The European Union and the Egyptian Neighbour: Assessing the Characterization of Resilience as an External Action Priority
| Author | Javier Bordón |
| Position | Research Assistant Trainee (Asyudante de Investigación en Prácticas) at King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies (KSA) and Master's in Geopolitics and Strategic Studies at University Carlos III of Madrid (Spain). ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3522-7833>. |
| Pages | 323-348 |
PAIX ET SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALES
Journal of International Law and International Relations
Num 7, janvier-décembre 2019 | ISSN 2341-0868
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2019.i7.11
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 7, janvier-décembre 2019, pp. 323-348
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2019.i7.11
Citation: BORDÓN, J., «The European Union and the Egyptian Neighbour : assessing the characterization of
resilience as an external action priority», Paix et Sécurité Internationales, num. 7, 201 9, pp. 323-348
Received: 26 July 2019
Accepted: 08 September 2019
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EGYPTIAN NEIGHBOUR:
ASSESSING THE CHARACTERIZATION OF RESILIENCE AS AN
EXTERNAL ACTION PRIORITY
Javier BORDÓN1
I- INTRODUCTION. II- METHODOLOGY. III- LITER ATURE REV IEW.
IV-RESULTS OF THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: RESILIENCE IN THE
ACTION PROGRAMMES. V- A BROADER VIEW: BILATERAL ARMS SALES
AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY FACILITY. VI- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EU
RESILIENCE STRATEGY. VII-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES.
ABSTRACT: The concept of resilience acquired academic momentum and pervaded a growing
number of crosscutting disciplines along the second half of the twentieth century. Drawing on its
epistemological fl exibility, its implicit redefi nition of agency and the inclusion of the parameters of
uncertainty and the inevitability of crisis in its very core, it did not take long until the fi elds of Inter-
national Relations and foreign policy-making paid thorough attention to its potential outreach and
operationalization. Nor it is surprising that the European Union, imbued in a comprehensive review
of its external strategy’s fl aws and shortages, embraced the term as a means to underpin the para-
digmatic bridge laid by the guidance of principled pragmatism. Yet, resilience-fostering can point at
states or societies, and the authoritarian nature of Egypt’s regime compels to prioritize the latter, in
accordance to EU’s democratic stance. The current paper will o er a brief review of EU foreign-po-
licy approaches vis-à-vis Egypt, an European Neighbourhood Policy/Instrument walkthrough and it
will aim at putting in quantitative terms what kind of resilience is the Union placing at the forefront.
To conclude, a series of recommendations will be formulated for EU resilience strategy.
KEYWORDS: state/societal resilience, ENP, MENA, stability-democracy dilemma,
authoritarianism, civil society, policy outputs, Annual Action Programmes.
LA UNIÓN EUROPEA Y EL VECINO EGIPCIO: EVALUANDO LA CARACTERIZACIÓN
DE LA RESILIENCIA COMO PRIORIDAD DE ACCIÓN EXTERIOR
RESUMEN: El concepto de resiliencia captó el interés de la academia y penetró en un número
progresivo y transversal de disciplinas a lo largo de la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Apoyándose
sobre la fl exibilidad epistemológica, la redefi nición implícita de la agencia y la inclusión de los
parámetros de incertidumbre e inevitabilidad de la crisis en su seno, las áreas de Relaciones Inter-
1 Research Assistant Trainee (Asyudante de Investigación en Prácticas) at King Faisal Center
for Research and Islamic Studies (KSA) and Master’s in Geopolitics and Strategic Studies at
University Carlos III of Madrid (Spain). ORCID ID:
7833>.
The European Union and the Egyptian Neighbour: assessing the characterization of resilience as an external action
priority
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 7, janvier-décembre 2019, pp. 323-348
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2019.i7.11
nacionales y diseño de política exterior no tardaron en posar su atención sobre su alcance y opera-
cionalización. Tampoco es de extrañar que la Unión Europea, imbuida en una revisión integral de
los defectos y carestías de su estrategia exterior, acogiera el término con afán de apuntalar el puente
paradigmático que tiende el llamado pragmatismo con principios. Ahora bien, la promoción de la
resiliencia puede apuntar a los estados o a las sociedades, y en este sentido, de acuerdo con la lógica
pro-democrática de la UE, la naturaleza autoritaria del régimen de Egipto exigiría una priorización
de aquella segunda dimensión. Este artículo pretende ofrecer un repaso ligero de los enfoques de
política exterior de la Unión vis-à-vis Egipto, una guía a lo largo de la Política (o Instrumento)
Europea de Vecindad, y procurará resolver en términos cuantitativos qué tipo de resiliencia sitúa la
Unión en primera línea. A modo de conclusión, se ordenará una serie de recomendaciones para la
estrategia de resiliencia de la UE.
PALABRAS CLAVE: resiliencia estatal/social, PEV, MENA, dilema estabilidad-democracia, au-
toritarismo, sociedad civil, productos de política, Programas de Acción Anual.
L’UNION EUROPÉENNE ET LE VOISIN ÉGYPTIEN: ÉVALUER LA
CARACTÉRISATION DE LA RÉSILIENCE EN TANT QUE PRIORITÉ DE L’ACTION
EXTÉRIEURE
RESUME: Le concept de résilience a acquis une dynamique académique et a imprégné un nom-
bre de disciplines transversales le long de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle. S’appuyant sur son la
fl exibilité épistémologique, sa redéfi nition implicite d’agence et l’inclusion des paramètres de l’in-
certitude et l’inévitabilité de la crise, les domaines des Relations Internationales et de la politique
étrangère n’ont pas tardé à se concentrer sur son champ d’application et son opérationnalisation. Il
n’est pas surprenant non plus que l’Union européenne, chargée d’un examen approfondi des défauts
et des carences de sa stratégie étrangère, ait adopté ce terme dans le but de soutenir le pont paradig-
matique que l’on appelle généralement pragmatisme avec principes. Pourtant, le renforcement de
la résilience peut pointer vers des États ou des sociétés, et la nature autoritaire du régime égyptien
oblige à donner la priorité à ces derniers, conformément à la position démocratique de l’UE.
