Red-teaming NLW: a top ten list of criticisms about non-lethal weapons.

AuthorKoplow, David A.
PositionFrederick K. Cox International Law Center Symposium: International Regulation of Emerging Military Technologies

Critics of non-lethal weapons (NLW) have asserted numerous complaints about the concepts, the Department of Defense research and development efforts, and the pace of innovation in the field. These critiques challenge the cost of the programs, their consistency with international law, the adverse public reaction to some of the devices, and the dangers of proliferation, among other points. This article summarizes the various assessments, in form of a "top ten list" of criticisms, and evaluates their weight. The author concludes that some of these points of objection have merit, but overall, the NLW enterprise is worthy of continuation and even expansion, to meet more fully its ambitious goals.

CONTENTS

  1. INTRODUCTION II. NON-LETHAL WEAPONS COMPLAINTS 1. NLW TECHNOLOGY IS STILL LARGELY A CAPABILITY IN SEARCH OF A MISSION 2. NLW TECHNOLOGY IS DEVELOPING TOO SLOWLY 3. PUBLIC OPINION, IN THE UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHERE, HAS NOT WARMED TO NLW 4. COSTS AND LOGISTICS DEMANDS ARE EXCESSIVE 5. INTERNATIONAL LAW IMPEDES USE OF SOME NLW 6. NL W MAY MAKE US TACTICALLY TOO QUICK ON THE TRIGGER 7. NLW MAY MAKE US STRATEGICALLY TOO PRONE TO FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS 8. OUR USE OF NL W MAY EMBOLDEN OPPONENTS 9. NLW TECHNOLOGY WILL PROLIFERATE TO FOREIGN MILITARIES AND BE USED AGAINST US 10. NLW TECHNOLOGY WILL SPREAD TO OTHER BAD ACTORS III. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION

    The concept and practice of non-lethal weapons (NLW) is no longer a new and fledgling enterprise. U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni's famous invocation of NLW to assist in covering the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Somalia occurred way back in 1995. (2) Directive 3000.3, the foundational charter for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) engagement in the field, was issued in 1996. (3) The Joint Directorate, the organizational sanctum supporting the Pentagon's day-to-day research and development in the field, stood up in 1997. (4)

    This makes NLW a twenty-year-old campaign. Measured another way, 1995 was two or three wars ago. And, of course, many of the relevant technologies and devices trace their lineage back much further. Conversely, many other familiar institutions and social phenomena that modern society considers mature and well established are younger than NLW. The Toyota Prius, for example, debuted in 1997, (5) as did the first Apple online store. (6) Nintendo released the Nintendo 64 video game system 1996. (7) Of local interest, the re-birth of the current Cleveland Browns came in 1999.8 Even Pokemon, unleashed in 1996, is as old as NLW. (9) Thus, it has been long enough since the birth of NLW that it is now appropriate to undertake some serious, even skeptical, appraisal of the program and its constituent elements. The underlying theories and the programmatic features are now sufficiently strong and well established to be able to endure tough scrutiny.

    One version of that searching analysis is red-teaming, trying to construct the strongest possible case against NLW, as a form of high-stakes testing. As an avid supporter of NLW, I am especially interested in exploring how well the program--its history, current status, and anticipated future directions--can stand up to this type of audit, as well as contemplating what rebuttals to the critiques may be persuasive. To begin this red-teaming, I have prepared a Top Ten List of objections, doubts, and concerns about NLW. I hope that a review of this roster of complaints can inspire a focused, even-handed appraisal of the overall pros and cons of the NLW enterprise.

  2. Non-Lethal Weapons Complaints

    1. NLW Technology is Still Largely a Capability in Search of a Mission

      To date, there really has been no great demand for NLW. Customers are not eagerly lining up to procure the products. The overwhelming function of the military remains "to kill people and break things," and if the bad guys continue to shoot live munitions at us, then the good guys will need to return fire with ordnance that is as lethal as possible. (10) Both force protection and mission accomplishment demand the traditional accoutrements of military operations; NLW will, at best, occupy a boutique niche. Even if civilians are present--which is the situation in which NLW would ordinarily be of greatest application--deadly force is typically still necessary and appropriate as a means of self-defense. The array of NLW capabilities, present and future, designed to fill a gap "between bullhorns and bullets," is basically a solution to a nearly non-existent problem. Almost always, bullhorns or bullets will be both necessary and sufficient. (11)

    2. NLW Technology is Developing Too Slowly

      Despite the best, and quite admirable, efforts of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD), the military services, and a small but growing armada of contractors in the nascent non-lethal military-industrial complex, there is still not enough there there. The requisite inventiveness, and the capacity to carry new capabilities into operation, have been in short supply. As one indicator, the current JNLWD annual report (12) is remarkably similar to its forebearers from five or ten years ago in describing the array of currently available technologies (which are still relatively modest) and in forecasting the more adventuresome future systems (which are seemingly not getting much closer to operability.) Some of the fact sheets, describing...

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