Joseph Raz’s Service Conception and the Limits of Knowability

• Published date: 01 September 2021
• Author: Adriana Placani
• Date: 01 September 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12326

Ratio Juris. Vol. 34 No. 3 September (207–223)

© (2021) The Authors. Ratio Juris, published by the University of Bologna and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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Joseph Raz’s Service Conception

andtheLimits of Knowability

ADRIANA PLACANI

Abstract. This essay criticizes Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority on the basis of its

knowability condition. The condition states that for agents to be justified in following authori-

tative directives, they must be able to know (i.e., form reliable beliefs) that the authority is-

suing the directives is in fact legitimate. Three grounds for concern are identified. The first is

that the satisfaction of the normal justification thesis (NJT), which states that the legitimacy of

authorities hinges on whether their directives enable subjects to better conform to reason, only

provides agents with reasons to believe that it is justified to act as if an authority were legitimate

(i.e., on the assumption that it is). Based on the belief/acceptance distinction, the NJT allows

for a gap between what is actually the case and what agents are willing to go along with in

order to improve the likelihood of conforming to right reason. The independence condition

(IC), which states that for those matters where the NJT obtains it must be better for a subject to

improve such conformity than to decide for herself, must be satisfied in conjunction with the

NJT, but suffers from its own particular problems. Thus, the second problem identified is that

of incommensurable values, which appears when agents are not able to decide between the

value of improving right reason— NJT— and the value of deciding for themselves— IC. Finally,

the third problem is that of vagueness about right reason, where agents attempting to deter-

mine whether an authority meets the two conditions are not able to settle whether reason is

improved. Together, these three problem areas of knowability serve to challenge Raz’s position.

1. Introduction

Even only a cursory glance at the vast literature on authority reveals the merits of

Jerome Hall’s statement: “It is difficult to know precisely what questions should be

asked about authority” (quoted in Braybrooke 1960, 469). The problem he describes,

however, is one that Joseph Raz has avoided in his own work. This is not to say that

Raz has discovered a cipher for unlocking the secret to asking questions— the ones

that matter, at least— but rather that his work addresses authority in such a way as to

show that he is not at a loss when it comes to queries about it. This can help explain

Raz’s prominence in political and legal philosophy, as well as his ongoing pursuit of

answers to problems that arise when conceptualizing the inner workings of author-

ity. The following essay focuses attention on Raz’s service conception of authority,

and one related query that comes from his work.

Raz’s account of authority attempts to make sense not only of what authority is,

but also of why and how an individual could regard an authority as legitimate. Certain

epistemic conditions exist that enable the recognition of an authority. Another way of

saying this is that an authority is knowable. As the following will illustrate, knowability

Adriana Placani

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Ratio Juris, Vol. 34, No. 3© (2021) The Authors. Ratio Juris, published by the University of Bologna and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

is a crucial piece in Raz’s overall account. Even if one accepts at face value that know-

ability is of great importance in the service conception, the boundaries of the overall

account need delimitation. This will be the first major pursuit in the following paper:

outlining some core concepts of Raz’s service conception of authority. The second task

is to show why there are good reasons to doubt the feasibility of satisfying the concep-

tion’s knowability condition. To substantiate this, three problem areas of knowability

are highlighted: (1) the two conditions for legitimate authority entail acceptance rather

than belief; (2) the incommensurability of values; (3) the vagueness of “right reason.”

As the preceding indicates, investigation of these issues will both focus on and

limit itself to Raz’s service conception. The aim is not to refute Raz’s account (at least

not yet). What this essay accomplishes is the analysis and problematization of the

service conception, with particular emphasis placed on the knowability condition.

In this sense, the following provides both an analytical orientation as well as an op-

portunity to highlight some of the weaknesses that attend Raz’s account of authority.

Before beginning analysis, I want to give an overview of this paper’s structure.

Section2 offers a brief account of the main ideas of the service conception of author-

ity. The aim here is to introduce the basic concepts and chief questions that shape the

ensuing work. Section3 relies on the main ideas already introduced, but reconsti-

tutes them in the form of an example. The aim is to clarify and concretize the more

formal exposition of the service conception provided in Section2. This will prepare

the ground for the critical analysis to follow. Sections4 and 5 thus critically examine

and scrutinize Raz’s account. The main focus is the knowability condition and the

deficiencies that attend it. This section aims to cast doubt on the feasibility of the

knowability condition. Section6 concludes this work.

2. Authority in Raz: Core Elements

The service conception of authority first and foremost poses two problems— one moral

and the other theoretical. The moral problem can be put in the interrogative; as such it

asks, How can an individual have a duty to subject his or her own judgment and will

to that of another? Of the theoretical problem, Raz says: “In exercising authority we

impose on others duties that they did not have before, and we do so simply by express-

ing an intention to do so” (Raz 2006, 1013). The theoretical problem, then, concerns

how reasons (for action) and obligations can be imposed simply by communicating

the intention to impose them (ibid., 1012). Raz provides solutions to both problems.

The service conception seeks to solve the moral problem by means of two condi-

tions, which are called conditions of legitimacy (ibid., 1017– 8). The first is the normal

justification thesis, or NJT. The condition of legitimacy captured by it stipulates that

when the NJT is met, a subject would better conform to reasons that apply to her

anyway if she intends to be guided by an authority’s directives than by following

those reasons directly (ibid., 1014). In other words, NJT holds that “authorities are

legitimate only if their directives enable their subjects to better conform to reason”

(ibid., 1014– 8). The second condition is the independence condition, or IC. It says

that matters concerning which the first condition is met are such that with respect to

them it is better to conform to reason than to decide for oneself without the aid of the

authority (ibid., 1014).

Again, Raz claims that the above two conditions answer the moral problem. Here

is a succinct way of formulating his solution: If an individual (subject) who intends