Le présent document proposera un aperçu des approches dynamiques vis-à-vis de l’Égypte, une
procédure pas à pas pour la politique européenne de voisinage et visera à mettre en termes quantita-
tifs le type de résilience que l’Union place au premier plan. Pour conclure, une série de recomman-
dations sera formulée pour la stratégie de résilience de l’UE.
MOTS-CLES: résilience étatique/sociale, PEV, MENA, dilemme stabilité-démocratie, autoritaris-
me, societé civile, résultats politiques, Programmes d’Action Annuels.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), signed by the High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and drafted by her
close advisor Nathalie Tocci, seated the strategic priority of resilience at the
core of EU foreign policy, notwithstanding it had already been introduced as
a purposeful tenet in the 2015 Reviewed European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP). Feeding on its fi rst steps within psychology studies and its later
transposition to the fi eld of environmental policy, an overarching defi nition
of resilience must comprise the basic elements introduced by Haris ,
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who deems resilience as “the capacity and ability of organizational systems
to recover from shocks and disasters and to continue to thrive during and
after disasters”2. The term ‘disaster’ can be easily replaced by that of ‘crisis’,
leading to the EUGS’ formula: “the ability of states and societies to reform,
thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises”3.
On one hand, this conceptualization falls in line with the challenging equi-
librium between the reminder that stability is no substitute for sustainability
–what EU circles could label, among different aspects, as ‘good governance’,
or plain democracy- and the need to avoid preaching4, that is to say, while ac-
knowledging the limits to EU policies on the ground. On the other, it poses a
clear distinction, although not always readily applicable to the highly complex
realities of MENA, between those potential recipients of the resilience-dri-
ven efforts: states and societies. And in a rhetorically subtle, yet informative
way, the EUGS delineates where the ideal preference lies. Almost invariably at
the centre of the community’s system of beliefs, whose relevance also derives
from they being policy drivers and sources of credibility, authoritarian states
are considered inherently fragile in the long term, while they can boost their
resilience “when societies feel they are becoming better off and have hope
in the future”5. Adding the assumption that major improvements demand
a home-grown character to the resilience vocabulary, non-state actors or civil
society would come to represent the preferential targets when addressing its
neighbourhood.
Under this logic, democratic environments are better suited for absorbing
the negative effects of a shocking event, hence authoritarian states, apart
from being unstable and threatening long-term security, are less accountable
in the advancement of human rights and democratisation, thus represent an
obstacle to EU resilience by themselves. Andrea Dessì attempts to clarify
EUGS provisions and supply with strategic guidance by concluding that ‘au-
2 , H., “Ethics of Resiliency in Crisis Management”, In A. (ed.), Global
Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy and Governance, Springer International Publi-
shing, 2018, pp. 1.
3 , Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the
EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, 2016, p.23.
4 , N., Framing the EU Global Strategy. Rome, Italy: Springer International Publishing,
2017.
5, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe... cit., p. 25.
The European Union and the Egyptian Neighbour: assessing the characterization of resilience as an external action
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2019.i7.11
thoritarian resilience’, despite embodying the customary practice, would be a
backlash for EU interests, therefore “greater resources and focus should be
placed on the societal dimension”6.
The present research paper will try to answer, fi nding the channel for the
bulk of the relations between the EU as a whole and Egypt in the European
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), the question of: what kind of resilience
is the EU prioritising vis-à-vis Egypt? State or society resilience?. In doing so,
the author will frame his assessment in order to verify whether the European
Union is prioritizing a state-resilience approach vis-à-vis Egypt, thus beco-
ming our hypothetical statement.
II. METHODOLOGY
This case study will focus on the main instrument the European Union
has for accomplishing its foreign policy objectives regarding Egypt, which,
without undermining its own casuistry, depicts an exemplary partner for
analysing and weighing the set of understandings and tools and their un-
derlying concerns that we may fi nd within the context of the so called Sou-
thern Neighbourhood, the territorial demarcation giving content to the EU’s
strategy towards the Middle East and North Africa. The time frame for the
research will encompass the EU-Egypt Annual Action Programmes under
the ENP since 2014, once Abdelfatah Al Sisi formally becomes President
of the Republic and the political scene in Egypt enters a process of stabi-
lisation, until the last Multiannual Programme that is expected to stretch its
components until 2020. Through empirical research, and following OECD’s
recommendation to ensure the quantitative nature7 when building policy ou-
tput indicators, this paper will itemise the fi nancial allocations for the array of
projects within those programmes, classify the monetary units by the criteria
of what kind of resilience are they attempting to target and conclude where
the priority in EU decision-making lies.
6 , A., “Crisis and Breakdown: How Can the EU Foster Resilience in the Middle East
and North Africa?”, IAI Working Papers, nº 17, 2017, p.16. Retrieved from:
it/sites/default/fi les/iaiwp1737.pdf>.
7 OECD., Slovak Republic: Better Coordination for Better Policies, Services and Results. Paris, France:
OECD Publishing, 2015.
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Together with legal documents portraying their bilateral cooperation, EU
offi cial websites content and EU institutions’ releases, media documents, re-
ports by experts and various types of academic works will provide the sour-
ces for conducting the current research. The fi rst section, covering the li-
terature review, will be divided in a number of subsections dealing briefl y
with the concept of resilience and its state and societal dimensions at the
EU level; the evolution and main aspects of the ENP and ENI, particularly
in their form in regards to Egypt; and the salient foreign policy approach to
this country materialising the fault line between Maghreb and Mashreq, also
paying attention to very specifi c issues at the domestic level that might help
to explain EU behavioural patterns. Then the second section will offer the
quantitative analysis of policy outputs around state and society resilience,
observing and categorising amounts, stakeholders and recipients. In order
to stress the potential discordances between rhetoric and practice, a short
third section will comment upon two different mechanisms out of the Action
Programmes that have the potential to foster respective kinds of resilience:
Member States’ arms sales to Egypt and the EC Civil Society Facility. Lastly,
a series of recommendations for EU resilience strategy will be put in place.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
1. RESILIENCE IN THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL STRATEGY
The European Union strategic tenets and premises face a ream of poten-
tial and serious contradictions that, while offering a necessary dose of ambi-
guity for a wider room for manoeuvre, poses some diffi culty in foreign policy
design. For instance, it is asserted that “our enduring power of attraction can
spur transformation in these countries”8, however, it is equally accepted that
can only happen with those countries wishing to develop stronger relations
with the EU. Here, the notion of principled pragmatism fi nds its adequate
fi t, stemming from “a realistic assessment of the strategic environment as
from an idealistic aspiration to advance to a better world”9. In this sense, the
components of the concept of resilience become the bridge for both pur-
8 , Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe... cit., p. 9.
