Terrorism

• Pages: 32-36

32 Volume 22, April–June 2016 international law update

© 2016 International Law Group, LLC. All rights reserved. ISSN 1089-5450, ISSN 1943-1287 (on-line) | www.internationallawupdate.com

information is needed, and the German court is

best positioned to assess whether any disclosure can

be accomplished without jeopardizing the sensitive

trade secrets involved.”

e Court concluded that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying Andover’s §

1782 petition.

citation: Andover Healthcare, Inc. v. 3M Co., 817

F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2016).

TERRORISM

Second Circuit reviews case where

Plaintiffs are seeking to enforce

judgments for terrorism related

injuries and deaths against Iran; Iranian

party argues that Iran Threat Reduction

and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012,

Section 8772, violates U.S. separation of

powers because it was solely directed at

this specific case

Can a statute direct a particular result in a

single pending lawsuit? e question raised by Bank

Markazi, whether § 8772 violates the separation of

powers by purporting to change the law for, and

directing a particular result in, a single pending

case, brings this case before the Supreme Court of

United States.

Respondents, over 1,000 victims of terrorist

acts sponsored by Iran, ranking within 16 discrete

groups, brought a lawsuit against Iran, pursuant

to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976

(“FSIA”) terrorism exception, in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia. Upon

nding that Iran was liable to each suitor, the

court entered judgments by default. Although,

together, respondents obtained billions of dollars

in judgments against Iran, a majority of these

judgments remained unpaid.

To enforce their judgments, the 16 groups of

respondents registered them in the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New

York. Following the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

69 they moved then for the turnover of about $1.75

billion in bond assets held in a New York bank

account, allegedly owned by Bank Markazi. In

2008, the terrorism judgment holders in Peterson,

264 F.Supp.2d 46, led writs of execution. e

District Court restrained the bonds. Other groups

of terrorism judgment holders were joined in the

Peterson enforcement proceeding through a variety

of procedural mechanisms.

In 2002, Congress enacted the Terrorism

Risk Insurance Act (TRIA). TRIA authorizes the

execution of judgments obtained under the FSIA’s

terrorism exception against “‘[…]the blocked assets

of [a] terrorist party (including the blocked assets

of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist

party).’ § 201(a), 116 Stat. 2337, note following 28

U.S.C. § 1610. […]” As per TRIA, a “blocked asset”

is any asset seized by the Executive Branch pursuant

to either the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA),

or the International Emergency Economic Powers

Act (IEEPA). Both these measures authorize the

President to freeze the assets of foreign enemy states

and their agencies and instrumentalities.

In 2012, the President issued an Executive

Order blocking “[a]ll property and interests in

property of any Iranian nancial institution,

including the Central Bank of Iran, that are in the

United States.” Exec. Order No. 13599, 3 CFR 215

(2012 Comp.). However, the availability of these

assets was contested. Moreover, to place beyond

dispute the availability of these blocked assets for

satisfaction of judgments rendered in terrorism

cases, Congress passed statute § 502 of the Iran

reat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of

2012, 126 Stat. 1258, 22 U.S.C. § 8772. “[…]§

8772 provides that, if a court makes specied

ndings, ‘a nancial asset ... shall be subject to

execution ... in order to satisfy *1319 any judgment

to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded

against Iran for damages for personal injury or

death caused by’ the acts of terrorism enumerated

in the FSIA’s terrorism exception. § 8772(a)(1).