Mechanisms of Authoritarian Rule in Bahrain

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.13169/arabstudquar.37.1.0033
• Published date: 01 January 2015
• Date: 01 January 2015
• Pages: 33-53
• Author: Nebil Husayn

ASQ 37.1 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals

MECHANISMS OF AUTHORITARIAN

RULE IN BAHRAIN

Nebil Husayn

Abstract: This investigation identif‌ies the different elements in Bahraini society and government

that indicate the existence of authoritarian rule and the mechanisms which perpetuate it.

Hardliners in the royal family have strategically obstructed democratization in the country

by controlling Bahrain’s ideological and coercive state apparatus. The ideological apparatus

encourages public disavowal of political reform and marginalizing Bahrain’s Shī‘ī heritage.

The coercive state apparatus regularly punishes, imprisons, and physically abuses political

activists and those who are suspected of encouraging civil unrest. Bahrain’s alliance with

Saudi Arabia has encouraged hardliners in the government to particularly promote anti-Shī‘ī

agendas that stigmatize, disenfranchise, and repress the majority of its citizens. Representa-

tives of the Bahraini government have consistently accused Iran of providing logistical support

to Bahraini activists. However, evidence suggests the claims of Iranian involvement in the 2011

demonstrations or an alleged coup attempt in 1981 to be false. Finally, this article identif‌ies

developments in 2011, both inside and outside of the country, that encouraged the reduction of

repression of its citizens.

Keywords: Bahrain, authoritarianism, Khawālid, protests, anti-Shī‘ī, sentiment, Arab Spring,

repression, coercive state apparatus, ideological state apparatus

Introduction

Numerous indications in Bahraini society and government conrm the existence

of authoritarian rule and an enterprise that maintains it. Drawing on Benjamin

Smith, this article searches for elements of the coercive state apparatus (CSA),

which includes security forces and the judicial system, and strategic alliances

that encourage authoritarianism in normal life and in times of crisis. A number

of sociologists have additionally identied the ideological state apparatus (ISA)

as a mechanism that maintains hegemonic worldviews and limits changes in

the existing power structure (Althusser, 1972: 145-149; Heywood, 1994: 84-85,

99-101). In addition to the CSA and alliances, the government of Bahrain has

utilized the media, schools, mosques, and private and public sector jobs to create

an ISA that encourages and coerces public afrmation of the status quo. Tactics

include the characterization of Bahrain as Arab, Sunnī, and loyal to the monarchy

Nebil Husayn, PhD Candidate, Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, NJ, USA.

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34 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY

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and the protestors as dangerous, deceitful, sectarian, and loyal to Iran. Hardliners

in the government particularly promote anti-Shī‘ī agendas that stigmatize,

disenfranchise, and repress the majority of its citizens. Various investigations have

identied the claims of the state as largely ctitious; however, over a thousand

citizens have been detained and some convicted and sentenced for crimes

predicated upon these claims (Bassiouni et al., 2011: 320-321, 389-400; The

Guardian, 2011: para. 21; Physicians for Human Rights (USA), 2011). In 2011,

the government carried out a systematic crackdown of protests and justied its

actions through discourses on loyalty. Protesters were publicly accused of treason,

while pro-government partisans were portrayed as loyal and loving citizens. After

analyzing the government’s claims, this investigation will end by utilizing the

events of 2011 as a case study to identify developments both inside and outside

of the country that have encouraged the reduction of repression in the country.

For example, international challenges to ideological discourses as well as political

and economic pressures from foreign governments and organizations were all

effective in producing responses from the Bahraini government.

Tensions between Hardliners and Reformers

As a country that receives more than half of its revenue from oil and minerals,

Bahrain is economically a rentier state.1 The number of its citizens is no greater

than 700,000, 60 to 70 percent of whom are Shī‘ī, while the ruling al-Khalifa

family is Sunnī (Katzman, 2012: 28; Richards, 2008: 46). There is some indication

that smaller populations are easier to repress, and small states tend to be less

democratic than those with larger populations (Ross, 2001: 345). Rentier states are

also able to obstruct democratization efforts by using their wealth to fund parts of

the coercive apparatus like secret police and modernization without liberalization

(Ross, 2001: 326-327). According to Kiren Chaudhry (1994), Gulf states in the

1970s used their oil revenues to develop programs that deliberately “destroyed

independent civil institutions while generating others designed to facilitate the

political aims of the state” (9).

Both personal and strategic interests encourage hardliners in the royal family

to maintain authoritarian rule rather than shift power toward a more democratic,

parliamentarian state. Personal interests include direct access to billions of dollars,

and the ascendancy of the person and his clan in the government. Strategic interests

include the promotion of anti-Shī‘ī and anti-Iranian sentiments in the region

through sectarianism and the systematic discrimination of Shī‘ī citizens. Alliances

with other Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia offer full support of authoritarian-

ism and discriminatory practices in Bahrain. Opposition gures in Bahrain have

identied hardliners in the government such as Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa and

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