9 Ibid, p. 16.
The European Union and the Egyptian Neighbour: assessing the characterization of resilience as an external action
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poses, being “an ingredient for stability, good governance and prosperity”10,
although dropping the emphasis on democratisation of the neighbourhood11.
The assiduously mentioned key principles for the unifi ed foreign poli-
cy –differentiated approach, fl exibility, tailor-made policies, endorsement of
home-grown initiatives, greater local ownership– reverberate the perception
of an international stage, specifi cally in MENA, characterised by a growing
complexity, a rampant dynamism12, where the EU counts with diminishing
prospects for fulfi lling its will and sees itself surrounded by an arc of insta-
bility13. All those tenets can be integrated into the logic of resilience, whose
strength resides in its measured commitment and the acknowledgement of
the own weaknesses and the existence of other worldviews. In sum, a fresh
intake of realpolitik.
For its detractors, the novel concept implies “stability for authoritarian re-
gimes and supporting reforms in the countries the governments of which are
eager to accommodate them”14. For its advocates, it means drafting feasible
goals and choosing a non-linear, long-term path through which neighbouring
entities can build capacities for improvement and adaptation. The former
stance may miss that a resilience-driven foreign policy decision entails qualif-
ying “the resilience of whom (or what) and resilience to whom (or what)”15.
In other words, EU external action towards its southern partners will have to
deem the recipients’ state or –very often, and– societal character, “not only
to prevent EU policy from inadvertently strengthening ‘authoritarian resilien-
10 , A., “Crisis and Breakdown: How Can the EU... cit.”, p. 4.
11 , A., “The Resilience Paradigm in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the
European Neighbourhood and Democratization”, Around the Caspian, 2018. Retrieved from:
the-european-neighbourhood-and-democratisation/>.
12 , E. and , N., “Implications of the EU Global Strategy for the Middle
East and North Africa”, MENARA Future Notes, Nº1, 2016. Retrieved from:
iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/implications-eu-global-strategy-middle-east-and-north-africa>.
13 , N., “The European Union in a changing global environment: a more connected,
contested and complex world”, EEAS Working Paper, 2015.
14 , A., “The Resilience Paradigm in the 2016... cit.”
15 , S. and , V., “Introduction Framing Resilience: A New Pathway For
EU-MENA Relations”, In and V. (eds.), The EU, Resilience
and the MENA region, Brussels, Belgium: Foundation for European Progressive Studies and
Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2017, pp.11-28.
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ce’, [...] but also in order to ensure that its policies are based on the largest
possible pool of viewpoint and concerns”16, specially relevant in a region
where security and economic problems fi nd a great deal of association with
deep crises of governance and the dividing line between both targets of resi-
lience is often blurred. In addition, a source of containment for the Union’s
ambitions is to be found in the wariness these authoritarian regimes have in
relation to the European commitment to the promotion of values and third
actors and its indirect weakening effect upon the regimes’ survival, leading to
the rationale that, for the engagement to be somehow successful, its credibi-
lity as a reliable partner must remain rather intact.
Regarding state resilience, it will make reference to the capacity of the
state17, that is to say, virtually every policy targeting the governmental institu-
tions, administration, public fi rms and services. In contrast, society resilience
will cover non-state actors, encompassing civil society, “cultural organisations,
religious communities, social partners and human rights defenders”18, which
could be further developed into student organisations, women’s groups or
worker unions.
2. EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND INSTRUMENT
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), launched in 1995, opened
the window for the fi rst modest steps in the institutionalization of EU-Egypt
bilateral relations, as exemplifi ed by the 2001 Association Agreement, still
in effect. Yet, the scope for such a non-binding cooperation soon proved
insuffi cient in the light of rapidly mounting changes that urged the EU to
secure a broader leverage across the sea, and to the east to Central Asia: the
media-called ‘big bang’ enlargement abruptly moved the external borders,
posing emerging challenges amid potential instability spillovers and the uns-
teady dynamics stemming from fault lines separating political spaces vastly
differentiated in socioeconomic and security terms; the changing geostrategic
environment, namely the failure of the Middle East Peace Process, the ‘War
on Terror’ and U.S. invasions in the region19; and the disappointing outcomes
16 , A., “Crisis and Breakdown: How Can the EU... cit.”, p. 16.
17 , S. and , V., “Introduction Framing Resilience... cit.”
18 , Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe... cit., p. 27.
19 , Y., “The EU and the Middle East: The European Neighbourhood Policy”. In
Y. (ed.), Confl ict and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 2018, pp. 110-127, .
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of the EMP framework, which did not prevent from growing domestic isla-
mophobia and irregular migration.
For all the aforementioned, the year 2004 gave birth to the European
Neighbourhood Policy and, in 2007, the fi rst EU-Egypt Action Plan entered
into force, coinciding with the implementation of the European Neighbour-
hood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), “the main fi nancial instrument to
fund cooperation programmes with the Neighbourhood partner countries
(and committing) 1€ billion for the period 2007-2013”20 to Egypt. Four years
later, the Arab uprisings and the subsequent excessive optimism led to the
novelty of an incentive-based approach, the ‘more for more’ principle, “whereby
efforts by partner countries were to be rewarded with additional fi nancial and
other support”21. In Egypt’s case, the debate around the drivers plunging,
fi rst Hosni Mubarak’s ouster and later Muhammad Morsi’s in 2013, still dis-
cusses the triggering effect of regional mobilisation networks and the role
played by external sponsors as much as it cannot be fully grasped without
stressing internal developments in place. For some, popular discontent pri-
marily stemmed from a lack of social justice, economic opportunities and a
proper administration beyond coercive and extractive means. Mubarak’s regi-
me depicted a continuity with Perlmutter’s characterization of the ‘praetorian
state’22. Morsi’s last months were plagued with service shortages and upward
prices and unemployment, despite being democratically elected in rather free
polls and championing a reformist Islamist agenda that, in principle, might
be appealing for a conservative society like Egypt. Yet, critics in the opposi-
tion feared the President’s widening powers and, even if Islamization gathers
supporters, those aspirations do not systematically equate to the Muslim Bro-
therhood23. For others, the sudden opening of the political space reignited
the competition among visions over the nature and role of the state that can
be traced back to the irruption of modern governance and the abrogation of
20 , European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Egypt,
2018.
