Metaphor and theory: a case study of astronomy

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.13169/prometheus.38.3.0310
• Pages: 310-334
• Published date: 20 December 2022
• Date: 20 December 2022
• Author: Tonci Grubic

Prometheus 310

RESEARCH PAPER

Metaphor and theory: a case study of astronomy

Tonci Grubic

Liverpool Business School, Liverpool John Moores University, UK

ABSTRACT

Metaphors enable the understanding of one thing in terms of another. Although central to rea-

soning and theorizing, there is limited understanding about their role in theory development.

This paper presents a process of metaphorical reasoning that addresses the question of how

metaphors support theory development. The process is applied to the case of astronomy, which

helps explain why metaphors create reality and why their reality-creating side cannot be sepa-

rated from their creative side. The paradoxical nature of metaphors means that metaphorical

reasoning is an open-ended process. The paper also shows that emergence – a fundamental prop-

erty of metaphors – explains their paradoxical nature. This same property makes metaphor a

compressed interpretation of the world, characterized by the discarding of information. Finally,

it is argued that metaphors are abstract intermediaries between senses and experiences. Given

that metaphors are central to reasoning and theorizing, it is not surprising that these findings are

consonant with what we know about theory (creative, reality-creating, sparse, abstract and open-

ended). What is surprising, though, is that the discarding of information seems to be essential for

the building of theory. The paper concludes by exploring what this entails for our understanding

of theory.

Introduction

Metaphors enable understanding by allowing the experiencing one thing in terms of another. There

is a growing recognition in cognitive sciences about the significance of metaphors for reasoning and

understanding (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999; Fauconnier and Turner, 2003). That metaphors

play an essential part in theorizing is widely acknowledged and studied in many disciplines; for

example, management (Morgan, 1980, 1983, 2006; Weick, 1989; Tsoukas, 1991), physics (Lightman,

1989; Dyson, 2008; Bohm and Peat, 2010) and artificial intelligence (Watson, 2019).

Although essential for reasoning and theorizing, there is limited understanding of how

metaphors actually support theory development. A majority of research has focused on what

metaphors do rather than how they support theory development. This paper first reviews the key

theories about metaphors. Building on the review findings, the paper proposes a process of meta-

phorical reasoning that might underpin theory development, and then explains the methodology

devised to test the process. The results of applying the process in the case of astronomy are pre-

sented and their implications for our understanding of how metaphors support theory development

are considered. The paper concludes by exploring what the implications entail for our under-

standing of theory.

*CONTACT: t.grubic@ljmu.ac.uk

ACCEPTING EDITOR: Kevin Scally

DOI:10.13169/prometheus.38.3.0310

Tonci Grubic311

Three theories of metaphor

The most frequently used metaphor theories are comparison theory, interaction theory and concep-

tual metaphor theory. Here, the aim is to identify what is known about how metaphors work and

what is still missing in that knowledge.

Comparison theory

Originating with Aristotle, comparison theory treats metaphors as similes equivalent to the assertion

that A is like B in certain definite respects (Johnson, 1990). To process the metaphor means to see

that the A domain (target) shares certain properties and relations with the B domain (source). The

whole emphasis is on the similarities. The distinctive feature of comparison theory is its insistence

that similarities revealed through the metaphorical transfer exist objectively in the world and are

expressible in literal propositions (Johnson, 1990). Aristotle’s view was that metaphor had to be

(1) a mere use of words and not a matter of concepts, and (2) a deviant use of words since they are

applied to things to which they do not properly apply. If a metaphor had a meaning at all, there

would have to be some consistent basis for determining what the appropriate literal sense was. For

this, Aristotle chose similarity (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).

Interaction theory

Created by Black (1955), interaction theory offers two improvements over comparison theory. First,

it recognizes that metaphor is not a matter of language, but of cognition. Second, it argues that meta-

phorical meaning is created or generated and is emergent in nature. Black (1955, pp.284–5) says: ‘It

would be more illuminating in some of these cases to say that the metaphor creates [original empha-

sis] the similarity than to say that it formulates some similarity antecedently existing’. Richards

(1936), who argues that thought is irreducibly metaphorical and that linguistic metaphors are mani-

festations of these underlying metaphoric thought processes, inspired Black. However, Richards

fails to provide an account of metaphorical creativity. Black (1955) argues that some metaphors

have irreducible meaning beyond any statement of similarities of two objects. The meaning of the

metaphor depends on thought processes in which an entire system of implications from the target

domain interacts with the system from the source domain in a cognitive act of ‘seeing-as’ or ‘con-

ceiving-as’. According to Black, the comparison theory misses this interactive process by which an

emergent structured meaning is generated in such a way that it cannot be broken into parts without

destroying crucial meaning relations. That is, comparison theory of metaphor is too reductionist and

atomistic in its account of metaphorical meaning.

Conceptual metaphor theory

Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) are the key proponents of conceptual metaphor theory. Their

account of how metaphors work in generating understanding builds on three findings of cognitive

sciences: (1) the mind is inherently embodied, (2) thought is mostly unconscious and (3) abstract

concepts are largely metaphorical. The first states that our conceptual system neurally makes use of,

and is shaped by, our sensory and motor systems. That is, understanding is framed in terms of con-

cepts shaped by our embodied experiences. The second finding argues that our thought is mostly

unconscious and that we do not have much control over how we conceptualize situations and reason

about them. For abstract thought, metaphorical reasoning in the form of conceptual or complex

metaphors is used. Built on these three findings, the theory of conceptual metaphor consists of four

parts (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999): (1) theory of conflation, (2) theory of primary metaphor, (3) neu-

ral theory of metaphor and (4) theory of conceptual blending.