Report No. 27 (2021) IACHR. Petition No. 12.754 (United States)

• Year: 2021
• Case Type: Merits
• Court: Inter-American Comission of Human Rights

REPORT No. 27/20

CASE 12.754

REPORT ON THE MERITS (PUBLICATION)

NVWTOHIYADA IDEHESDI SEQUOYAH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OEA/Ser.L/V/II

D.. 37

A. 22, 2020

Original: English

Approved electronically by the Inter-American Commission on A. 22, 2020.

Cite as: IACHR, Report No. 27/20. Case 12.754. Merits (Publication). Nvwtohiyada Idehesdi Sequoyah. United S.s of America. A. 22, 2020.

www.cidh.org

INDEX

I. INTRODUCTION 2

II. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES 2

A. Petitioners 2

B. S. 3

III. FINDINGS OF FACT 3

A. Legal framework 4

B. P. proceedings regarding competency to stand trial and to self-represent 4

C. Death sentence and automatic appeal 7

IV. ANALYSIS OF LAW 8

A. Preliminary considerations 8

B. to a fair trial and to due process of law 10

1. General considerations regarding the right to self-representation and its limitations 10

2. The right to self-representation in death penalty cases 11

3. A. of the case 11

C. Right not to receive cruel, infamous or unusual punishment 12

1. Right of every person with mental disabilities not to be subjected to the death penalty 12

2. A. of the case 13

D. Right to be tried without undue delay 14

1. General considerations on the right to be tried without undue delay 14

2. A. of the case 14

E. Right of protection against cruel, infamous or unusual punishment 16

1. The deprivation of liberty on death row 16

F. The right to life and the right to protection against cruel, infamous or unusual punishment with respect to the eventual execution of Nvwtohiyada Idehesdi Sequoyah 16

V. ACTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO REPORT No. 15/19 17

VI. ACTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO REPORT 95/19 17

VII. FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17

VIII. PUBLICATION 18

REPORT No. 27/20

CASE 12.754

MERITS

(PUBLICATION)

NVWTOHIYADA IDEHESDI SEQUOYAH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
APRIL 22, 2020

1. INTRODUCTION

1. On February 2, 2007, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the “Inter-American Commission” or “IACHR”) received a petition submitted by C. de la Vega, from the F.C.N. International Human Rights Law Clinic of the University of San Francisco, and Human Rights Advocates and fos*ters (the “petitioners”), alleging the international responsibility of the United S.s of America (the “S.” or “the United S.s”) for the violation of the right of Nvwtohiyada Idehesdi Sequoyah (“Mr. Sequoyah”), who has been on death row in California since 1992, to be tried without undue delay.

2. The Commission approved its admissibility report No. 42/10 on M. 17, 2010.1 On M. 30, 2010, the IACHR notified the report to the parties and placed itself at the disposition of the parties to reach a friendly settlement. The parties were allocated the time periods provided for in the IACHR’s R.s of Procedure to present additional observations on the merits of the case. A. of the information received by the IACHR was duly transmitted to the parties.

2. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

1. Petitioners

3. The petitioners state that Mr. Sequoyah, born B.R.W., is a U.S. citizen who is incarcerated on death row at the San Quentin Prison in California since February 1992. A. being allowed to represent himself, he was convicted of murder in San Diego in 1991 and sentenced to death in early 1992. The petitioners allege that the United S.s has violated Mr. Sequoyah’s rights to be tried without undue delay, to receive humane treatment in detention, to protection of the court, as well as his right to life.

4. According to the petitioners, at the time Mr. Sequoyah was imprisoned on death row, the government was on notice of very substantial evidence that he was suffering from psychological harm. T. different judges hearing his criminal case, years apart, had independently questioned his mental stability at trial and therefore, had appointed psychiatrists to evaluate him. A full formal competency trial was conducted. T. mental health professionals testified regarding Mr. Sequoyah’s psychiatric hospitalization several years prior to his arrest, and the court received expert testimony that he was not competent to stand trial. E. after a jury found him competent to stand trial under a complex standard that does not negate the existence of mental illness but merely quantifies it, the judge who had initiated the competency procedure nonetheless found that he still suffered from a mental disorder which impaired him from perceiving the risks of representing himself. A. Mr. Sequoyah’s request to represent himself was granted by a judge who, according to the petitioners, was unaware of the prior evidence of Mr. Sequoyah’s mental problems, two additional judges expressed doubts about his mental state. The first judge sought to initiate another psychiatric evaluation but was prevented by an appellate court from doing so. At trial, yet another judge questioned Mr. Sequoyah’s reasoning ability, though he did nothing to stop the proceedings.

5. The petitioners note that Mr. Sequoyah’s mental health was already in question during the trial proceedings and that it has continued to worsen during his time spent on death row. T. allege that the S. of California had ample evidence of psychiatric damage which made him vulnerable to further emotional damage inflicted by the “death row syndrome.” T., in a context of an overall lack of health care in the California prison system.

6. The petitioners indicate that, for three years and nine months, Mr. Sequoyah remained without any counsel or assistance to appeal his case. In December 1995, he was appointed a state public defender to represent him on his appeal and habeas corpus proceeding. The record for the six years of litigation in the trial court received by the public defender lacked numerous documents, transcripts, statements, and evidence of proceedings and orders of the court. The petitioners also state that what was included was badly scrambled and disorganized. A. two years of sorting through the documents, the defender filed a correction motion in December 1997 and the final record on appeal was delivered to the California Supreme Court in February 2007, fifteen years after Mr. Sequoyah was condemned to death.

7. T. state that Mr. Sequoyah’s opening brief was due in September 2009 and that the due date was substantially delayed given the death of one of his attorneys. The date was subsequently changed to January 2011 following the retirement of one of the attorneys and the appointment of a new one. In their brief on the merits before the IACHR, the petitioners argued that, even if the target date was met, it was estimated that it would take at least five years for the appeal to be heard by the California Supreme Court given the immense backlog. T. alleged that, under the best of circumstances, Mr. Sequoyah would have been on death row for 24 years before his first appeal would have been decided.

2. S.

8. The United S.s submits that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any facts that would constitute a violation of Mr. Sequoyah’s rights under the American D.. It states that the U.S. appellate process and habeas corpus procedures afford those convicted of capital offenses a high level of internationally recognized protection.

9. Any perceived delay in the California Supreme Court’s adjudication of Mr. Sequoyah’s appeal results only from due process safeguards in place to preserve his right to legally challenge his conviction and sentencing, as well as his extension requests. Given that he has requested so many extensions of time to file his appellate brief, he cannot now claim that the consequent delay was cruel, infamous or unusual punishment. Therefore, the S. submits that the petitioners failed to state a claim under Article XXVI of the D.. It also alleges that delays caused by thorough judicial review are not inconsistent with the D. but rather, according to the S., evidence of the United S.s’ commitment to due process of law. The S. further notes that if the California Supreme Court affirms the conviction, Mr. Sequoyah may pursue federal causes of action to challenge his detention or any perceived delays.

10. The S. also alleges that the IACHR has only applied the “undue delay” provision of Article XXV of the D. to refer to pre-trial delay, and that it “has never held that any perceived delays between sentence and execution constitute “undue delay”, let alone...