21 , European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 2016.
22 , A. “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of
Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities”, Comparative Politics, vol. 1 (3), 1969, pp. 382-
404.
23 , A. “Shari’a after Morsi: Egypt revolted against inept governance, not Islamic
supremacism”, National Review, vol.65(14), 2013..
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the Ottoman Caliphate. In Shadi Hamid’s understanding, liberalism is only
neutral for those who are already liberals24, and the fact is democracy would
not smoothly come hand-in-hand with the former. With lessening support
abroad and intensifying protests at home, the army’s coup d’état initiated a
process of stabilisation, crashing the dissidence and restructuration of the
state grip over the country. The European Union did not condemn the go-
vernment’s toppling, instead fi xed its position to the return to the democratic
process and the rejection of the use of violence25.
In sum, under the ‘more for more’ principle, turning out to be poorly refl ec-
ted upon, the top-down mentality and ‘one size fi ts all’ motto towards politi-
cal and economic reform did not manage to produce satisfactory results. The
unexpected demographic movements seeking asylum in Europe evidenced
the need for a new turn.
Learning from failure, a strategic shift calls for new labels. The 2015 Re-
viewed ENP and the ENI did not renounce to imbue a resemblance of the
traditional logic of appropriateness –“the idea of the ‘good life’ that is grounded
in the identity of a specifi c community”26–, sticking to the conceptualization
of the universal values as inherent EU interests, nonetheless, as explained
before, a logic of consequences –“deliberate consideration of alternatives,
assessment of their outcomes and preference-driven choices”27– consolida-
ted within the communitarian vocabulary. Stabilisation –suggesting state re-
silience- becomes the core driver. The joint priorities for cooperation under
ENP maintain the goal of good governance and human rights but it will be
framed by economic development and stabilisation, security and migration
and mobility28, the last two pointing at a heavy weight for governmental re-
silience, and only after conceiving a complementary role for civil society’s
24 , S., Islamic Exceptionalism: How the struggle over Islam is reshaping the world, St. Martin
Press, New York, 2016.
25 BBC, “World reaction to the ousting of Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi”, BBC News, July 4,
2013.
26 , H. and , K., Justifying EU foreign policy: the logics underpinning EU enlar-
gement. In B. and T. (eds.), Rethinking European Union foreign policy, pp.
126-142, 2004, p.127.
27 , M., “Logic of Consequences and Logic of Appropriateness”. In M. and
D. (eds.), Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, 2014, pp. 1-17, p.2.
28 , European Neighbourhood Policy: What is it?, 2016.
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involvement. On the ground, Arab non-state actors have also tended to per-
ceive EU’s stance as biased in favour of arbitrarily selected organisations,
adding to an insuffi cient fi nancial support, undue bureaucratic hurdles and
very slow disbursement29.
For the period 2014-2020, the ENI is expected to allocate over 15€ billion
to the Neighbourhood30. The bulk of it would be assumed to be channelled
through the Annual Action Programmes, later replaced by the multiannual
frameworks -since 2017-, which aim to provide cohesion and continuity to
the concrete policies and facilitate their evaluation. According to the EC,
out of that fi gure approximately 1€ billion corresponds to cooperation with
Egypt31. Quite interestingly, as we will see, the numbers codifi ed within the
Action Programmes do not even get close to the former, suggesting that the
Single Support Framework might not be that ‘single’ after all. Unfortunately,
the review of those missing components falls out the scope of this research,
coupled with the fact that some of them remain out of public disclosure.
3. EU APPROACH TO EGYPT
Whether digging into the bilateral agreements constituting the legal struc-
ture for their cooperation, assessment reports released by EU institutions or
independent academic diagnosis, conclusions tend to converge to very similar
fi ndings and dilemmas, suggesting the general lines of the joint strategy vis-
à-vis Egypt have consistently prevailed, in spite of an entirely new rhetorical
repertoire and innovative outputs that proved lacking, or were silently with-
drawn: the stability of now, rather than the one of tomorrow, pays worthy.
The security-stability nexus requires a close engagement with the state, even
if it implies overlooking the regime’s behaviour or whether they have virtua-
lly fused in one, but Egypt’s meaning for the EU has other bifurcations, yet
mostly leading to the state. As commented on a policy paper requested by
one of the parliamentary committees, Egypt implies “the need to preserve
political stability of many authoritarian regimes because of their modera-
te foreign policy outlook, their strategic and geopolitical signifi cance, their
cooperation with many countries in fi ghting terrorism and limiting illegal mi-
gration, and because of the EU’s need to secure energy routes from North
29 , Y., “The EU and the Middle East: The European... cit.”
30 , European Neighbourhood Policy... cit.
31 , European Neighbourhood Policy... cit.
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Africa and keep oil and gas prices stable”32. Beyond this, in line with the
resilience priority, the Union has become aware of a previously unsuspected
anchorage of the regional nation-states, as the litmus test brought about by
the Arab uprisings was not followed by the Sykes-Picot map’s disruption, in
fact, the initial weakening of their internal sovereignty has not been neces-
sarily matched with the same levels of erosion at their external dimension33,
making it even more compelling to deal with the state structures struggling
for survival, at the expense of a civil society clutter without enough prospects
for success or trustworthiness.
The Partnership Priorities for 2017-2020 show the uneasy concessions
the EU has to make to Sisi’s government in order to guard its security and
economic concerns and try to advance a meaningful compliance in return.
