Sources of Law in Transition. Re-visiting General Principles of International Law

• Author: Maria Panezi
• Pages: 66-79

66 ANCILLAIURIS(anci.ch)2007:66Article

Summary1

GeneralPrinciplesofInternationalLawhavebeenamuch

contestedsourceamongInternationalLawscholars.Theambigu

itythatsurroundstheirinterpretationhasresultedtoavividdia

loguearoundtheirlegalnature,andtheiruseincontemporary

judicialpracticeofdomesticandinternationaltribunals.Global

izationandtheeverincreasingcomplexityofInternationalEco

nomicsaffectedthepositionofGeneralPrincipleswithinthe

internationallegalsystem,andresultedtotheirprogressivecon

solidationintheareaofInternationalEconomicLaw.Further

examinationofissuesarisingvisàvisGeneralPrinciplescould

provetobeusefulinotherareasoflaw,inthesamemannerthey

addressedlegalissuesinInternationalEconomicLaw.

Introduction

GeneralPrinciplesofLawandtheirlegalsignificance

andapplicationhavebeenstudiedextensivelyintotheory

overthepastcentury.Theacademicdialoguebecamevivid

duetovariousreasonssuchastheambiguityofthenotion

ofGeneralPrinciplesortheincorporationofGeneralPrin

ciplesassuchintoarticle38oftheInternationalCourtof

Justice(hereinaftertheICJ)statute.

Article38paragraph1(c)oftheICJStatutelists„general

principlesoflawrecognizedbycivilizednations“asoneof

thesourcesofapplicablelawincasesofdisputesarising

underInternationalLaw.Thisarticleisveryoftencitedas

anauthoritativetextthatenumeratesapplicablelawinthe

jurisprudenceofvariouscourtswheneveradisputearises

amongsubjectsofInternationalLaw.Thus,outofallarti

clesoftheStatute,thisassumesapositionofparticular

importance,sincepartiesoftenexpectittobeappliedin

casesbeforeothertribunalsinadditiontotheICJ.Werethe

domainofitsapplicationsimplythejurisprudenceofthe

ICJ,oritspredecessor,thenthestudyofGeneralPrinciples

wouldhavebeensimpleroratleastmorecontrollablefora

1 Panezi_maria@yahoo.comLL.B.,March2005,AthensNationaland

KapodistrianUniversity,SchoolofLaw,Athens,Greece,LL.M,

May2006,NewYor kUniversity,SchoolofLaw,NewYork, USA,

PhDCandidate,OsgoodeHallLawSchool,Toro nto ,Canada.The

authorwouldliketothankProfessorEyalBenvenistiforhis

insightfulguidanceandsupervisionoftheLLMthesiswhichpro

videdtheframeworkforthisarticle,andProfessorsAchillesSkor

dasandVai osKaravasfortheirusefulcomments.Theusual

disclaimerapplies.

researcher.However,thepossibilityorthefactofinvoca

tionoftheprovisionbyothertribunalsinadditiontothe

ICJ,giveseachsourceofthearticlealargerspectrumof

applicability.

GeneralPrinciplesasasourceofnormativityappearto

bevagueanddifficulttodefineandlocateincontemporary

practice.Thiscouldpotentiallyleadtodifferentattitudes

towardsthem:itcouldbethattheyareseenasablanketof

safety,afinalresortwhennothingmoreconcretecanbe

foundtoregulateacertainissue,oratthesametimearea

sonforpreoccupation,anopendoorthroughwhichunpre

dictablelegislationmightenterintolegalrelationshipsthat

didnotforeseeorexpectsuchanoutcome.Thetwodiffer

entattitudesreflectatthesametimeanoverallstance

towardsthecontemporaryroleofthestate.Thosewhosee

GeneralPrinciplesasatoolforinnovativenormative

assessmentofsocialphenomenaarelessattachedtotradi

tionalnotionsofstatesovereignty.Ontheotherhand,those

whoremainsuspicioustowardsGeneralPrinciplesarealso

reluctanttoabandontheclassicalviewthatplacesthestate

inthecentralpositionofinternationallawproduction.

ThispaperwilltrytoaddresshowGeneralPrinciplesof

InternationalLawhavegainedacrucialpositioninInterna

tionalEconomicLaw.Itisdividedintothreeparts.

Thefirstpartanalyzesbrieflythetraditionalviewof

GeneralPrinciplesofInternationalLawandatthesame

timeattemptstoidentifyoperativepartsintheorythatare

stillapplicabletoday.Itstartswithaveryshortreferenceto

theirhistorybeforetheincorporationintheICJStatute.

Thenitmovesintolookingatthetextofarticle38par.1c.

Italsoexaminestheirlegalnatureandthenwetryto

developacomprehensivedefinitionofGeneralPrinciples

ofInternationalLawbylookingintotheoristsandthedefi

nitionstheyhavegiventhroughoutthe20thcentury.

Finallythischapterlooksintotraditionalclassificationsof

GeneralPrinciplesaswellasashortreferencetoexamples

oftheiruseintheICJjurisprudence.

Thesecondpart,afterrecognizingthatthereisgener

allyaformofskepticismtowardsGeneralPrinciples,

movesintolookingatwhatweidentifyasthetwomajor

reasonsforthisskepticism,namelythefearofjudicialdis

cretionandthedisapprovalofincorporatingthewords

SourcesofLawinTransi ti on

RevisitingGeneralPrinciplesofInternationalLaw

MariaPanezi