Common interests, closer allies: how democracy in Arab states can benefit the West.

• Author: O'Connell, Jamie
• Position: Introduction through III. Arab Democratization and Western Interests, p. 341-386

Western leaders have reacted ambivalently to the antigovernment protests during the "Arab Spring" and the political developments that have followed in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia. This Article argues that they should see democratic change in Arab countries as an important long-term goal and seek opportunities to support it. Democratization would advance Western countries' interests, as well as the ideals they proclaim and the interests of Arab citizens who aspire to govern themselves.

The Article synthesizes empirical social science, social science theory, and policy analysis that strongly suggest that democratization of Arab countries would serve core Western interests in the region. First, democracy would have a stabilizing impact inside Arab countries, reducing the risk of civil war and internal terrorism in the long run and quite possibly in the short run. Second, interstate conflict, which this Article's original empirical findings show to be frequent in the Arab world would likely diminish in the long run as more Arab states became democratic. Third, terrorist attacks against Western countries would be less likely to originate in Arab countries if the latter became solid democracies. Finally, Western countries' fundamental interests in the region align more closely with those of Arab publics than those of Arab dictators, so Arab citizens are likely to be better partners for the West. This benefit will not materialize automatically, however. Western policymakers will have to overcome ordinary Arabs' well-justified skepticism about their intentions. Their first step must be to transform their attitudes and policies so as to respect Arab citizens as equals and partners.

The Article also considers the possibility that Islamists elected to lead new Arab democracies would use state power to harshly oppress women and minorities. It concludes that this is unlikely, but not out of the question. Continued autocracy is likely to strengthen Islamists' support anyway, so Western countries should not hesitate to support democratization out of concern over what Islamists might do in office.

Western countries must step carefully as they try to support democratic change in Arab countries. Their power is limited and they cannot be the primary drivers of change. Their efforts must be guided by subtle analysis of local power dynamics and of how their influence functions in each national context.

1. INTRODUCTION II. A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: DEMOCRACY AS A HUMAN RIGHT III. ARAB DEMOCRATIZATION AND WESTERN INTERESTS A. Enhancing Internal Peace 1. Western Interests in Internal Peace 2. The Long-Run Impact of Democracy 3. The Short-Run Impact of Democratization: Semidemocracies 4. The Short-Run Impact of Democratization: Autocracies 5. Synthesis B. Promoting International Peace 1. The Democratic Peace Finding 2. Policymakers' Embrace of Democratic Peace Ideas 3. The Incidence of Militarized Conflict in the Arab World 4. Explaining the Democratic Peace C. Preventing Transnational Terrorism D. More Reliable Allies 1. Relying on Citizens, Not Regimes 2. Israel, Arab Democracy, and Western Policy IV. ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM A. Who Islamists Are B. Moderation Through Participation C. Prioritizing Delivery Over Moral Renewal D. Domestic and International Counterweights E. No Alternative: Autocracy's Boomerang Effect F. Engagement, Not Exclusion V. CONCLUSION: SUPPORTING DEMOCRATIZATION I. INTRODUCTION

   Tunisian fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation on December 17, 2010, represented a desperate protest against his humiliation by petty bureaucrats, but his story triggered a series of uprisings with cataclysmic political effects, first by fellow Tunisians and then by hundreds of thousands of others in countries across the Arab world. (1) The demonstrations quickly produced extraordinary results, toppling Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in February. (2) Algeria's government lifted a nineteen-year state of emergency and King Mohamed VI of Morocco promised to curb his own power. (3) Protestors in Syria resisted brutal assaults by security forces, while Libyan army units joined civilians in rebelling against leader Muammar Qaddafi. Arab publics remained mobilized throughout 2011, despite a Saudi-led effort to dampen momentum for change. (4) By early 2012, Qaddafi had fallen, (5) the Syrian regime had been abandoned by other Arab dictatorships," and Egyptians were maintaining pressure on the military to permit a transition to full democracy. (7) While some regimes seemed to have turned back democratic challenges, (8) dramatic change had already occurred in Tunisia and appeared likely at least in Egypt and Libya. Conditions remained dynamic around the Arab world, perhaps even in the wealthy Persian Gulf states. (9)

