32 Volume 22, April–June 2016 international law update
© 2016 International Law Group, LLC. All rights reserved. ISSN 1089-5450, ISSN 1943-1287 (on-line) | www.internationallawupdate.com
information is needed, and the German court is
best positioned to assess whether any disclosure can
be accomplished without jeopardizing the sensitive
trade secrets involved.”
e Court concluded that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Andover’s §
1782 petition.
citation: Andover Healthcare, Inc. v. 3M Co., 817
F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2016).
Second Circuit reviews case where
Plaintiffs are seeking to enforce
judgments for terrorism related
injuries and deaths against Iran; Iranian
party argues that Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012,
Section 8772, violates U.S. separation of
powers because it was solely directed at
this specific case
Can a statute direct a particular result in a
single pending lawsuit? e question raised by Bank
Markazi, whether § 8772 violates the separation of
powers by purporting to change the law for, and
directing a particular result in, a single pending
case, brings this case before the Supreme Court of
United States.
Respondents, over 1,000 victims of terrorist
acts sponsored by Iran, ranking within 16 discrete
groups, brought a lawsuit against Iran, pursuant
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(“FSIA”) terrorism exception, in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. Upon
nding that Iran was liable to each suitor, the
court entered judgments by default. Although,
together, respondents obtained billions of dollars
in judgments against Iran, a majority of these
judgments remained unpaid.
To enforce their judgments, the 16 groups of
respondents registered them in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New
York. Following the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
69 they moved then for the turnover of about $1.75
billion in bond assets held in a New York bank
account, allegedly owned by Bank Markazi. In
2008, the terrorism judgment holders in Peterson,
264 F.Supp.2d 46, led writs of execution. e
District Court restrained the bonds. Other groups
of terrorism judgment holders were joined in the
Peterson enforcement proceeding through a variety
of procedural mechanisms.
In 2002, Congress enacted the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act (TRIA). TRIA authorizes the
execution of judgments obtained under the FSIA’s
terrorism exception against “‘[…]the blocked assets
of [a] terrorist party (including the blocked assets
of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist
party).’ § 201(a), 116 Stat. 2337, note following 28
U.S.C. § 1610. […]” As per TRIA, a “blocked asset”
is any asset seized by the Executive Branch pursuant
to either the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA),
or the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA). Both these measures authorize the
President to freeze the assets of foreign enemy states
and their agencies and instrumentalities.
In 2012, the President issued an Executive
Order blocking “[a]ll property and interests in
property of any Iranian nancial institution,
including the Central Bank of Iran, that are in the
United States.” Exec. Order No. 13599, 3 CFR 215
(2012 Comp.). However, the availability of these
assets was contested. Moreover, to place beyond
dispute the availability of these blocked assets for
satisfaction of judgments rendered in terrorism
cases, Congress passed statute § 502 of the Iran
reat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012, 126 Stat. 1258, 22 U.S.C. § 8772. “[…]§
8772 provides that, if a court makes specied
ndings, ‘a nancial asset ... shall be subject to
execution ... in order to satisfy *1319 any judgment
to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded
against Iran for damages for personal injury or
death caused by’ the acts of terrorism enumerated
in the FSIA’s terrorism exception. § 8772(a)(1).

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