Jurisdiction

• Pages: 18-21

18 Volume 23, January–March 2017 international law update

© 2017 International Law Group, LLC. All rights reserved. ISSN 1089-5450, ISSN 1943-1287 (on-line) | www.internationallawupdate.com

against the prof‌fered description of U.S. criminal

law. ese analyses showed that Belgium had a

reasoned basis for concluding that Trabelsi could

be extradited, and that conclusion—based in

substantial measure on Belgium’s construction of

its own law—is entitled to considerable deference.

*1192

Even outside the context of specialty and dual

criminality, U.S. courts will defer to the judgment

of foreign courts construing their own laws. See,

e.g., United States ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia, 109

F.3d 165, 168-69 (3d Cir. 1997) (af‌f‌irming an

extradition after “defer[ring] to the judgment of the

High Court of Justice for Trinidad and Tobago on

the validity of the [operative] extradition treaty and

its continuing vitality at the time of ... extradition”).

International comity remains important in

this context. e deference here is customary,

rather than “excessive” or “extraordinary,” as the

concurring colleague claimed. *1193

e concurring colleague casts doubt on

the Belgian proceedings because, purportedly,

“Belgium has fulf‌illed its interest in this case.”

Concurring Op. at 1195. But the Judges had no

reason to suppose that because Trabelsi served his

Belgian sentence, Belgian authorities subjected the

extradition request to lighter scrutiny than was

warranted; the double-jeopardy principle itself is

worth protecting. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF

THE UNITED STATES § 476 cmt. c (AM LAW

INST. 1987) (“e principle that a person should

not be subject to double jeopardy is common to

legal systems generally, and in many countries is

constitutionally mandated.”). e record contains

nothing to support the concurrence’s speculation.

e Court of Appeals af‌f‌irmed the order

denying Trabelsi’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

citation: US v. Trabelsi, 845 F. 3d 1181—Court of

Appeals, Dist. of Columbia Circuit 2017.

JURISDICTION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)

(2) and Fifth Amendment. United States

Court of Appeals, District of Columbia

Circuit affirms the order of the United

States District Court for the District

of Columbia denying jurisdictional

discovery and granting Palestinian

Authority’s Motion to Dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction

In 2011, Jewish worshippers were shot by armed

gunmen at Joseph’s Tomb, a holy site in the West

Bank believed by many to be the burial place of the

biblical patriarch. Among the victims were Ben-Yosef

Livnat, who was killed, and U.S. citizens Yitzhak

Safra and Natan Safra, who were wounded in the

gunf‌ire. According to the Livnats and Safras, the

perpetrators of the attack were the security guards

hired to protect Joseph’s Tomb by the Palestinian

Authority. e Palestinian Authority is a government

headquartered in the West Bank city of Ramallah.

e Palestinian Authority has non-member observer

status in the United Nations and receives foreign

aid from the United States, the European Union,

and other sources. e United States does not

recognize the Palestinian Authority as a government

of a sovereign state. e Livnat and Safra families

brought suit in federal district court seeking to hold

the Palestinian Authority vicariously liable for the

attack, bringing claims under both the Antiterrorism

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, and common-law tort. e

families alleged that the guards who perpetrated the

attack at Joseph’s Tomb were acting within the scope

of their employment by the Palestinian Authority,

which knew that the commander of the guards had

served time in Israeli prison on terrorism-related

charges. *47

e district court addressed the issue of

personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(k)(2), concluding that the Livnats

and Safras had forfeited all other statutory bases

for personal jurisdiction. Applying the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the court found

that the Palestinian Authority was not “at home”