The association between corporate governance mechanisms and compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements: evidence from 12 African countries

Date23 October 2020
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/CG-08-2019-0270
Pages1371-1392
Published date23 October 2020
AuthorYosra Mnif,Hela Borgi
Subject MatterStrategy,Corporate governance
The association between corporate
governance mechanisms and
compliance with IFRS mandatory
disclosure requirements: evidence
from 12 African countries
Yosra Mnif and Hela Borgi
Abstract
Purpose The purpose of this study is toexamine the association between two corporate governance
(CG) mechanisms,namely, the board of directors and the audit committee(AC) and the compliance level
with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) mandatory disclosure requirements across 12
Africancountries.
Design/methodology/approach This paper usesa self-constructed checklist of 140 itemsto measure
the compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements (here after, COMP) of 202 non-financial
listedfirms during the 20122016 period. This paper applies panelregressions.
Findings The findingsreveal that CG mechanisms playan important role in enhancing compliancewith
IFRS in the African context. The results show that board independence, AC independence and the
number of meetings held by the AC are positively associated with COMP. Regarding expertize, this
paper find thatAC industryexpertise along with accounting financial expertiseis associated with a higher
level of COMP than accountingfinancial expertize alone. These results show the importanceof the CG
mechanismsto enforce African companies to fullycomply with IFRS required disclosures.
Practical implications The findings should give a signal to supervisory authorities that more effortis
necessary to enforce IFRS across African countries if the introduction of IFRS is to bring the expected
benefits to investors and other users. Hence, the lack of full compliance should remain a concern for
regulators,professional accounting bodies and policymakers.
Originality/value This study contributes to the literature by providing further insights that, within the
African region an understudied context, extend current understanding of the association between CG
mechanismsand COMP.
Keywords Corporate governance, Compliance, IFRS, African countries
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are recognized as a comprehensive
set of “high quality” standards (Ball, 2006). However, accounting standards are only one
pillar upon which a sound financial reporting infrastructure should be built, yet other
important pillars should be considered such as the corporate governance (CG)
mechanisms (Tweedie and Seidenstein, 2004). CG mechanisms could have an important
influence on the preparers’ incentives to comply with IFRS disclosure requirements
(Pope and McLeay, 2011). Managers with undue discretion could generateincomplete and
Yosra Mnif is based at the
High Institute of Business
Administration of Sfax,
Sfax, Tunisia. Hela Borgi is
based at the Department of
Accounting, College of
Business and
Administration, Princess
Nourah bint Abdulrahman
University, Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia.
Received 29 August 2019
Revised 12 December 2019
7 March 2020
14 September 2020
25 September 2020
Accepted 25 September 2020
This research was funded by
the Deanship of Scientific
Research at Princess Nourah
bint Abdulrahman University
through the Fast-track
Research Funding Program.
DOI 10.1108/CG-08-2019-0270 VOL. 20 NO. 7 2020, pp. 1371-1392, ©Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 1472-0701 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jPAGE 1371
biased financial reporting, and thereby, not compliant with IFRS disclosure requirements
(Glaum et al., 2013). Previous compliance studies show that the even the mandatory IFRS
adoption does not guarantee that the companies are fully compliant with IFRS mandatory
disclosure requirements and provide evidence that it is usually at the discretion of
managers that leads to a heterogeneity in the level of mandatory disclosures across
companies (Glaum et al., 2013;Juhmani, 2017;Mazzi et al.,2017;Sellami and Fendri, 2017;
Sellami and Borgi, 2020). Followingthis, Mbir et al. (2020) show that effective CG structures
could ensure a high level of compliance to IFRS, which, in turn, leads to achieve the
expected high levels of reporting quality.
The high-profile financial scandals and the increasing instances of financial restatements
have focused more attention on the role of CG mechanisms in enhancing the corporate
financial reporting quality (Juhmani, 2017). Verriest et al. (2013) provide evidence that
companies with strong CG structures tend to be more compliant with IFRS disclosure
requirements compared to companieswith weak CG structures.
There is a growing recognition of the important role of CG mechanisms in enhancing financial
reporting quality, aligning management’s interests with those of the shareholders and reducing the
agency and information asymmetry problems (Juhmani, 2017). However, McGee (2009) argues
that the special issues in developing countries (e.g. African countries), such as weak legal
systems and corrupt practices, make the implementation of CG questionable. Furthermore,
Dahawy (2009) shows that African countries are ill-equipped to put in place the type of CG
established in developed countries because of the characteristics of the political and economic
systems of these jurisdictions, such as weak judicial and legal systems, corruption, political
interference in corporate affairs and limited skills of human resources.
The World Bank (2005,2010) also suggests that corporate reporting in Africa, such as in
Kenya and Tanzania, is poor and, generally, the lack of transparency pervades the
corporate reporting system, which may have contributed to the recent corporate failures
(Uchumi in 2006 and CMC holdings in 2011). The World Economic Forum (2012) reports
that corporate scandals involving companies listed in Kenya, at the Nairobi Securities
Exchange and Tanzania, at the Dar es Salaam Securities Exchange have reduced investor
confidence and raised questionson the integrity of financial reporting and CG regime.
Africa is a particular and interesting context because of its unique socio-economic, cultural
and business set-ups (Tawiah and Boolaky, 2019b). As argued by Gordon et al. (2012),
Nnadi and Soobaroyen (2015) and Tawiah and Boolaky (2019a), companies in developing
economies and more particularly African countries have different governance structures
compared to those in developed ones (La Porta et al., 1999). Tawiah and Boolaky (2019b)
argue that cross-continental studies that included African countries using generic proxies
do not really reflect the African settings, hence tend to have contrasting findings. The
African continent provides also motivation for this research because of the lack of evidence
on the association between CG mechanisms and compliance with IFRS mandatory
disclosure requirements (COMP)in this context.
In addition, the transition to democratic governance in many African countries presents an
opportunity for accounting and public policy research. Several African countries, such as
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia have
published national codes of CG to strengthen the enforcement of IFRS (Rossouw, 2005;
Waweru, 2014), and therefore, to enhance the compliance with IFRS requirements.
However, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show in the Reports on
the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) that compliance with IFRS required
disclosures was problematic in many African countries such as Botswana, Kenya,
Mauritius, Tanzania, Uganda,South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Hence, the purpose of this research is to investigate the association between two CG
mechanisms, namely, the board of directors (BD) and the audit committee (AC) and
PAGE 1372 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jVOL. 20 NO. 7 2020

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