For example, the opening paragraphs underline a “shared commitment to
the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human
rights”34. The document refers to the sustainability of the economy and social
development, strengthening their foreign policy ties, enhancing domestic sta-
bility, security, terrorism and migration management as the central pillars in
the forthcoming years. To address these issues, the agreement systematically
fi ngers at the public role, winks at the private sector participation in the eco-
nomy, in accordance to the Union’s traditional business approach, and only in
the end both parties confi rm to agree in the involvement of civil society as a
“potent contributor”35.
The cosmetic changes in EU’s stance might not be relinquished to be
just so if, without undermining the common geopolitical interests placed in
Egypt and the specifi c reinforced importance for some Member States, as the
former being the world’s third largest arms importer depicts36, in the current
internal context, it was not that diffi cult to “challenge the entrenched posi-
32 , A.A., “A stable Egypt for a stable region: Socio-economic challenges and pros-
pects”, EP Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Paper, 2018, p.32.
33 “Interregnum: The Regional Order in the
Middle East and North Africa After 2011”, MENARA Final Reports, 1, 2019, p.13.
34 , Communication to the Delegations on the EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities
2017-2020, 2017, p.1.
35 Ibid., p. 9
36 , M., “SIPRI: Egypt occupies 3rd position among world’s 25 largest arms impor-
ters”, Egypt Independent, 2019.
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tions by the Government”37. Similarly to other MENA countries, state and
regime are growingly interdependent, the public sector supplies the biggest
percentage of employment, the army is the key to the government and the so
called ‘Arab social contract’ has not preceded a feasible substitute. But a dis-
tinctive feature curbs out the opportunities to pursue society resilience under
the ENP in Egypt: the recent and ongoing development of one of the most
restrictive NGO laws in the world, the multilayered mechanisms for contro-
lling fi nancing and the pervasive penetration of third competitors. Enacted
on 29th May 2017, the new ‘NGO law’ makes “human rights work virtually
impossible”38, the National Regulatory Agency monitors funds, goals, opera-
tions and recipients, opinion polls under supervision are banned and punitive
measures are extremely severe. Moreover, international donors interested in
Egypt and in securing the regime’s favour have heavily diversifi ed during the
last years. China, Russia, Turkey and the Gulf states have sidelined the North
American and European leverages and fragmented the range of options for
a government looking for the best bargain. While countries like Saudi Arabia,
UAE and Kuwait have managed to direct around 12 billion USD right after
the 2014 coup39, EU’s contribution is way smaller, time-consuming in terms
of gaining access and subjected to stronger scrutiny and demand for reform.
Regarding the ENP, and in particular towards Egypt, its present, more vi-
sible defi ciencies do not differ vastly from those that can be equally traceable
in the Common and Foreign Security Policy. The strategic bonds with a num-
ber of major Member States renders the Egyptian state to play them to com-
pete against each other, collect the benefi ts and limit the scope for a common
position. The insuffi cient consistency in EU outputs leads the organisation
to usually appear to simply move from one crisis to the next one40. However,
there is no doubt at certain aspects, such as perceiving Egypt as a fi rst line of
defence against illegal migration. Indeed, all these contingent factors have an
impact on the chances for prioritising what kind of resilience.
37 , F., “EU Promotion of Deep Democracy in Egypt After the Arab Spring: A
missed opportunity?”, Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales, 33, 2017, p.27.
38 , J. and , M., “In Search of a More Effi cient EU Approach to Human
Rights: Civil Society and EU Strategies in Egypt”, MedReset Working Papers, 2018, p.10.
39 , F., “EU Promotion of Deep Democracy in Egypt... cit”, p. 24.
40 , A.A., “A stable Egypt for a stable... cit.”, p. 34.
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IV. RESULTS OF THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS:
RESILIENCE IN THE ACTION PROGRAMMES
The current section of the research departs from the assumption that
the Annual –and Multiannual- Action Programmes (AAPs) agreed between
the European Union and Egypt in the bilateral cooperation structure embo-
died by the Association Council constitute the legal roadmaps enabling the
effective implementation of the European Neighbourhood Instrument, at
least of its main components. At the same time, a variety of complementary
instruments, like the European Endowment for Democracy, the European
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the Sustainable
Energy Finance Facility, are understood as operating tools thus they absorb
a signifi cant yet minor amount of the fi nancial resources previewed for the
ENP and ENI. This second array of institutionalized mechanisms falls out
the scope of this research, arguing the EU-led calls for standardization and
integration of the legal frameworks pertaining the cooperation strategy into
unitary documents –ie. Single Support Frameworks, since 2014– would have
led to a lesser atomization of the funds across projects. Nevertheless, when
contrasting EU publicly available data at different levels, the discovery is quite
surprising.
According to European Commission’s offi cial online content, the ENI
mounted for Egypt total numbers of 115€ million in 2014, 105€ million in
2015, 100€ million in 2016, another 100€ million in 2017’s AAP and an es-
timated allocation between 432€-528€ million for the period 2017-202041.
These statements genuinely contrast with the total amount of 272.4€ million
for the period 2014-2020 that the current analysis sums by quantifying the
fi nancial resources codifi ed within the same AAPs and their available annexes
in the same EC’s offi cial website. This gaping fi gures suggest, on one hand,
the complementary mechanisms for conducting the ENI might be more pro-
minent than initially thought, on the other, a good deal of funds are not made
publicly available.
In order to assess whether the EU prioritises state or society resilience in
the Action Programmes with Egypt, the author has examined the following
documents: AAP 2014; AAP 2015 –four annexes–; AAP 2016 (Part I) –two
annexes–; APP 2016 (Part II) and APP 2017 (Part I) –one annex–; AAP
41 , European Neighbourhood Policy... cit.
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2017 (Part II) –two annexes–; Multiannual Action Programme 2018-2020
–three annexes-. Through each of them, the smaller components –concrete
and operational projects– have been revised to identify the exact individual
amount of monetary units that has been allocated to them and the key stake-
holders involved in the project. A particular actor is deemed to be a stake-
holder if it is an important implementing agent within the project or if it is
a clearly established benefi ciary. Then, depending on the objectives and the
recipient(s) within each project, we categorise the types of resilience that the
policy output is aiming to strengthen into: a) state resilience; b) society resi-
lience; and c) both state and society resilience.
