Sovereign immunity

Pages58-62
58 Volume 21, April–June 2015 international law update
© 2015 International Law Group, LLC. All rights reserved. ISSN 1089-5450, ISSN 1943-1287 (on-line) | www.internationallawupdate.com
government thereby ‘fullled the commitment it
made in Diplomatic Note No. 1206.’ Id. at 93. …”
“In United States v. Lopez-Imitalo, 305 F. App’x
818 (2d Cir. 2009), we considered a challenge to
a 40 year prison term imposed on a 58-year-old
defendant (see the defendant’s brief on appeal,
2007 WL 6370252), who had been extradited to
the United States from Colombia pursuant to an
agreement in which, as in the agreement in Baez, the
United States promised it would not seek a sentence
of life imprisonment. We rejected the defendant’s
‘argument that the Government breached the
agreement by seeking a sentence of 60 years, which
he assert[ed wa]s the functional equivalent of life
imprisonment’; and we stated that there was no
violation of the extradition agreement ‘[e]ven if the
district court’s sentence of 40 years were deemed to
be a sentence of `life imprisonment.’ 305 F. App’x
at 819. We stated that ‘[o]ur decision in . . . Baez .
. . compels the conclusion that the rule of specialty
[sic] was not violated. . . .’ Id.”
“Had the respective governments intended
the Diplomatic Note to be an assurance that the
U.S. government would not request a determinate
sentence exceeding [the defendant’s] expected
lifespan, they could have drafted the note to say
that. Id.” [Slip op. 5-6]
citation: U.S. v. Suarez, 791 F.3d 363 (2nd Cir.
2015).
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Eleventh Circuit affirms dismissal
of complaint filed by Venezuelan
entrepreneur for alleged expropriations
that occurred in Venezuela; Act of State
Doctrine, in conjunction with the FSIA,
precludes U.S. courts from reviewing
Plaintiff’s expropriation claims
Nelson J. Mezerhane, a successful Venezuelan
entrepreneur who ran a number of businesses in that
country, led a seventeen-count complaint against
República Bolivariana de Venezuela (“Venezuela”),
Superintendencia de las Instituciones Del Sector
Bancario (“SUDEBAN”), and Fondo de Protección
Social De Los Depósitos Bancarios (“FOGADE”),
as well as a number of additional Venezuelan
agencies and instrumentalities (“defendants”),
alleging that the defendants engaged in a pattern
of persecution against him that included numerous
violations of human rights law, expropriation of his
property in violation of international law, and other
tortious acts.
Mezerhane alleged that during Hugo Chavez’s
term as president of Venezuela, the government
targeted him to gain control over his media
companies. When he refused, President Chavez
retaliated against him, rst by attacking him in
public speeches, and later by expropriating his
and his family’s assets through illegitimate judicial
proceedings, which caused Mezerhane to suer
damages in excess of $1 billion.
In 2005, Mezerhane learned that the Venezuelan
government accused him of playing a role in the
murder of a Venezuelan prosecutor. He voluntarily
surrendered to Venezuelan authorities, was arrested
and incarcerated for 37 days. Upon being released
on bail in December 2005, Mezerhane led an
action with the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights for false imprisonment and human
rights abuses.
Mezerhane claimed that he was de facto stateless
because, as he stated, he was stripped of “all indicia
of citizenship,” including the rights to travel in and
outside of Venezuela, “to live in a non-incarcerated
state in Venezuela,” to “earn a livelihood,” and to
acquire, sell, and convey property, seeking asylum
in the United States.
In his complaint, Mezerhane describes
Venezuela as a “foreign state” for purposes of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), and
SUDEBAN and FOGADE as “agenc[ies] or
instrumentalit[ies] of a foreign state” under 28
U.S.C. § 1603(b). He asserts that the district court
has personal jurisdiction over SUDEBAN and
FOGADE based on their commercial activities in
the United States.
Venezuela and SUDEBAN jointly moved to
dismiss Mezerhane’s Complaint, claiming sovereign
immunity under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11,
while FOGADE led a separate motion to dismiss
on the same ground.

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