Legal Analogy as an Alternative to the Deductive Mode of Legal Reasoning

AuthorMaciej Koszowski
PositionJan Dlugosz University in Czestochowa, the Faculty of Philology and History
Pages73-87
e Indonesian Journal of International & Comparative Law
ISSN: 2338-7602; E-ISSN: 2338-770X
http://www.ijil.org
© 2017 e Institute for Migrant Rights Press
is article is connected to the research project the author carried out in the United
Kingdom as a guest researcher at Aberystwyth University as part of the Polish govern-
mental programme: “Mobilność Plus” [Mobility Plus].
LEGAL ANALOGY AS AN ALTERNATIVE
TO THE DEDUCTIVE MODE OF LEGAL
REASONING
Maciej Koszowski
Jan Długosz University in Częstochowa, the Faculty of Philology and History
E-mail: negotium@op.pl
is article demonstrates the inadequacy of legal deduction as a method that
guarantees the certainty and predictability of law and its outcomes in concrete
instances. Inter alia, it brings our attention to the far smaller role that the deduc-
tive pattern of inference plays in legal thought than one may suppose, since this
pattern rather only a schematic illustration of the decisions that were previously
made by recourse to the mental operations of a non-logical nature. In return,
as an alternative, legal analogy by which it is understood a mode of thinking
which enables the reasoners to take into account a mass of dierent factors that
are traditionally deemed to be relevant for legal thought and decision-making
is proered.
Keywords: Jurisprudence, Formalism, Positivism, Analogical Reasoning, Legal Argu-
mentation, Legal Inference.

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