Firstly, the state resilience category encompasses the cases in which the
stakeholders are the government, public administration in general, legal and
judiciary branches, critical economic sectors run by the state and national po-
licy programmes. For its part, the society resilience category includes private
companies –ie. Micro, Small and Medium Size Enterprises (MSMEs)-, civil
society organisations (CSOs), disability organisations (DPOs) and NGOs in
general.
A component is considered to apply for both state and society resilience
in those cases where, in the light of no further information available that
might permit to break down the funds in a more precise way, one of the con-
ditions set at the left column of the following chart occurs in combination
with one of the conditions at the right column:
TABLE 1 – Both State and Societey Resilience
A) the state plays a prominent role in
the management of funds.
B) the state is a clear benefi ciary.
1) at least, part of the fi nancial resources
are managed by non-state entities.
2) public-private joint ventures.
3) non-state actors are clear benefi ciaries.
Elaborated by the author.
A more detailed disaggregation of the components is provided in the
annex to this paper. The total amount of 272.4€ million for the period 2014-
2020 is divided in: a) 53.05€ million allocated to state resilience; b) 47.83€ mi-
llion set aside to society resilience; and c) 160.84€ million for both state and
society resilience. The total fi gure for our time frame -272.4€ million- inclu-
des the derived costs from EU project evaluation, audit, communication and
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visibility, whereas the other fi gures represent the net monetary units allocated
to each resilience priority.
Notwithstanding the former, the key test for assessing the prioritisation is
found in the ‘both state and society resilience’ category. Apart from accumu-
lating the biggest amount by far, it is illustrative to analyze what is the imple-
mentation rationale in relation to the triad: primary agent/second agent/end
benefi ciary. In most of the cases, the public entities are the prevailing agents
entitled with the supervision, approval, monitoring and implementation of
the components; very often depict the direct benefi ciaries; and sometimes
are expected to receive an indirect positive impact by giving support to an
output centrally targeting civil society. Meanwhile, non-state actors, althou-
gh in a well-framed manner, tend to be qualifi ed as the end benefi ciaries;
sometimes have competences for a joint implementation with the state in
egalitarian terms; but more often represent the secondary agent with partial
instruments for enforcement under public supervision. The pervasiveness of
the governmental actors has also to be considered in relation to the fact that
Egypt possesses one of the highest corruption rates in the world42. In sum,
when a combination of the two dimensions is advanced, the strength of the
public structures tends to go in the fi rst place while society resilience is usua-
lly targeted as the last stop.
V. A BROADER VIEW: BILATERAL ARMS SALES AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY FACILITY
It has become clear to us that the state-resilience approach gathers more
resources than the society-resilience goal along the various Action Program-
mes, nonetheless, is that an analogous pattern to the broader assemblage of
EU foreign policy towards Egypt? The previous insights quoting different ex-
perts, which stress that security and economic interests have generally displa-
ced the promotion of European standards, already suggest that stabilisation
implies a closer engagement with the state for gaining its favour and ensuring
its survival as a geopolitical asset. With the objective of corroborating that
assessment, we will take a very brief glance at two other cooperation mecha-
nisms, one that could be deemed as a quintessential thrust for state resilience
and the other a sole commitment to society resilience: bilateral arms sales to
Egypt and the EC Civil Society Facility, respectively.
42 . Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, [website content], 2018.
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Weapons trade with Egypt, although an exclusive competence by Member
States, is relevant to our assessment because it is an indicator of the disparity
in the added value of each kind of resilience from a monetary perspective,
but also as evidence for the real attachment to the so called ‘authoritarian
resilience’ discourse. Between 2014 and 2018, Egypt more than doubled its
arms imports and France and Germany prevailed among the fi ve largest wea-
pon exporters43. Not being conclusive enough, in 2016, British sales to Egypt
were estimated at 168€ million –more than the fi nancial resources allocated
to both state and society resilience for a six-years period–, France closed
agreements for approximately 7.2€ billion, including dual-use technology, and
Germany signed a billion-euro contract for two submarines in 201444. Backed
with data produced by SIPRI, a policy brief published last year concluded
that France had surpassed the U.S. as the top provider of arms to Egypt and
Germany increased its sales by 205% in fi ve years45.
For its part, the Civil Society Facility was created after the Arab uprisings
in 2011 in an attempt to cooperate closer and more fruitfully with social
actors in Egypt, hence mitigating the society’s long-standing absence from
institutionalized political participation and, in some incipient understanding,
enhance the country’s resilience by targeting capabilities for its population’s
development and well-being. Nowadays, the newly enacted legal provisions
and the overall regime’s reluctance have rendered the Facility almost non-en-
forceable in Egypt, however, even in 2011, “the fi nancial envelop of the fa-
cility was small to match with its stated objectives”46. The highest fi gure of
900.000€47 in 2013 is nothing comparable to the resources devoted to state
resilience.
43 , M., “SIPRI: Egypt occupies 3rd position among world’s... cit.”
44 , H., “EU-Egypt Bilateral Relations: What Scope for Human Rights Advocacy?”,
EuroMed Rights Working Paper, 2016.
45 TIMEP, “European Arms Sales to Egypt”, TIMEP Briefs, 2018.
46 , B., “EU Cooperation with Civil Society in Egypt: Assessing the New Neighbour-
hood Civil Society Facility”, paper presented at the International Conference on Social Scien-
ces and Humanities, at the Queen’s College, University of Oxford, 2018, p.8
47 Ibid.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EU RESILIENCE STRATEGY
For resilience –defi ned as the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withs-
tanding and recovering from internal and external crises– to be met as the top, ove-
rarching priority it represents at the EU’s foreign policy core, while keeping
in mind that the ‘authoritarian resilience’ model has already proven to be a
double-edge instrument in a growingly unstable neighbourhood, a set of re-
commendations needs to be introduced:
– The European Union, even acknowledging the limits to its external ou-
treach, has to deploy a diversity of efforts to diminish and deter the ongoing
process of personalization within Egyptian politics. In fact, since times of
Gamal Abdel Nasser, reliance of the political system’s sustainability upon
one fi gure of leadership has been an endemic pattern in the country. ‘Strong-
manship’ without a suffi ciently consolidated underpinning structure collides
with the long-term, crisis-containment endeavour that the concept of resi-
lience poses, therefore, the EU must persevere in supporting the institutio-
nalization of an administrative class attached to a bureaucratic model having
some key resemblances with the Webberian one, that is to say, a class not
easily subjected to co-optation, preferably depoliticized and constituting a
fi rewall in the face of the risk of indistinctiveness between regime and state.
