Report No. 15 (2017) IACHR. Petition No. 358-07 (Costa Rica)

• Petition Number: 358-07
• Report Number: 15
• Respondent State: Costa Rica
• Case Type: Admissibility
• Court: Inter-American Comission of Human Rights
• Alleged Victim: Miguel Ángel Larios Ugalde

REPORT No. 15/17

PETITION 358-07

REPORT ON ADMISSIBILITY

MIGUEL ÁNGEL LARIOS UGALDE

COSTA RICA

OEA/Ser.L/V/II.

D.. 16

27 J. 2017

Original: Spanish

Approved by the Commission on J. 27, 2017.

Cite as: IACHR, R. No. 15/17. A.. M.Á.L.U.. Costa Rica. J. 27, 2017.

www.cidh.org

REPORT No. 15/17

PETITION P-358-07

REPORT ON ADMISSIBILITY

MIGUEL ÁNGEL LARIOS UGALDE

COSTA RICA

JANUARY 27, 2017

I. INFORMATION ABOUT THE PETITION

Petitioning party:	Jorge Enrique Infante Rojas and M.Á.L.U.
:	Miguel Ángel Larios Ugalde
S. denounced:	Costa Rica
R.s invoked:	Articles 8 (R. to A Fair Trial) and 23 (R. to Participate in Government) of the American Convention on Human R.s1; Article 7 of the Protocol of San Salvador; and other sources of International Law on Human R.s

II. PROCEDURE BEFORE THE IACHR²

D. on which the petition was received:	M. 23, 2017
Additional information received at the initial study stage:	A. 10, 2007, and February 15, 2008
D. on which the petition was transmitted to the S.:	May 17, 2011
D. of the S.’s first response:	August 26, 2011
Additional observations from; the petitioning party:	J. 17, 2012, and M.7., 2015
Additional observations from the S.:	September 25, 2012

III. COMPETENCE

Competence Ratione personae:	Yes
Competence Ratione loci:	Yes
Competence Ratione temporis:	Yes
Competence Ratione materiae:	Yes; American Convention (deposit of instrument on A. 8, 1970) No; Protocol of San Salvador, under the terms of Section VII

IV. ANALYSIS OF DUPLICATION OF PROCEDURES AND INTERNATIONAL RES JUDICATA, COLORABLE CLAIM, EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES AND TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION

Duplication of procedures and International res judicata:	No
R.s declared admissible	Articles 8 (R. to A Fair Trial) and 25 (R. to Judicial Protection) in accordance with Article 1.1 (Obligation to Respect R.s) of the American Convention
Exhaustion of domestic remedies or applicability of an exception to the rule:	Yes; September 27, 2006
Timeliness of the petition:	Yes; M. 23, 2007

V. ALLEGED FACTS

1. The petitioners declare that the alleged victim was a judge at the C. of P.Z., which in A. 1997 settled criminal case 97-20063-030, sentencing two individuals accused of drug trafficking to 18 years in prison –a decision confirmed by the C. of Appeal. L., in early 1999, the convicts’ defense counsel filed an ancillary proceeding, by requesting that a more favorable rule be retroactively applied; but the C. of Criminal Enforcement of Alajuela rejected it. The defense appealed said decision to the C. of P.Z., which decided to return the case to the enforcement judge and order him to settle said proceeding. H., the enforcement judge did not abide by the C.’s order and declared incompetence, as he considered that his duty was to enforce the punishment imposed not establish another. C., the defense filed another appeal to the C. of P.Z.. On July 9, 1999, the C., based on the new provisions of the Criminal Code of Procedure of 1998, accepted the appeal and reduced the convicts’ punishment to 6 years’ imprisonment.

2. The petitioners say that in October 1999, due to information spread by the media concerning alleged acts of corruption, the F.C. ordered to investigate judges and prosecutors who participated in punishment reductions. In this regard and based on the facts above, the alleged victim was subjected to administrative proceedings for hearing a case beyond his jurisdiction and for reducing a punishment significantly. T., on M. 20, 2000, under Article 199 of the Constitutional Law of the Judiciary³, the Supreme C. of Justice concluded that the alleged victim had committed a serious error when he settled the case without considering the existing jurisprudence and rules; as a result, it dismissed him from his office as a judge.

