President Obama's approach to the Middle East and North Africa: strategic absence.

• Author: Williams, Paul R.
• Position: Barack Obama - New Beginnings, Resets & Pivots: The International Legal Practice of the Obama Administration

Many commentators argue that the White House does not have a policy regarding the Middle East and North Africa. Based on observations of the White House's foreign policy decisions over a breadth of seven years, this article argues that The White House does have a clear policy and it is one of Strategic Absence. The term Strategic Absence is used to describe political behavior that arises from a belief that sometimes, in foreign affairs, it is better to be absent rather than present. Strategic Absence has led to a degradation of American influence in the Middle East and has contributed to deteriorating conflict situations in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. The author describes the six core tenets of Strategic Absence and demonstrates, through case studies, that the Obama Administration has responded to challenges and threats to the United States' strategic interests in Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria according to the parameters of the doctrine of Strategic Absence.

CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. EMPLOYING THE DOCTRINE OF STRATEGIC ABSENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S STRATEGIC ABSENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA IV. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION

Unfortunately, [a policy of] disengagement turns out not to work. A drones-first policy has stoked anti-American fervor from Pakistan to Yemen. Libya is on the brink of civil war. Syria has become "the most catastrophic humanitarian crisis any of us have seen in a generation," as Mr. Obama's U.N ambassador said.

Fred Hiatt, Editor, Washington Post (1)

Think tank reports, op-eds by former senior government officials, and news reporting on leaks from current officials highlight the same theme: the degradation of American foreign policy interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). (2) Conflict and uncertainty reign across Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Turkey, fueled by violence, dissention, and the ever-increasing threats of ISIS, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the PKK. In contrast, Egypt currently enjoys a measure of tranquility, the price of which was the reversal of the Arab Spring momentum and a return to heavy-handed governance by an elected military regime.

Many commentators accuse the White House of not having a policy vis-a-vis the Middle East and North Africa. In reality, however, the White House has a very clear, if not well-articulated, doctrine.

The White House has variously described its MENA doctrine as "Don't Do Stupid Stuff", or alternatively "Leading from Behind." (3) From observing the White House's foreign policy decisions over a breadth of seven years, the doctrine can more fully be surmised to be one of Strategic Absence. The term Strategic Absence is used to describe political behavior that arises from a belief that sometimes, in foreign affairs, it is better to be absent rather than present. (4)

The White House's doctrine of Strategic Absence is built around the following core elements: narrowing the definition of American strategic interests; (5) avoiding the lure of human rights driven policy and actions; (6) shifting responsibility for international conflict management to regional actors and international partners while pursuing "partnership lite"; (7) limiting belief in the United States' ability to positively affect change; (8) minimizing U.S. military involvement overseas while at the same time maximizing the use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS); (9) and generally relying upon accommodation (some would say appeasement) as a viable basis for accomplishing American strategic interests. (10)

2. EMPLOYING THE DOCTRINE OF STRATEGIC ABSENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

   During the past seven years, the United States has faced challenges to its strategic interests in Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria. The United States also faced existential threats from the nonstate terrorist organizations of AQAP and ISIS. In each of these cases, the Obama Administration responded to these challenges and threats according to the parameters of its doctrine of Strategic Absence.

   American power can make a decisive difference, but we cannot do for Iraqis what they must do for themselves, nor can we take the place of Arab partners in securing their region.

   President Obama (11)

   In Iraq, the adoption of the doctrine of Strategic Absence was born out of President Obama's frustration with and criticism of his predecessor's policies in the Middle East, his electoral promise to bring American troops home, and his limited belief in America's ability to influence events in Iraq. (12) His application of the doctrine revolved around: minimizing American military engagement via the complete withdrawal of all American troops from Iraq; (13) shifting the burden of securing the country to the Iraqi Army via the transfer of substantial advanced weaponry to the Iraqi Army; disengaging from Iraq's political transition to an inclusive and pluralistic democracy; (14) and narrowing the definition of America's interest in "democratizing" Iraq to "trouble-free stability" in Iraq. (15)

   [Leading from behind is] so at odds with the John Wayne expectation for what America is in the world,--[b]ut it's necessary for shepherding us through this phase.

