New Approaches to Legal Methodology

• Author: Jochen Bung
• Pages: 80-84

80 ANCILLAIURIS(anci.ch)2007:80Article

Summary1

Thetopicsofjuridicaleverydaybusinessarerelativelyshort

livedandthecommentaryonthiseverydaypracticefrequently

runsbehind.FollowingtherapiddevelopmentofHighCourt

jurisdiction,especiallyattheEUlevel,wenoticeasettingof

methodologicalstandardsthatcannotbecomprehendedbythe

guidelinesofclassicalinterpretation.Asjurisprudenceisaprac

ticaldisciplineandaslegalpracticehasdevelopeditsowninner

dynamics,theroleoflegaltheorybecomesamatterofincreasing

necessity.

Introduction

Jurisprudenceisessentiallyapracticaldiscipline.There

fore,ithasnotbeenestablishedasaninstitutionaldualism

ofappliedandtheoreticaljurisprudenceattheuniversities,

unlikee.g.mathematicsorphysics.However,alookatthe

previoushistoryofthesubjectshowsthattherewasa

period(inWestGermanyfromaboutthe1970stothe

1990s)inwhichaselfconfidentlegaltheorysoughttodo

genuinebasicresearch.2Itwasatimeofenthusiasticrecep

tionofargumentsfromneighbouringdisciplineslikephi

losophyandthesocialsciences,withoutconcernforthe

aspectofpracticalutility.

Regrettably,thisgoldenageoftheoryisover.Thetopics

ofjuridicaleverydaybusinessarerelativelyshortlivedand

thecommentaryonthiseverydaypracticefrequentlyruns

behind.FollowingtherapiddevelopmentofHighCourt

jurisdiction,especiallyattheEUlevel,wenoticeasettingof

methodologicalstandardsthatcannotbecomprehendedby

theguidelinesofclassicalinterpretation.Thedistinction

betweeninterpretinganddevelopingthelaw,essentialin

Germanlegalmethodology,hasobviouslybecomepoint

less.Legislationalsoappearstobealaboratory–firstexper

imentingandthenevaluatingtheoutcome.

Ofcourse,thesedevelopmentsarenotaccidental,but

resultfromsocietaltransformations,notchosenbycourts

andonlypartlyintendedbythelegislator.Therefore,the

fundamentalcriticismofpoliticalconservatismandeco

1ThetextisbasedonalectureIgaveinBeijingandBrusselsin2005.

Asitseemstome,theargumentsarestillcorrect,eventhespeak

ingofnewapproaches,whichofcourseisinsomemeasureahint

atthedialecticsimpliedinthewidespreadnotionofOldEurope.

2Seee.g.E.Hilgendorf(2005),DieRenaissancederRechtstheorie

zwischen1965und1985,Würzburg.

nomicliberalismisnotcorrect.Itistruethattherearetoo

manyobscurelegalregulations.Anditisalsotruethat

probablyhalfofthemmightnotbeneededatall.Theprob

lemis–quotingHenryFordonthecostsforadvertising–

wedonotknowwhichhalf.

Asjurisprudenceisapracticaldiscipline,asIhave

pointedout,andaslegalpracticehasdevelopeditsown

innerdynamics,theroleoflegaltheorybecomesamatterof

increasingnecessity.Ithinktherearebasicallythree

answerstothatissue.Firstly,onecouldclaimthatwith

respecttotheobviousselfsufficiencyoflegalpractice,one

shouldceaseregardingthelawasasuitableobjectoftheo

rizing.Secondly,onecouldmaketheconfusingcomplexity

oflegalpracticeanobjectofconfusinglycomplextheories.

Finally,youcouldfollowtheclassicalapproachoftheory,

andthusfocusongivingsimpleanswerstothefundamen

talquestionsofthelaw.Aslongaswedonotignorethedif

ferencebetween“simple”and“assimpleaspossible”we

shouldpresumablypreferthethirdalternative.

1.Thebasicquestionoflegalmethodology

Regardlessofthemutabilityofthelegal“matter”legal

theorystilladdressesthesamefundamentalquestions.One

ofthemreferstotherightapplicationofthelaw.Wecan

considerthistobethebasicquestionoflegalmethodology

(asanelementarypartoflegaltheory).Inthefollowing

analysisIshallattempttogiveananswertothatquestion

andworkoutsomeofitsimplications.Referringthelawto

thequestionofitsrightapplicationinthefirstplacemeans

toacknowledgethelawassomethingtobegraspedinsome

waybeforeitisthoughttobeapplied.Thatseemstobeself

evidenttothepointofbeingalmosttrivial,butisbyno

meansuncontroversialinthediscourseoflegaltheory.As

GermanlegaltheoristsMarieleDederichsandRalphChris

tensenclaim:Thereisnolawbeforethecase(“Esgibt[…]kein

RechtvordemFall”).3Theunderlyingargumentofthat

statement–Iassume–wasexpressedbythephilosopher

HansGeorgGadamerthisway:Understandingalwaysis

applying(“Verstehenist[…]immerschonAnwenden”).4

3M.DederichsandR.Christensen(2004),DieRollederBeobacht

ungzweiterOrdnunginderRechtsprechungdesEuGH,inF.

Müller,IsoldeBurr(eds.),RechtsspracheEuropas,Berlin,p.365.

NewApproachestoLegalMethodology

JochenBung