3. The alleged victim filed an appeal for review to the Supreme C. of Justice, but it was rejected on May 23, 2000. A., he filed ordinary labor proceedings to the L.C. of Pérez Zeledón to request that his dismissal from office be declared unjust and his restitution be ordered. On September 10, 2004, the C. rejected both main requests and partially accepted the supplementary request consisting in moving his contributions from the judiciary’s pension plan to the plan of the Social Security Fund. G.t.C.’s refusal, the alleged victim filed an appeal to the C.o.S.P.Z. in which he alleged prescription. On July 15, 2005, the C. rejected the appeal on the grounds that there were no procedural shortcomings, or omissions that could have caused annulment or defenselessness, thus overruling the exception of prescription. Against this decision, the alleged victim filed an appeal for reversal to the Second Chamber of the Supreme C. of Justice to request that his dismissal be declared unjust and his restitution to office be ordered. After analyzing each one of the arguments by the petitioning party, the Chamber rejected the appeal on M. 22, 2006, arguing that “there is an impartial situation of absolute mistrust of the appellant’s work as a judicial officer; therefore it is impossible for him to continue in the Judiciary.” The decision, which had two negative votes, was notified on September 27, 2006.

4. In addition, the petitioners mention, as context information, that apart from being subjected to administrative proceedings, Mr. Larios Ugalde was criminally accused of incompetence but that on October 8, 2003, he was acquitted of all charges, as it was proved that he and another judge had been deceived and misled by the third judge and the prosecutor. According to the judgment, “after the debate, it is evident that [the alleged victim] did not consciously and willingly issue a judgment contrary to the law” and that judge P.G., “who did understand the case file and the same jurisprudence of the Third Chamber fully –which he admitted in the debate, and was proved in the previous analysis–, willingly proceeded to write said judgment, hiding from his colleagues basic information that would mislead them about their duty.” The petitioner says that the text of said judgment was presented in the context of the appeal for reversal at the labor proceedings, despite which this remedy was rejected. M., the petitioner says that due to the application of Article 199 of the Constitutional Law of the Judiciary –under which the Full C. can dismiss judicial authorities–, many judges have resorted to the Constitutional Chamber to request that paragraph 2 of said article be declared unconstitutional. N., the C. has dismissed all such requests on the grounds that the article fully agrees with the Costa Rican Constitution.

5. The petitioners argue that the alleged victim’s dismissal violated his rights to judicial independence, to work, and to access and hold public office, inasmuch as the Supreme C. analyzed his judicial decisions, interpretations and judgments only to impose the highest punishment on him, going beyond its disciplinary powers and based on an ambiguous and arbitrary rule that does not describe reprehensible conducts.

6. The S. argues that the petition is inadmissible under provisions in Article 47 (b) of the Convention. It says that the events reported do not establish a violation of human rights, because the legal proceedings carried out regarding this case were heard by competent, independent and impartial courts in accordance with the rules of due process. T., it emphasizes that the fact that the final judgment –both in disciplinary terms and judicial terms concerning labor law– has been detrimental to the interests of the alleged victim cannot be considered a violation of the American Convention.

7. The S. argues that before the criminal investigation, the Second Chamber of the Supreme C. of Justice established that there was serious negligence that led the alleged victim to issue a judgment wrongly; therefore, under the domestic law, it was lawful to impose a disciplinary punishment on him for failing to comply with his duties as a judge. In this regard, the S. declares that on M. 20, 2000, the F.C. agreed to dismiss the alleged victim as a judge due to serious and unwarranted errors (serious legal malpractice) in his administration of justice inasmuch as he took over jurisdiction in a matter out of his competence instead of presenting the conflict of jurisdiction to the F.C.. Regarding the alleged violation...