   An adviser to President Obama (16)

   In Libya, the Obama Administration coined the phrase "leading from behind" to describe its approach to protecting American strategic interests. This approach encompassed: narrowing the definition of American strategic interests to neutralizing Col. Qaddafi's ability to kill civilians seeking to topple his regime; (17) partnership and burden sharing through the utilization of multilateral political and security institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, NATO, and the International Criminal Court; (18) and minimizing American military engagement by refusing to commit any troops to fight the Gaddafi regime (19) while emphasizing the limited nature of U.S. airstrikes throughout the campaign.

   This latter point is illustrated by a congressional briefing provided in late June 2011. (20) From April to June, 2011, the U.S. conducted about 60 airstrikes and 30 drone strikes. (21) In the report to Congress, administration officials argued that those strikes were defensive actions simply meant to protect aircraft. (22) They made the case that the U.S. was not engaged in hostilities and instead played a "non-kinetic" role in the conflict, simply offering services such as refueling and surveillance to our regional partners. (23) As reported by the New York Times, the entire tone of the report was one in which the Obama administration took great pains to emphasize that the U.S. was not playing a leadership role in the region and, instead, ceded control to other players in the conflict. (24)

   The doctrine of Strategic Absence continued into the post-conflict phase where the Obama administration was categorical about not engaging in peacekeeping or substantial efforts at nation building, leaving the work largely to the UN and emerging local democratic entities. (25)

   If there's one lesson this administration has learned, from President Obama's 2009 Cairo speech through the Arab Spring, it's that when it comes to this region, nothing happens in a linear way--and precious little is actually about us, which is a hard reality to accept.

   Senior State Department Official (26)

   In Egypt, previous Administrations had always shown considerable deference to President Mubarak despite his human rights record. (27) This approach of avoiding the lure of human rights driven policy and actions, coupled with limited belief in America's ability to promote meaningful change formed the core of the Obama Administration's approach to Egypt as it progressed through various phases of the Arab Spring. President Obama's speech at Cairo University was a watershed moment in the minimization of a human rights narrative in the American-Egyptian relationship, going further than his predecessors in its avoidance of nearly any mention of human rights. (28) The subsequent embrace of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood regime, followed by a similar embrace of General Sisi and his military-centric regime, also followed this pattern of avoiding the lure of a human rights driven policy. (29)

   Notably, the Obama Administration briefly tried to influence the behavior of the Sisi regime by suspending nearly $500 million in military sales, but rather quickly abandoned this approach under the belief illustrated by the quote above that America had little to no ability to affect change in Egypt. (30)

   [I]f a JV team puts on Lakers uniforms, that doesn't make them Kobe Bryant. I think there is a distinction between the capacity and reach of a bin Laden and a network that is actively planning major terrorist plots against the homeland versus jihadists who are engaged in various local power struggles and disputes, often sectarian.

   President Obama (31)

   In the case of ISIS, the Obama Administration laid the foundation for Strategic Absence by narrowly defining American strategic interest to exclude threats by local jihadi power struggles. The Administration also dramatically understated the threat posed by ISIS to the United States, placing it outside the narrowly defined sphere of American strategic interests. As it became necessary to utilize force to confront ISIS and prevent the collapse of Iraq, the Obama Administration relied on a partnership with the Iraqi Army, pro-Iranian militias, Syrian opposition forces, and our more traditional Kurdish allies. (32) For the air campaign, the Obama Administration assembled an effective coalition of European and Arab states. (33)

   In the case of the Kurdish forces and the Syrian opposition forces, the approach was one of "partnership lite" in that the Americans resisted requests by the Kurdish forces to provide advanced weaponry, instead directing the weapons through Baghdad and the same military infrastructure that initially...