The global land rush: markets, rights, and the politics of food.

• Author: Narula, Smita
• Position: Introduction to III. Assessing the Frameworks: Principal Distinctions and Overlapping Problems A. Principal Distinctions: Rights, Risks, and Land Distribution 1. Risks vs. Rights Violations b. Repudiating Rights Violations and Managing Trade-offs, p. 101-138

In the past five years, interest in purchasing and leasing agricultural land in developing countries has skyrocketed. This trend, which was facilitated by the 2008 food crisis, is led by state and private investors, both domestic and foreign. Investors are responding to a variety of global forces: Some are securing their own food supply, while others are capitalizing on land as an increasingly promising source of financial returns. Proponents argue that these investments can support economic development in host states while boosting global food roduction. But critics charge that these "land grabs" disregard land users' rights and further marginalize already vulnerable groups." small-scale farmers, pastoralists, and indigenous peoples who are being displaced from their land and from resources essential to their survival. Amid mounting global protests, two dominant frameworks have emerged to assess and contest the global rush for agricultural land. This Article critically examines both approaches.

Part I provides an overview of the drivers and impacts of large-scale land transfers and the problematic land transactions involved. Part II sets out the contours of what I term the market-plus approach and the rights based approach--the frameworks assumed respectively by proponents and opponents of these deals. Part III analyzes key conceptual differences in each framework's approach to rights and risks and to land distribution. I argue that the market-plus approach tolerates and facilitates rights violations, whereas the rights-based approach sets a normative baseline that repudiates these impacts and addresses key distributive concerns. Part III assesses the potential of each approach to effectively regulate land deals in practice. I find that both approaches emphasize procedural safeguards to protect land users' rights and argue that these safeguards" are ineffective at contesting the power dynamics at play in land transactions. Part IV proposes concrete reforms to help empower communities most affected by land deals and argues that international actors must be more involved in securing rights protections.

INTRODUCTION I. LARGE-SCALE LAND TRANSFERS: DRIVERS, TRANSACTIONS, AND IMPACTS A. Drivers and Actors Behind Large-Scale Land Transfers B. Land Transfers and Transactions: Documented Problems C. Negative Impacts on Host Communities II. CONTESTING THE GLOBAL LAND RUSH: MARKET VS. RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES A. The Market-Plus Approach 1. The Market-Plus Approach to Land: Land as a Commodity 2. "Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources" B. The Rights-Based Approach 1. The Rights-Based Approach to Land: Land as a Gateway to Human Rights 2. "Eleven Principles: Minimum Human Rights Principles Applicable to Large-scale Land Acquisitions or Leases" III. ASSESSING THE FRAMEWORKS: PRINCIPAL DISTINCTIONS AND OVERLAPPING PROBLEMS A. Principal Distinctions: Rights, Risks, and Land Distribution 1. Risks vs. Rights Violations a. Framing and its Consequences b. Repudiating Rights Violations and Managing Trade-Offs c. Addressing Distributive Concerns and Managing Conflicts Between Rights Holders 2. Land Markets and Land Distribution a. The Market-Plus Approach: Enhancing Productivity or Exacerbating Problems? b. The Rights-Based Approach: Making the Case for Agrarian Reforms B. Overlapping Problems: The Limitations of Procedural Safeguards 1. The RAI Principles: A Misplaced Focus on Procedural Fairness 2. The Eleven Principles: Procedural Means for Substantive Ends 3. A Critical Challenge: Generating Political Will IV. EMPOWERING AFFECTED COMMUNITIES A. Resistance Strategies and the Need for Structural Support B. Restricting and Regulating Large-Scale Land Transfers C. Reforming our Approach to Land: A Framework for the Future CONCLUSION INTRODUCTION

In 2011, Saudi Star PLC leased roughly 25,000 acres of Ethiopia's most fertile farmland from the Ethiopian government to produce rice for export to the Middle East. (1) The investment sought to capitalize on Saudi Arabian state subsidies for the foreign production of staple crops, which is part of the country's strategy for ensuring its own food security. (2) The Ethiopian government signed the Saudi Star contract, and others like it, seeking to revolutionize domestic agricultural production, employ local farmers, and produce more food for local consumption. (3) Ethiopian officials claim that land earmarked for agricultural development is "unused" or "under-utilized," and that no communities have been displaced as part of the land deals. (4) But investigations reveal that the Ethiopian government has actively worked to remove communities from land that is earmarked for commercial agricultural development. According to a report by the Oakland Institute:

