Somali piracy--are we at the end game?

AuthorHuggins, Jon
PositionEnd Game: An International Conference on Combating Maritime Piracy

"Somali Piracy--Are We at the End Game?" examines the current state of Somali piracy and provides recommendations for reaching a sustainable solution both at sea and onshore. The authors provide a detailed background on international efforts to mitigate piracy and over the course of the article attempt to put the goals of both nations and international organizations, and the shipping industry, into context by: (1) assessing how close we have come to the "End Game" of piracy; (2) taking a closer look at the current positive trends and statistics; (3) evaluating the primary factors that must be considered in developing a long-term and sustainable solution at sea; and (4) addressing the importance of on-shore based initiatives. They conclude that while the initial crisis has been mitigated, a continued commitment and an increased focus on onshore initiatives are needed to ensure that a long-term and sustainable solution to Somali-based piracy is reached.

CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. ARE WE READY TO DECLARE "END GAME?" III. A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF POSITIVE TRENDS AND STATISTICS A. Attack Reporting B. The Shipping Industry's Continued Commitment C. The Naval Response D. The Possible Return to Historic (Pre-Piracy) Levels of Maritime Security IV. ASSUMPTIONS AND PRIMARY FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION A. Factor One: Response Capability at Sea B. Factor Two: Maritime Situational Awareness and Reporting C. Factor Three: Law Enforcement on the High Seas D. Factor Four: Vessel Awareness/Protection E. Factor Five: Conditions of Seafarers V. GOVERNANCE ASHORE--THE REAL END GAME FOR SOMALI PIRACY VI. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION

The Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) program, a project of the One Earth Future Foundation, (1) was initiated at the absolute height of the Somali piracy crisis in the fall of 2010. At that time, nearly 700 hostages were being held in over thirty ships off the coast of Somalia. In order to understand the complex nature of the piracy attacks, and the equally complex response, OBP cultivated a relationship with multiple stakeholders across the international navies, maritime nations, industries, advocacy groups, and academia.

After initial setbacks, where the pirates seemed able to adapt and effectively counter actions taken by the international community, the response at sea finally turned the tide against the Somali pirates. Through the combined efforts of industry and navies, pirate attacks were suppressed, and pirate groups were mostly deterred from launching new assaults. (2) Much of the coordination required to accomplish this can be credited to the efforts of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), (3) the Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) coordination mechanism for navies, (4) and industry efforts to coordinate ship self-defense through agreed Best Management Practices (BMP).

Throughout this three-year process, OBP has remained engaged by close association with CGPCS activities and by convening meetings with relevant stakeholders. After the international community achieved a milestone of six consecutive months without a successful pirate attack by the fall of 2012, OBP asked its partners to participate in a working group to develop expectations and define the desired end state to the Somali piracy threat. For the purposes of defining goals, the group was split between members of the shipping industry and those representing nations and international organizations. The group representing the nations and international organizations determined that continued observance of BMP and a sustained international navy presence would facilitate a move toward regional leadership and development ashore, establishing a safe and sustainable environment for merchant vessels and seafarers in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The group representing the shipping industry came to a similar conclusion, desiring to establish a set of conditions in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean whereby vessels can return to transit procedures and self-protection requirements in place before 2005 without undue risk to the crew.

Over the course of this article, we shall attempt to put these goals into context by: (1) assessing how close we have come to the "End Game" for Somali-based piracy; (2) taking a closer look at the current positive trends and statistics; (3) evaluating the primary factors that must be considered in developing a long-term and sustainable solution at sea; and (4) addressing the importance of shore-based initiatives.

