rely, can be significantly harmed, thereby injuring the region's economies. (37) This potential injury could be avoided if addressed by all of the Dead Sea's riparians--Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories--in a cooperative setting. (38)

   The present condition of the region's water resources has affected the economic condition of Israel and the Palestinian territories in other, more definite ways. Astutely, Chaim Weizmann...