Evenhandedness of Surveillance

• Pages: 115

Page 115

During the Executive Board's 1995 biennial review, held in February 1995, some Directors expressed concern about an apparent lack of evenhandedness-or symmetry-in IMF surveillance. In particular, some regarded IMF surveillance as less effective in some important country cases; they saw a need for the IMF to strengthen its surveillance over its larger members whose policies had systemic implications affecting all IMF members. Similar concerns have also been raised outside the IMF.

To some extent, it may be inevitable that IMF members receive different degrees of attention in surveillance. Perhaps the largest difference is between members implementing IMF-supported programs and those that are not-a difference explained mainly by the IMF's need to safeguard its financial resources and the close monitoring associated with an IMF-supported financial program. There is also an inevitable distinction between attention devoted to some members' policies and the IMF's degree of influence on these policies. Arguably, some of the IMF's largest members receive as much attention as many IMF borrowers, as reflected, for example, in the prominent treatment of the policies of the IMF's largest members in the World Economic Outlook discussion. But although IMF financial support is provided in the context of adjustment programs entailing policy conditionality-thus ensuring a measure of congruence between the views of the IMF and a member's economic policies-the extent to which the IMF's views are taken...