The Arab Upheavals and the Turkish Perception vis-à-vis the West

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.13169/arabstudquar.35.3.0305
• Pages: 305-323
• Published date: 01 July 2013
• Date: 01 July 2013
• Author: S. Gülden Ayman
• Subject Matter: Turkish foreign policy,state identity,identity change,foreign policy roles,Arab upheavals,AKP's foreign policy

ASQ 35.3 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals

THE ARAB UPHEAVALS AND THE

TURKISH PERCEPTION Vis-À-Vis THE WEST

S. Gülden Ayman

Abstract: The article argues that Turkey’s perception of the West has been heavily inf‌luenced by

its idealized identity. After evaluating the circumstances under which this idealized identity began

to weaken, it shows how the images of the US and Europe have started to get compartmentalized

and Israel separated from the image of the West. The article explains the relationship between

the continuing process redef‌ining Turkey’s “personal identity” and its growing interest in the

Middle East. The transformation process that Turkey is passing through is critically important in

understanding the way in which Turkey has been affected by the upheavals and is reacting to the

new developments in the region. In this vein the article highlights the interaction between power

considerations and aspirations to re-def‌ine identity at home and abroad.

Keywords: Turkish foreign policy, state identity, identity change, foreign policy roles, Arab

upheavals, AKP’s foreign policy

Shaping and Re-shaping State Identity

As explained by Fearon, state identity could be taken into consideration in two

senses that do not necessarily overlap, but usually are not incompatible.1 Identity

represents the understanding of oneself in relationship to others and is dened by

what it is not. The creation of the “in-group” rests upon its differentiation from the

“out-group,” which may lead to devaluation of out-groups and tends to produce

competitive behavior with them. In the sense of “personal identity” the formation

of state identity shows similarity with the individual one with regard to references

made to the distinctiveness of self through relations with signicant others. Within

the realm of personal identity, state identity could also be instrumentalized focusing

on shared mental representations of historical events and the major historical gures

associated with them. An important component of personal identity is created by

“transforming” or “charismatic” leaders. As argued by Volkan, such leaders do not

only bring hundreds of thousands or millions of people out of political isolation

and into a new kind of political participation. They sometimes go a step further,

like Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, introducing their own images and subjected feeling

Saadet Gülden Ayman is Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Political Sciences, Istanbul

University.

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306 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY

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of shared sameness to their followers as well as reshaping the external world of

their followers.2

On the other hand, in the sense of “social identity” state identity refers to social

categories that states are members of the Arab League, EU or NATO. In many

instances a state’s personal identity and social identity are mutually reinforcing.

While personal identity encourages, determines or leads to a state’s membership in

an international institution, the membership enhances its personal identity.

When considering change of a state identity, two types of dynamics, external

and internal, potentially affect this process.3 First, identity of a state, its place in

the world, its allies and enemies could be re-dened as political leaders reinterpret

them. Secondly, identity of a state is subject to change because of external factors

that are not necessarily conned within the realm of its membership in certain

institutions. Moreover, what is observed at the practical level is that rather than

it being determined either by internal or external environment, the process of

re-denition of identity often involves complex interactions between them.

As stated by Wendt, after the breakdown of consensus about identity commitments

within the Soviet Union in the 1980s over the Leninist theory primarily due to the

state’s inability to meet the economic-technological military challenge from the

West, a critical examination of old ideas about self and other—and, by extension,

of the structures of interaction by which the ideas have been sustained—began.4

The process of identity change is mediated by power perceptions of the concerned

state not only related to its current capabilities but also those that it assumes to acquire.

In a process of re-dening a state’s identity, perceived capabilities either encourage

or set limits on shaping and institutionalizing a new understanding of identity.

Questioning a state’s identity and attempting to alter it does not necessarily mean

that transformation involves a quick and smooth process and/or would denitely

be accomplished. In order to assert that a state’s identity is re-constructed it needs

to reach a relative stability level and become resistant to change. That can only be

acquired through institutionalization. Institutionalization that legitimizes particular

identity constructions and reinforces certain practices and rules of behavior takes

place through various forms of political socialization. At the domestic level, it

could be measured by the level of consensus reached throughout society; whereas,

on the international relations level, alliances, political and economic organizations

do not only reect and assure identity of states, they could also be the vehicles of

new self understanding.

From Defensive Westernization to Identity Building

In Turkish political life the idea of Westernization is directly linked with the

modernization process.5 Westernization emerged as a vehicle in the Ottoman

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