Introducing dominant‐currency pricing in the ECB's global macroeconomic model
Author | Saskia Mösle,Georgios Georgiadis |
Published date | 01 August 2020 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/infi.12361 |
Date | 01 August 2020 |
International Finance. 2020;23:234–256.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/infi234
|
© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
DOI: 10.1111/infi.12361
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Introducing dominant‐currency pricing in the
ECB’s global macroeconomic model
Georgios Georgiadis
1
|
Saskia Mösle
2
1
European Central Bank, Frankfurt,
Germany
2
Kiel Institute for the World Economy,
Kiel, Germany
Correspondence
Georgios Georgiadis, European Central
Bank, Sonnemannstr. 20, 60314
Frankfurt, Germany.
Email: georgios.georgiadis@ecb.int
Abstract
A large share of global trade being priced and invoiced
primarily in U.S. dollar rather than the exporter’sorthe
importer’s currency has important implications for the
transmission of shocks. We introduce this “dominant‐
currency pricing”(DCP) into ECB‐Global, the ECB’s
macroeconomic model for the global economy. To our
knowledge, this is the first attempt to incorporate DCP into
a major global macroeconomic model used at central
banks or international organisations. In ECB‐Global, DCP
affects in particular the role of expenditure‐switching and
the U.S. dollar exchange rate for spillovers: In case of a
shock in a non‐U.S. economy that alters the value of its
currency multilaterally, expenditure‐switching occurs only
through imports; in case of a U.S. shock that alters the
value of the U.S. dollar multilaterally, expenditure‐switch-
ing occurs both in non‐U.S. economies’imports and—as
these are imports of their trading partners—exports.
Overall, under DCP the U.S. dollar exchange rate is a
major driver of global trade, even for transactions that do
not involve the United States. To illustrate the usefulness
of ECB‐Global and DCP for policy analysis, we explore the
implications of the euro rivalling the U.S. dollar as a
second dominant currency in global trade. According to
ECB‐Global, in such a scenario the global spillovers from
U.S. shocks are smaller, whereas those from euro area
shocks are amplified; domestic euro area monetary policy
effectiveness is hardly affected by the euro becoming a
second globally dominant currency in trade.
KEYWORDS
dominant‐currency paradigm, global macroeconomic modelling, spil-
lovers
JEL CLASSIFICATION
F42; E52; C50
1
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INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly integrated global economy, spillovers and the interdependence of economic
policies have gained immense prominence among commentators. Consequently, there has been
a growing interest in the use of global macroeconomic models, which incorporate rich
transmission channels of cross‐border spillovers for scenario analyses and forecasting. This is
also true for central banks, which increasingly recognise the importance of the global economy
for the evolution of the domestic economy. And especially for major central banks, it has been
increasingly recognised that it is important to account for the effects of domestic monetary
policy on the rest of the world. For example, at the IMF the Flexible System of Global Models
(Andrle et al., 2015) and the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal (Laxton & Kumhof, 2007)
model have been used extensively for simulations underpinning the World Economic Outlook;
at the ECB, ECB‐Global (Dieppe, Georgiadis, Ricci, Van Robays, & van Roye, 2017) regularly
provides insights from scenario analyses in different contexts.
In parallel, academic research has recently highlighted the role of dominant‐currency
pricing (DCP) for the domestic and cross‐border transmission of shocks. Traditionally, open‐
economy models assume that exports are priced and invoiced in the currency of the producer,
that is, producer‐currency pricing (PCP), or in the currency of the destination, that is, local‐
currency pricing (LCP). In contrast, the data suggest that a large share of trade is invoiced in a
few dominant currencies (Gopinath, 2015).
1
In particular, the data displayed in Figure 1
document that a large share of global trade is invoiced in U.S. dollars. This is the case in
particular for emerging market economies (EMEs), and notably for transactions that do not
involve the United States as a trading partner. Moreover, Chen, Chung, and Novy (2018),
Fitzgerald and Haller (2012), Georgiadis and Schumann (2019) and Gopinath and Rigobon
(2008) provide evidence that export and import prices are sticky in the invoicing currency.
DCP has important implications for the dynamics of trade variables that differ from those under
PCP and LCP. Specifically, Casas, Diez, Gopinath, and Gourinchas (2017) consider a three‐country
New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (NK DSGE) model for the Home economy,
the rest of the world (RoW) and the United States, in which export prices are sticky in U.S. dollars.
In their model, in the case of a multilateral appreciation of the Home currency driven by a
contractionary monetary policy shock, Home terms‐of‐trade are stable as import and export prices
both fall in Home currency terms. This is in contrast to PCP, under which the terms‐of‐trade rise as
Home import prices fall while Home export prices are constant; and this is also in contrast to LCP,
under which the terms‐of‐trade fall as Home import prices in domestic currency remain constant
while Home export prices in domestic currency fall. In turn, the differential responses of the terms‐
of‐trade imply differences in the role of expenditure‐switching in case of a multilateral appreciation
GEORGIADIS AND MÖSLE
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