The “Discourse” of International Law and Humanitarian Intervention

Published date01 June 2017
AuthorGustavo Gozzi
Date01 June 2017
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12159
The “Discourse” of International Law
and Humanitarian Intervention
GUSTAVO GOZZI*
Abstract. This essay analyzes the doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” in the
frame of international law in the second half of nineteenth century and identifies
the ground of legitimation of this intervention in the violation of presumed uni-
versal laws of humanity. The analysis emphasizes the transformation of the par-
adigm of “humanitarian intervention” into the current doctrine of the
“responsibility to protect,” which under the rubric of “responsibility” legiti-
mizes limitations on a state’s sovereignty in cases where the state fails to guar-
antee the protection of its own population. This reconstruction of the genealogy
of “humanitarian intervention” illustrates the continual exceptions to the princi-
ple of nonintervention, which means that the Westphalian principle of sover-
eignty has always been violated. Both doctrines—humanitarian intervention
and the responsibility to protect—can be considered “hegemonic techniques”
that use so-called universal concepts in order to legitimize unilateral power
interests.
1. Methodological Premises
This essay focuses on the theory of international law that in the nineteenth century
legitimated the Western states’ so-called humanitarian intervention, on the pre-
tense that this would bring civilization to other states and peoples regarded as
inhuman. The objective of this essay, adopting the perspective proposed by Martti
Koskenniemi, will be to identify the legitimization discourse underpinning the
international law of humanitarian intervention.
In his preface to The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, Koskenniemi (2001, 2) com-
ments that the book can be regarded as a history of international law considered
as “a sensibility that connotes both ideas and practices” of the liberal and cosmo-
politan movements of the nineteenth century. Many objectives of the interna-
tional lawyers of this period were partially realized: the rule of law and the
general suffrage for instance. But in the colonies the presence of Western powers
had opposite effects.
* The essay was discussed at the international conference “‘Il mite civilizzatore delle nazioni.’
Investigating International Law’s Past; Philosophical, Methodological and Theoretical Issues,”
Ravenna andBologna, 26–27 March 2013.
V
C2017 The Author. Ratio Juris V
C2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Ratio Juris. Vol. 30 No. 2 June 2017 (186–204)
Koskenniemi clearly sets out his methodological perspective, adopting a Fou-
caultian approach
1
to cast light on the normative structure of international law that
grounds the idea of European superiority over other civilizations and cultures.
It may be seen, then, that The Gentle Civilizer of Nations has all the makings of a pro-
foundly innovative work, for the approach it introduces is neither essentially bio-
graphical nor a timeline for distinguishing between different epochs. The
development and transformations of international law are instead investigated by
Koskenniemi by tracing a history of the social, legal, and political ideas of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, enabling him to bring into focus the relation between
“power” and “discourse,” on the one hand, and “history” and “narration,” on the
other.
The period he investigates starts from a watershed moment marking the begin-
ning of modern international law, a mid-nineteenth-century development owed to
the work of certain liberal jurists. Koskenniemi points out in particular the jurists
affiliated with the Institut de Droit International established in Ghent in 1873: They
rejected the idea of European society as a society of kings and diplomats and in its
place put forward the conception of international law as both consciousness and con-
science, expressing on the one hand an organic relation between law and society
and on the other the moral sentiments (and prejudices) of European societies.
This original approach enables Koskenniemi to outline what became the stand-
ard view or paradigm of international law in the nineteenth century: International
law was the expression of a humanitarian liberalism that conceived it as a universal
construct, amenable to being extended to other civilizations, with a view to ena-
bling all peoples to attain the levels of civilization achieved by the European
peoples.
In this way Koskenniemi laid bare the “discourse” embedded in the paradigm of
international law, in the sense of an unmistakable Eurocentric design aspiring to
become universally binding by carrying a colonial project to completion. His inves-
tigation highlights the Janus-faced aspect of nineteenth-century liberalism: On the
one hand it styled itself as the “legal conscience of the civilized world,” but on the
other it set in motion instances of hubris and cruelty legitimized by a presumption
of superiority on the part of the West. An important part of this story was the idea
of “humanitarian” intervention forming the subject of this essay.
2. The Theory of “Humanitarian” Intervention: Barbaric Humanity and
the European Peoples’ Civilization
According to the French jurist Antoine Rougier, an explicit reference to the “laws
of humanity” appeared in the second half of the nineteenth century (Rougier 1910,
473)
2
in the sources of European international law, where these laws were set in
contrast to the logic governing the “barbaric” peoples and the “partially civilized”
1
A Foucaultian perspective means that “law is not the vis-
a-vis of power, speaking absolute
truth or universal justice to power, but [...] a form of power itself that produces a truthregime
through legalknowledge claims.” In this approachlaw is “invested in the production andregu-
lations of objects[...] withinthe realm of the legal” (Aalbertsand Golder 2012, 608).
2
This essay by Rougier provides an in-depth reconstruction of the complex theory of humani-
tarian intervention in the nineteenthcentury.
The “Discourse” of International Law 187
Ratio Juris, Vol. 30, No. 2 V
C2017 The Author. Ratio Juris V
C2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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