– The credibility of the EU as a supranational project with global aspirations
is repeatedly questioned due to the far-fetched, often cosmetic operationa-
lization of its pursued objectives and the recurrent dissonances in relation
to its Member States’ behaviour. The geopolitical signifi cance of issues like
energy, migration, terrorism or weapons trade for Europe is practically insur-
mountable, however, it is convenient to take into consideration that better
prospects for securing those areas demand an adequate and decisive promo-
tion of society resilience too.
– Despite the former statement, the Union also needs to be aware of enga-
ging in cooperation with civil society segments without triggering or favou-
ring an unaffordable weakening of the state that would dangerously conduct
to its collapse. Capacity-building of Egyptian social groups non-aligned nor
co-opted by the regime would be desirable as long as a suffi ciently high and
double-checked benchmark for their democratic credential can be confi rmed.
The Egyptian state might be entitled to implement some sort of supervision
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in this sense, but the EU should make sure that its selection of benefi cia-
ries, monitoring and fi nancial commitment is stronger. Political Islam should
not be systematically discarded among the targeted groups, although the
approach to it should be extremely thorough and it must ensure that the po-
tential benefi ciary is not permeated by extremist discourses and components,
even consolidating a comprehensive stopcock for the latter.
– Third competitors like China or Saudi Arabia are sidelining the EU as inter-
national donor, however, the Union remains the critical market for Egyptian
goods and services and its major trading partner. The EU should remind this
to Egypt’s government as a potential deterrence against letting these emer-
ging powers to penetrate into the national fi nancial sustenance so easily, since
an uninterrupted and profi ting international trade is key for the regime’s le-
gitimacy.
VII. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES
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Annex I: Component Classifi cation by Type of Resilience
EU-EGYPT Annual
Action Programme
State resilience Society resilience Both state and socie-
ty resilience
Annual Action Program-
me 2014 / Annex ‘Ex-
panding Access to Educa-
tion and Protection for at
Risk Children in Egypt’.
-EU budget cost: EUR
30 million
Component 3 – Opera-
tionalising Child Law:
-Amount: 9.5 million.
-Stakeholders: Gover-
nment and targeted
administration.
Component 1 – Com-
munity Schools:
-Amount: 13.4 million.
-Stakeholders: Ministry
of Education, gover-
norates, local commu-
nities.
Component 2 – Inclu-
sive-model schools:
-Amount: 6.5 million.
-Stakeholders: MoE
and civil society.
Annual Action Program-
me 2015 / 4 Annexes.
-EU budget cost: 63.4
million. (included the
4.4 millions fi nanced
by third entities, like
Germany).
Annual Action Program-
me 2015 / Annex I ‘Citi-
zen Rights Project’.
-EU budget cost: EUR
11.4 million (10 million
to the projects; 0.4
by third parties and 1
million for evaluation
etc.)
Component 1 – Su-
pport to the National
Council for Human
Rights (NCHR):
-Amount: 3.7 million.
-Stakeholders: NCHR.
Component 2 – In-
crease women partici-
pation in public life:
-Amount: 6.7 million.
-Stakeholders: Natio-
nal Council for Wo-
men, several Ministries,
civil society, particular-
ly women.
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Annual Action Program-
me 2015 / Annex II
‘Promoting Inclusive Eco-
nomic Growth in Egypt’.
-EU budget cost: EUR
16 million. (15 million
+ 1 million for evalua-
tion and audit, contin-
gencies, etc.)
Component 2 – Grant
Facility Schemes that
will implement pro-
jects of specifi c ad-
ded-value:
-Amount: 11 million.
-Stakeholders: private
sector and civil society
delivering support ser-
vices to MSMEs.
Component 1 – stren-
gthening the capacity
of stakeholders to im-
plement business cli-
mate…:
-Amount: 4 million.
-Stakeholders: seve-
ral Ministries, selected
MSMEs, CSOs.
Annual Action Pro-
gramme 2015 /Annex
III ‘Upgrading Informal
Areas Infrastructure’.
-EU budget cost: EUR
28 million (27 million
+ 1 million for evalua-
tion, etc.)
Component 1:
-Amount: approx. 16.2
million.
-Stakeholders: CSOs.
Component 2:
-Amount: approx. 10.8
million.
-Stakeholders: Minis-
tries, administration
and public companies
, private contractors,
residents.
Annual Action Program-
me 2015 / Annex IV
‘Fostering Reforms in
the Egyptian Renewable
Energy and Water Sectors
through Developing Capa-
city Building’.
-EU budget cost: EUR
8 million (7.4 million
for the project and 0.6
million for evaluation,
etc.).
Component 1 – Stren-
gthening the capacities
at central and local le-
vels in the water sector:
-Amount: 4.6 million.
-Stakeholders: Ministry
of Water Resources
and Irrigation.
Component 2 – Stren-
gthening the capacities
at central and local le-
vels in the energy sec-
tor:
-Amount: 2.8 million.
-Stakeholders: The
Ministry of Electricity
and Renewable Energy.
Annual Action Program-
me 2016 (Part I) / 2
Annexes
- EU budget cost: 50
million.
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Annual Action Program-
me 2016 (Part I) / An-
nex I ‘Advancing Women’s
Rights in Egypt’
-EU budget cost: EUR
10 million (+0.24 be-
ing fi nanced by poten-
tial grant benefi ciaries;
9.34 million for project
and 0.9 million for eva-
luation, etc.)
Component 1 – Su-
pport to the imple-
mentation of the Na-
tional Action Plan for
Female Genital Mutila-
tion abandonment:
-Amount: 4.6 million.
-Stakeholders: Natio-
nal Population Coun-
cil, Ministry for Po-
pulation, Ministry of
Health, Ministry of
Justice.