Prior to relocation, no community consultation was carried out, either by Saudi Star or the government. Villagers only knew that their land had been given to investors once the bulldozers began clearing the area. When they expressed concern to the government about the clearing of their ancestral lands, government officials reportedly replied, 'You don't have any land, only government has land.' (5) Since 2008, the Ethiopian government has leased out at least 8.9 million acres of land to foreign and domestic investors through arrangements like the Saudi Star contract. At this writing, another 5.2 million acres were on offer through the Ethiopian government's land bank for agricultural investment. (6) In some regions, the government planned to relocate 1.5 million people by 2013. (7) The relocation program, or "villagization process" in Ethiopia's Gambella region--the site of the Saudi Star investment--has been particularly devastating for indigenous communities cut off from sources of food, water, healthcare, and education. (8) Many of these relocations have been forced and have taken place without meaningful consultation or compensationf. (9) The Ethiopian government has reportedly threatened, assaulted, or detained those resisting the relocation process. (10) As of January 2012, government security forces enforcing the relocations were implicated in at least twenty incidents of rape. (11)

The Gambella regional government promised basic resources and infrastructure in the new villages to which communities have been relocated, but investigations reveal "inadequate food, agricultural support, and health and education facilities." (12) The jobs created will likely not compensate for the number of people displaced, (13) and water diverted from local farming and fishing to rice production may force locals to compete for water in addition to land. (14) These relocations also threaten many indigenous communities' way of life. (15) For example, the indigenous Anuak community practices a shifting form of cultivation that is at odds with the sedentary nature of the relocation villages. Similarly, the pastoralist Nuer community must now "abandon [its] cattle-based livelihood[] in favor of settled cultivation." (16)

These troubling developments threaten to destroy livelihoods and exacerbate widespread hunger and malnutrition in a country that is already well known for its cyclical famines. (17) The lack of farms or food in relocation sites has led one individual to comment: "Now we're living like refugees in our own country." (18) Another displaced individual poignantly lamented: "The government is killipg our people through starvation and hunger ... we are just waiting here for dea" 1." (19) Because indigenous communities in Gambella lack formal title to the land they have traditionally occupied, (20) they have no redress in the form of expropriation or compensation procedures under Ethiopian law, (21) despite the Ethiopian Constitution's strong recognition of customary rights of land tenure. (22) The Ethiopian government's claim that these lands are uninhabited or underutilized also thwarts the potential for constitutional and legislative protections. (23)

Investors have expressed little concern for the rights of host (24) and have instead praised Ethiopia for its low labor costs, tax and duty exemptions, relaxed regulations, and abundant amounts of "undeveloped" land. (25) For its part, the Saudi Star is hoping to expand its investment to 500,000 acres within the next ten years. (26) The going rate for this land is approximately $4 per acre per year. (27)

The Ethiopian experience is not singular. (28) In the past five years, interest in purchasing and leasing agricultural land in developing countries has skyrocketed. (29) The commodification of foreign land is admittedly nothing new, but the scale and intensity with which recent investments have proceeded is startling. (30) Reliable measurements are difficult to obtain, and even figures derived from incountry empirical research may underestimate the scale of investments because of constrained access to data or the exclusion of deals that are still under negotiation. (31)

All sources agree, however, that the amount of land being targeted for purchase or lease is dramatic. According to the World Bank Group, (32) foreign investors targeted more than 56 million hectares (138 million acres) of agricultural land between 2008 and 2009. (33) More than 75% of these deals took place in Sub-Saharan Africa. (34) Another study notes that close to 60 million hectares (148 million acres) of land were acquired in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2009 alone (35)--an area the size of Germany and the United Kingdom combined. (36)

This trend, which was facilitated by the 2008 food and financial crises, is being led by state and private investors, both domestic and foreign. (37) In some cases, investments are to produce food for export, while other investments are to produce biofuels or to benefit from carbon emissions credits for clean development mechanism projects. In still other cases, entities invest for purely speculative reasons. (38) The World Bank...