Renewable Resources, Pollution and Trade

Date01 May 2016
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12217
AuthorHoratiu A. Rus
Published date01 May 2016
Renewable Resources, Pollution and Trade
Horatiu A. Rus*
Abstract
Detrimental spillovers from industrial activity onto resource-based productive sectors arevery common, yet
their effects remain understudied. While international trade often creates conditions for the over-
exploitation of open-access renewable resources, it also provides opportunities for separating different pro-
ductive sectors spatially. The existing literature suggests that a diversified exporter of the renewable
resource good tends tolose from trade in both welfare and conservationterms as a result of over-depletion,
while the exporter of the non-resource good gains. However, the resource stock externality of harvesting
and the inter-industry pollution externality often coexist in reality. In a small open economy framework,
this paper shows that acknowledging their interaction changes the nature of the autarkic equilibrium and
enriches the set of resource conservation and welfare outcomes from trade.Depending on the relative dam-
age inflicted by the two industries on the environment, which in turn are functions of the pollution intensity
and bioeconomic parameters, it is possible that the inter-sectoral pollution externality persists and speciali-
zation in manufacturing is not optimalfrom a welfare perspective.
1. Introduction
Renewable resources can be under two kinds of pressures: excessive harvesting, when
no effective management is in place, and pollution from other sectors. Understanding
the effects of international trade on such an environment is of immediate and obvious
policy interest. The effects of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill of April 2010 on a
host of natural resources in the Gulf of Mexico—among which some severely depleted
stocks—from birds, to sea turtles, to coral reefs and several species of fish is a stark
reminder of the industrial pollution effects on renewable natural resources and on the
industries that rely on them. Such externalities are not limited to ecological disasters,
but are unfortunately quite common. Around the world, open-access fishing areas are
often located in the proximity of polluting manufacturing facilities. According to a UN
study (see Sale et al., 2008, p. 16), up to 80% of the ocean pollution is derived from
industrial or residential land-based activities, in the form of “excess nutrients (fertil-
izers, sewage, other nitrogenous compounds), persistent organic pollutants (POPs)
(halogenated hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls, and dioxins), radioactive sub-
stances.” Other high profile examples of pollution–resource exploitation interaction
issues range from the North Atlantic salmon fishery,
1
to the lobster fishery in the
North Pacific, the collapsed walleye fishery in the Tittabawassee River in Michigan,
the Baia Mare, Romania cyanide pollution of the rivers adjacent to gold mines and
countless similar, albeit less publicized cases in the developing world. This paper inves-
tigates the effects of international trade when an open-access renewable resource is
subject to the two interacting problems: over-harvesting and pollution. These have
* Rus: Economics and Political Science, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue W, Waterloo,
ON, Canada N2L 3G1. Tel.: 11-519-888-4567 (ext. 38338); E-mail: hrus@uwaterloo.ca. I am indebted to
Brian Copeland, Werner Antweiler, Sumeet Gulati and Edward Barbier for very useful suggestions. I
also thank Soham Baksi, the editor of this publication and two anonymous referees for comments. All
remaining errors are mine.
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C2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Review of International Economics, 24(2), 364–391, 2016
DOI:10.1111/roie.12217
been identified as two of the leading factors that effect synergistically the potential
unprecedented mass collapse of marine species forecasted in a report of the Interna-
tional Programme on the State of the Ocean (IPSO).
2
Previous works have looked at each of the twin pressures of excessive harvesting
and pollution damage separately. Brander and Taylor (1997) show that a small open
economy that exports an open-access resource will suffer resource depletion and may
incur a long-run real income loss, whereas a country that exports the alternative non-
resource good will gain from trade, as pressure is lifted off the resource. Copeland and
Taylor (1999) show that with a cross-sectoral pollution externality, trade tends to cause
small economies to specialize and that severe resource depletion may occur. In their
model, a resource exporting country still gains from trade because specialization leads
to a contraction of the polluting sector. In reality however, many renewable resources
are concomitantly subject to both types of pressures. Are these results still valid? The
present work builds—for comparability—on the baseline Brander and Taylor (1997)
model and the subsequent Brander and Taylor (1998a) model and resembles the two
in that it deals with an open-access natural resource and the impact of international
trade on its stock. It departs from their framework in that it also assumes the existence
of production externalities, such as in Copeland and Taylor (1999). However, unlike
the latter model, where the production in the clean sector is only a function of the
“environmental capital” stock,
3
in the present paper the production of the “clean
good consists of harvesting, thus it necessarily also depletes the resource stock. The
paper models a scenario in which a manufacturing sector pollutes the resource
grounds, thus hurting the harvesting sector. The assumption that both sectors exert a
differentiated pressure on the stock of the resource is not only more realistic, but
also—as it turns out—important in establishing results that depart from the ones in
the existing studies.
As documented in numerous biological studies, the nursery grounds for many spe-
cies of fish are located along coastal areas, which are also the more polluted areas,
owing to the industrial waste spilled directly into the sea and carried by rivers from
inland. Partly because of weak regulation or poor resource management, many devel-
oping countries experience an accelerated depletion of their resources after opening
up to international trade. Indeed, it is not surprising that under a quasi-open-access
resource exploitation regime, expanding the size of the potential market leads to
increased over-exploitation in a resource-based economy. The welfare effects of this
form of tragedy of the commons amplified by trade are potentially very significant in
poor, small, developing economies, where the shares of the resource sectors in both
exports and gross domestic product (GDP) are substantial. At the same time, the phe-
nomenon of dirty-industry migration from North to South—as a foreseeable effect of
tightening up of standards in the developed world
4
—may result in increased industrial
pollution of the environment in the developing world: the “pollution haven” effect.
5
Increasing trade and investment openness makes both over-depletion and pollution
haven scenarios theoretically plausible.
To preview the main findings, the autarkic equilibrium in this economy is ineffi-
cient. Besides the open-access problem, whose magnitude is a function of demand
parameters, there is the uninternalized effect of pollution. For some values of the bio-
economic parameters, the production possibilities frontier is convex–concave and the
supply of the manufacturing good (M) is non-monotonic. Opening up to trade allows
the economy to potentially do better in welfare terms in the long run. Non-traditional
gains from trade occur from spatially separating the conflicting sectors by focusing
production on the area of comparative advantage. While the canonical results are
RENEWABLE RESOURCES, POLLUTION AND TRADE 365
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C2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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