Jurisdiction

• Pages: 60-63

60 Volume 20, July–September 2014 international law update

© 2014 International Law Group, LLC. All rights reserved. ISSN 1089-5450, ISSN 1943-1287 (on-line) | www.internationallawupdate.com

as explained above, the entire section of the OLC-

DOD Memorandum that includes any mention

of intelligence gathering activities. [redacted]”

[Slip op. 15]

“e three-part test for ‘ocial’ disclosure,

relevant to Exemption 1, which the District

Court took from [Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171

(2d Cir. 2009)], has been suciently satised.

[redacted] is’ ‘as specic as the information

previously released’’ [redacted], it ‘`match[es]

the information previously disclosed,’’ and was

‘`made public through an ocial and documented

disclosure.’’ Dist. Ct. Op., 915 F.3d at 536 … In

reaching this conclusion, we do not understand

the ‘matching’ aspect of the Wilson test to require

absolute identity. Indeed, such a requirement

would make little sense. A FOIA requester would

have little need for undisclosed information if it

had to match precisely information previously

disclosed.” [Slip op. 15]

“With the redactions and public disclosures

discussed above, it is no longer either ‘logical’ or

‘plausible’ to maintain that disclosure of the legal

analysis in the OLC-DOD Memorandum risks

disclosing any aspect of ‘military plans, intelligence

activities, sources and methods, and foreign

relations.’ e release of the DOJ White Paper,

discussing why the targeted killing of al-Awlaki

would not violate several statutes, makes this clear.

[redacted] in the OLC-DOD Memorandum adds

nothing to the risk. Whatever protection the legal

analysis might once have had has been lost by

virtue of public statements of public ocials at the

highest levels and ocial disclosure of the DOJ

White Paper.” [Slip op. 12] (footnotes omitted)

[Slip op. 15]

e Court concludes that:

(1) a redacted version of the OLC-DOD

Memorandum must be disclosed, (2) a redacted

version of the classied Vaughn index submitted

by OLC must be disclosed, (3) the Glomar and

“no number, no list” responses are insuciently

justied, (4) DOD and CIA must submit Vaughn

indices to the District Court for in camera

inspection and determination of appropriate

disclosure and appropriate redaction, and (5) the

Oce of Information Policy (“OIP”) search was

sucient.

NOTE: A second appeal involving this matter

is currently pending in the Second Circuit. See

e New York Times Company v. United States

Department of Justice, Nos. 14-4432-cv(L), 14-

4764(Con) (2d. Cir).

   : he New York Times Company v. United

States Department of Justice, Nos. 13-422(L), 13-

445(Con.) (2d Cir. April 21, 2014).

JURISDICTION

I                

              

      ( D     T  ),

S   C          

               ’

                 

     “   ”   N  Y ; 

              

                    

       ’     

                   “

  ”             

Sonera Holding B.V. is a Dutch holding

company that negotiated to purchase shares of

Çukurova Holding A.S. (Cukurova) in Turkcell

Holding A.S (Turkcell Holding), a Turkish joint

stock company that owns a controlling stake in

Turkey’s largest mobile phone operator.

e negotiations failed and in 2005, pursuant

to a letter agreement, the parties began arbitration

before an arbitration tribunal in Geneva,

Switzerland. After protracted proceedings,

in 2011, the tribunal found that the parties

concluded a share purchase agreement, and

ordered Cukurova to pay Sonera $932 million in

damages for its failure to deliver the shares. Sonera