  1. ARE WE READY TO DECLARE "END GAME?"

    With the dramatic drop in piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean, some stakeholders are cautiously asking whether the international community has successfully ended Somali-based piracy. The fact that knowledgeable policymakers are having this debate indicates that things are going much better than they could have hoped just eighteen months ago. On the surface, much of the evidence supports a conclusion that the problem has been solved. For example, reported attacks have dropped by more than 80 percent between 2011 and 2012; (5) 2013 saw a continued decline, with the IMB reporting only 15 incidents, both actual and attempted attacks, attributed to Somali pirates. (6) The number of hostages has dropped to fewer than 100 in 2013--down from a high of around 700 hostages at the beginning of 2011. (7) Finally, as of May 2013, it had been more than a year since pirates had hijacked and held a ship. (8)

    In spite of the good news, the world has not yet reaped the benefits from this drop in attacks. The cost of suppressing piracy in terms of first order costs had only decreased by around 20 percent to around $6 billion according to the latest Economic Cost of Piracy Report by OBP. (9) The World Bank has also estimated that, even in a down year, piracy impacted the global economy to the tune of around $18 billion when the secondary impacts were considered. (10) Thus, despite successful suppression efforts, the international community is still paying a premium price in its fight against piracy.

  2. A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF POSITIVE TRENDS AND STATISTICS

    1. Attack Reporting

      While reported attacks are down 80 percent since 2011, there are signs that some attacks may have only been reported amongst internal channels of owners and flag states, meaning that the attacks were not included in international databases and reporting. Earlier this year, two of the leading reporting agencies made the following appeals:

      It has come to our attention that some private military security companies are reporting suspicious incidents through their internal communication channels and then to their customers. It is in all seafarer [s]' interest [s] that any concerns are reported immediately by phone to [the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization] UKMTO in accordance with BMP4. (11) Additionally, the NATO Shipping Center also issued a call for more timely and accurate reporting in a weekly report from February 2013, stating:

      It has been observed that some Masters are choosing to phone their Company Security Officer (CSO) first in the event of a piracy incident. However, one of the fundamental requirements of BMP4 is that UKMTO is the primary point of contact for merchant vessels during piracy incidents in the HRA. This aims to avoid unnecessary delay and prevent inaccurate or incomplete information from reaching military commanders. (12) In addition to calls for more accurate reporting by information centers serving the Indian Ocean, there was circumstantial evidence that indicated that not all attacks were being reported. First, based on military statistics, the span between the end of 2011 and the start of 2012 was a particularly active time for Pirate Action Groups (PAGs). (13) Many of these groups were observed operating in critical areas in the Indian Ocean, but this high number of potential attackers was not consistent with the low number of attacks actually reported based on historic rates. (14) Second, the success rate for attacks (based on the number of successful attacks as a percentage of total attacks) actually increased in 2012 after showing a downward trend over the previous two years. (15) This increase runs counter to the widely held belief that ships were less vulnerable after implementing BMP and other measures. Finally, there is ample anecdotal evidence from both Somali sources and from private companies themselves that not all attacks are reported and that many encounters have occurred in which neither party (the private security team or the pirates) had motive to report the incident. (16)

    2. The Shipping Industry's Continued Commitment

      At the height of the piracy crisis in 2010-2011, the shipping industry made enormous commitments to protect its vessels. As documented in the Economic Cost of Piracy Reports by OBP, measures adopted by the shipping industry amounted to around $5 billion over the course of 2012, which represented around 85 percent of the total direct costs of piracy to the international community. (17) The measures taken by the shipping industry were encapsulated in an industry-generated, self-governing mechanism called the "Best Management Practices (BMP) for Protection against Somalia-Based Piracy." (18) Recommended measures included ship-hardening techniques, suggestions for increased vigilance of crew, increased transit speeds, and established re-routing procedures. Also incorporated by most of the industry was the practice of developing a safe room, or "Citadel," where a crew could safely retreat in the event of a piracy attack until a naval response could be summoned. (19)

      At the height of the crisis, it was estimated that up to 80 percent of the shipping industry was practicing this expensive set of recommendations in spite of the industry's economic downturn that had created very slim profit margins. (20) However, the fact that so...

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