Negotiations on food security at the WTO: a never-ending story?

• Date: 24 July 2024
• Pages: 101-116
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/JITLP-03-2024-0018
• Published date: 24 July 2024
• Subject Matter: Strategy,International business,International business law,Economics,International economics,International trade
• Author: Joseph A. McMahon

Negotiations on food security at

the WTO: a never-ending story?

Joseph A. McMahon

Sutherland School of Law, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

Abstract

Purpose –The purpose is to chart the negotiationson the issue of food security which was identif‌iedas a

non-tradeconcern by the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) and how developingMembers of the World Trade

Organisation(WTO) suggested that that concern shouldbe addressed.

Design/methodology/approach –The history of negotiationsat the WTO is examined through the lens

of off‌icial documentssubmitted during various phases of negotiations since1996 beginning with the Analysis

and InformationExchange process to the Doha Round up to the latest Ministerial Conferencein Abu Dhabi in

February2024.

Findings –The negotiations have yet to complete despite beginning over 20years ago. The focus moved

since 2008 to look at specif‌ic issues which were addressed at a number of Ministerial Conferences but the

latest of theseindicate that an answer can only be foundin the re-negotiation of the AOA as a whole.

Research limitations/implications –By focusing on off‌icial documents, the rich literature on food

securityhas not been addressed.

Practical implications –The piece concludes by looking at issues which needto be resolved ahead of

agreement on overall reform and suggests solutions for example in the area of safeguards and public

stockholdingfor food security purposes.

Originality/value –The focus almost exclusivelyon off‌icial (and public) documents during the discussion

is noteworthy. It also conf‌irms that the WTO is not really that different from its predecessor - the GATT -

which tooknearly 50 years to reach AOA.

Keywords WTO, Food security, Public stockholding, Special safeguard mechanism

Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction

Adopted in November 1996 the widely-accepted def‌inition of food security derives from

paragraph 1 of the WorldFood Summit Plan of Action which provides that:

Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to suf‌f‌icient, safe

and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. [1]

The Plan of Action recognisedthat trade was a key element in achieving worldfood security

and echoing the Preamble to the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA),concluded as part of the

Uruguay Round which led to the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO),

© Joseph A. McMahon. Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the

Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and

create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to

full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at

http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode

The author would like to acknowledge the comments made by the reviewers and the editors on the

initial submission of this article. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.

Food security

at the WTO

101

Received20 March 2024

Revised26 June 2024

Accepted30 June 2024

Journalof International Trade

Lawand Policy

Vol.23 No. 2/3, 2024

pp. 101-116

EmeraldPublishing Limited

1477-0024

DOI 10.1108/JITLP-03-2024-0018

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:

https://www.emerald.com/insight/1477-0024.htm

noted that countries would “strive to ensure that food, agricultural trade and overall trade

policies are conducive to fostering food security for all through a fair and market-oriented

world trade system”[2]. Objective 4 of the Plan encouraged countries “[t]o support the

continuation of the reform process in conformity with the Uruguay Round Agreement,

particularly Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture”and to fully implement the

Marrakesh Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform

Programme on Least-Developed and NetFood-Importing Developing Countries (NFIDC). A

month later, at the f‌irst WTO Ministerial Conferencebecause the conclusion of the Uruguay

Round, the WTO Members declared that with respect to agriculture progress had been

made across the three pillars of the AoA –market access, domestic subsidies and export

subsidies [3]. The Declaration initiated a process of analysis and exchange of information

which would allow Members “to better understand the issues involved and identify their

interests before undertaking theagreed negotiations and reviews”[4]. The AoA introduced

reforms across three pillarsas part of a process referred to in the Preamble of establishinga

fair and market-orientedagricultural trading system [5].

On market access, there would be a move to a tariff-only protection regime as a range of

non-tariff measures were to undergo a process of tariff‌ication and this would be

accompanied by a series of reduction commitments[6]. Existing import access opportunities

were to be maintained through tariff quotas and Article 5 AoA created a Safeguard

Mechanism under which certain Members could impose additional tariffs if certain criteria

were met [7]. On domestic support, rules wereintroduced to discipline and reduce domestic

support with a distinction being drawn between such support which has no, or minimal,

distortive effect on trade (the Green Box) and trade-distorting support (the Amber Box).

Support placed in the Amber Box was expressed in terms of the total Aggregate

Measurement of Support which was subjectto reduction commitments [8]. In addition to the

measures listed in the Green Box, a number of other categories of domestic support

measures were exempt from reduction commitments e.g. developmental measures, direct

payments under production-limiting programmes (the Blue Box) and de minimis levels of

support [9]. Finally, in the export competition area, the right to use export subsidies was

limited to those situations listedin Article 9 alongside reduction commitments expressed in

terms of both volume and budgetary outlay for the covered products. Article 10 AoA is an

anti-circumvention provision which, inter alia, allows to the continuation of food aid

operations. In eachof these three areas, Members are subject to notif‌ication obligations.

The Preamble to the AoA referenced the possible negative effects of the reform process

on the NFIDC with the Marrakesh Decision recognising that although the AoA would

generate economic growth, there was a possibility that the reforms could lead to negative

effects for these countries with respect to the availability of basic foodstuffs from external

sources on reasonable terms and conditions [10]. Under the Decision, Members agreed to

review, for example, the level of food aid and its conditions and possible technical and

f‌inancial assistance to these countries to improve their agricultural productivity and

infrastructure. Article 20 AoA mandated negotiations for continuing the process of

fundamental reform to realise “substantial progressive reductions in support”with

paragraph (c) indicating that these negotiations would take into account “non-trade

concerns [and] special and differential treatment to developing country Members”. The

Preamble to the Agreementlists food security as a non-trade concern.

This article addresses the negotiations on food security from the beginning of the

mandated negotiations through the analysis and information exchange (AIE) process

initiated by the 1996 Ministerial Conference (Part II), the negotiations under the Doha

Declaration (Part III) to the negotiations focussing on public stockholding for food security

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