   The antigovernment protests of this "Arab Spring" caught Western leaders off guard. (10) Initially, they refrained from criticizing their long-time allies, presumably to avoid alienating them in case they survived. In some cases, they even offered new support. As Ben Ali clung to power, France offered to train his riot police in crowd control. (11) (Then-President Nicolas Sarkozy later admitted that he had "underestimated" the popular anger against Ben Ali's regime. (12)) The Obama Administration had demoted democratization as a foreign policy goal and avoided discussing it, reacting against the Bush Administration's attempt to create democracy by military force in Iraq. (13)

   Western governments' positions evolved in close parallel with the shifting balance of power on the ground. Where protests gained strength, Western leaders offered support for the protestors' "legitimate demands," but also called on them to remain peaceful, thus implying that security forces might be justified in responding with force. After Ben Ali fled into exile, President Obama proclaimed in the State of the Union Address, "Tonight, let us be clear: the United States of America stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democratic aspirations of all people." (14) But with Mubarak still in office in Egypt, the President declined to make "clear" that the United States stood with the Egyptian people as well as the Tunisians. (15) In general, he and his European counterparts were slower to express support for protestors challenging the governments of Western allies, such as Bahrain, which hosts the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, than enemies, such as Syria, a staunch ally of Iran. Indeed, in October 2011, as Bahrain's government provoked shock with its brutal response to peaceful protests, the Obama Administration announced it would sell it armored vehicles for which the government had, in the judgment of the Washington Post, "no plausible use ... other than against its own people." (16)

   Pressure on Western leaders rose as reporters contrasted their tepid equivocations in briefing rooms at the State Department and Quai d'Orsay with the images of protestors calling for democracy in the face of truncheons in Tahrir Square and Pearl Roundabout. Were these brave young Egyptians and Bahrainis not latter-day equivalents of the American and French revolutionaries of 1776 and 1789? Obama, Sarkozy, and their fellow leaders soon felt compelled to express clearer support for democracy wherever their allies did not rule--in Syria and Libya, and in Tunisia and Egypt after Ben Ali and Mubarak fell.

   Since early 2011, Western political leaders and foreign policy experts inside and outside government have debated whether democratization in Arab countries would serve their countries' interests. (17) This ambivalence is consistent with a general pattern in the foreign policies of the most powerful Western countries, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Their leaders regularly hail democracy as a universal value and see it as part of their countries' identities, but only sometimes support it elsewhere. They accept dictators as allies and give them political, material, and sometimes military support. For example, France backed the repressive and eventually genocidal regime of Juvenal Habyarimana in Rwanda until 1994, and since then the United States and United Kingdom have supported Habyarimana's autocratic overthrower, Paul Kagame. (18) Western democracies have aided or welcomed coups against democratically elected leaders, including in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973, and possibly Venezuela in 2002. (19) They have rejected the choices made democratically by citizens in Algeria in 1992 and the Gaza Strip in 2005, backing the Algerian military's coup to prevent an elected Islamist party from taking power and refusing to engage with Gaza's Hamas-led government. An analysis of major European Union (E.U.) initiatives aimed at promoting change in the Arab world in the 1990s and 2000s concluded:

   [W]hile declaring its commitment to promoting human rights and democracy, by its actions the EU has favoured regimes and practices that ultimately proved intolerable to a broad stratum of Arab society.... EU policies have actually betrayed the professed European values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law rather than exporting them. (20) U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt's famous comment on Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza--"he may be a son-of-a-bitch, but he's our son-of-a-bitch"--may be apocryphal, but is cited frequently because it captures an important truth about Western democracies' foreign policies: When push has come to shove, presidents before and after Roosevelt, and their counterparts in Europe, generally have preferred cooperative dictators to independent-minded democrats.

   This Article steps into this debate and contributes to policymaking and to scholarship on U.S. and other Western countries' foreign policies. It synthesizes empirical social science, social science theory, and policy analysis that illuminate the likely impact of democratic...