Component 2 – Su-
pport women’s access
to justice and legal em-
powerment:
-Amount: 4.74 million.
-Stakeholders: Legal
Aid Offi ces, Dispute
Settlement Offi ces,
women citizens.
Annual Action Program-
me 2016 (Part I) / An-
nex II ‘National Drainage
Programme III’
-EU budget cost: EUR
40 million.
Component B – Te-
chnical assistance for
capacity building for
strengthening EPA-
DP’s and MRWI’s
planning sector:
-Amount: 2.65 million.
-Stakeholders: EPADP
and MRWI.
Component A – In-
vestment, mainly
through work con-
tracts, for increased
effi ciency of drainage:
-Amount: 37 million.
-Stakeholders: EPA-
DP, MWRI, fi nal user
bodies (BCWUAs and
private sector), farmers
and their families.
Annual Action Program-
me 2016 (Part II) and
Annual Action Program-
me 2017 (Part I) / 1
Annex
-EU budget cost: EUR
20 million.
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 7, janvier-décembre 2019, pp. 323-348
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2019.i7.11
Annual Action Program-
me 2016 (Part II) and
Annual Action Program-
me 2017 (Part I) / An-
nex I ‘EU Facility for
Inclusive Growth and Job
Creation’.
-EU budget cost: EUR
20 million (18.1 million
for project and 1.9
million for evaluation,
etc.)
Component 2 – In-
creased potential of
SMEs to add value in
the economy and gene-
rate jobs:
-Amount: 3 million.
-Stakeholders: repre-
sentative organizations
of businesses, acade-
mic research institutes
and think tanks.
Component 1 – Im-
proved enabling envi-
ronment for business
creation and economic
development:
-Amount: 15.1 million.
-Stakeholders: Egyp-
tian SMEs , Ministry
of Finance, the Egyp-
tian Tax Authority,
Egyptian Customs Au-
thority, business asso-
ciations, NGOs, think
tanks.
Annual Action Program-
me 2017 (Part II) / 2
Annexes
-EU budget cost: EUR
33 million.
Annual Action Program-
me 2017 (Part II) / An-
nex I ‘Support to Accoun-
tability and Democratic
Governance’.
-EU budget cost: EUR
6 million (5.57 million
for project and 0.25
million for evaluation,
etc.).
Component 1 – Su-
pport to fi ght against
corruption:
-Amount: 3.7 million.
-Stakeholders: the Ad-
ministrative Control
Authority, the Illicit
Gains Department, the
Egyptian Financial In-
telligence Unit, etc.
Component 2 – Su-
pport to the House of
Representatives:
-Amount: 2.05 million.
-Stakeholders: The
Egyptian Parliament
and the Parliament
Training Institute.
The European Union and the Egyptian Neighbour: assessing the characterization of resilience as an external action
priority
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 7, janvier-décembre 2019, pp. 323-348
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2019.i7.11
Annual Action Program-
me 2017 (Part II) / An-
nex II ‘Support to Egypt’s
National Population Stra-
tegy’.
-EU budget cost: EUR
27 million (26.6 million
for project and 0.4 for
visibility and evalua-
tion).
Component 3 – Popu-
lation governance:
-Amount: 2 million.
-Stakeholders: Natio-
nal Population Council
and public task-forces.
Component 1 – Im-
proved Family Plan-
ning supplies:
-Amount: 16.6 million.
-Stakeholders: Ministry
of Health, private en-
terprises, citizens.
Component 2 – In-
creased Family Plan-
ning demand:
-Amount: 8 million.
-Stakeholders: Ministry
of Health, CSOs.
Multi Annual Action
Programme 2018-2020 /
3 Annexes.
-EU budget cost: EUR
76 million.
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 7, janvier-décembre 2019, pp. 323-348
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2019.i7.11
Multi Annual Action
Programme 2018-2020 /
Annex I ‘EU4 Energy
and Water’.
-EU budget cost: EUR
40 million (37.8 million
for projects and 2,2
million for evaluation,
etc.).
Component 1 – En-
hance capacities at cen-
tral and local levels to
effi cient demand dri-
ven systems:
-Amount: 18.8 million.
-Stakeholders: Gover-
nment, fi nancial or-
ganisations, investors,
think tanks, user asso-
ciations.
Component 2 – Mo-
dernisation of the wa-
ter and energy manage-
ment framework:
-Amount: 9.5 million.
-Stakeholders: pu-
blic-private partners-
hips, fi nancial entities,
administration.
Component 3 – Im-
proving the investment
climate in the water
and energy sectors:
-Amount: 9.5 million.
-Stakeholders: the New
and Renewable Energy
Authority, the Water
Regulatory Activity,
private sector partici-
pation.
The European Union and the Egyptian Neighbour: assessing the characterization of resilience as an external action
priority
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 7, janvier-décembre 2019, pp. 323-348
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2019.i7.11
Multi Annual Action
Programme 2018-2020
/ Annex II ‘EU for fair
access to basic services’.
-EU budget cost: EUR
12 million (11.8 million
for project and 0.2
million for evaluation,
etc.).
Component 1 – Su-
pport National spe-
cialized councils’ roles
in inclusion and pro-
tection of vulnerable
groups:
-Amount: 5.8 million.
-Stakeholders: Natio-
nal Council for Child-
hood and Motherhood,
National Council on
Disability Affairs.
Component 2 – Targe-
ted support to vulne-
rable groups through
civil society organisa-
tions:
-Amount: 6 million.
-Stakeholders: CSOs,
disability organisa-
tions.
Multi Annual Action
Programme 2018-2020 /
Annex III ‘Complemen-
tary support for capacity
development and civil so-
ciety’.
-EU budget cost: EUR
24 million (23.3 million
for project and 0.7 for
evaluation, etc.).
Component 1 – Insti-
tutional capacity deve-
lopment:
-Amount: 11.65 mi-
llion.
-Stakeholders: state
structures.
Component 2 – Su-
pport to civil society:
-Amount: 11.65 mi-
llion.
-Stakeholders: Big
and small CSOs and
NGOs.
TOTALS
EUR 272.4 million
(includes evaluation
costs, etc.)
EUR 53.05 million EUR 47.83 million. EUR 160.84 million
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