Indigenous Rights before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: a Call for a Pro Individual Interpretation

• Author: Valerio de Oliveira Mazzuoli - Dilton Ribeiro
• Position: Federal University of Mato Grosso, Brazil - Queen's University, Canada
• Pages: 522-553

e Indonesian Journal of International & Comparative Law

ISSN: 2338-7602; E-ISSN: 2338-770X

http://www.ijil.org

© 2015 e Institute for Migrant Rights Press

522

I R 

 I-A C 

H R

A C   Pro IndIvIdual I

valErio dE olivEira Mazzuoli

Federal University of Mato Grosso, Brazil

E-mail: mazzuoli@ufmt.br

dilton ribEiro

Queen’s University, Canada

E-mail: 11drfr@queensu.ca

In its traditional conception, international law regulates relations between

sovereign states. is denition is challenged by current developments of

international law, especially in the area of human rights. e human person

is arguably a bearer of rights and duties under international law. However,

recognizing this individual legal personality is not enough. International bodies

and treaties need to acknowledge that individuals are subjects of international

law within a pluralistic world. In other words, the law of nations must crystalize

the idea that individuals are, with all their cultural dierences, subjects of

international law. e Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognizes

this view through its pro homine principle, which informs that human rights

instruments must seek the best possible protection for the human person. In

this interpretative framework, the Inter-American Court crystalized a body of

norms protecting indigenous rights and their cultural and historical backgrounds

within the general protection system of the American Convention. e extensive

Indigenous Rights before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

523

Mazzuoli & Ribeiro

interpretation of rights articulates a new view on the individual legal personality.

Accordingly, this article seeks to understand this approach based on key decisions

of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on indigenous cases.

Keywords: International Legal Personality, International Human Rights,

Indigenous Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights., Communitarianism

1. INTRODUCTION

e recognition of multiculturalism is unquestionably one of the most

signicant post-Second World War movements stemmed from the notion

of individual personality and human centrality. It is intrinsically linked to

the conception of the human person as a bearer of cultural characteristics

that are indispensable to a full and useful existence and that, consequent-

ly, must always be observed and respected. Political philosophy, especially

after the 1980s, made room for debate and the development of multiple

conceptions of multiculturalism. is debate, which soon later became

a concern of law and for lawyers, was strongly rooted in a divergence

between communitarians and liberals, and many questions and dierent

philosophical theories and perspectives still surround this discussion.1

1. In political philosophy, the debate on multiculturalism, which relates to a body of

ideas concerning legal accommodation and policies of ethnic diversity, is strongly

divided between the liberal and communitarian approaches. Liberals essentially

argue that individuals must be free to decide their own concept of good life and not

be constrained by any enforced or inherited condition. Conversely, communitarians

arm that every human being is connected through roles in social relations.

Kymlicka argues dierently by asserting that debates concerning individuals

and groups reach a consensus on liberalism and democracy, but disagree on the

interpretation of these principles in multiethnic and multinational societies. For a

general view on the concept of multiculturalism, on the liberal and communitarian

dichotomy, and on the characteristics or argument of multiculturalism, see, e.g.,

Charles Taylor, Interculturalism or Multiculturalism?, 38 P  S. C

413 (2012); John Arthur, Multiculturalism, in T O H 

P E (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2005); B P, R

M (2000); M M, M: A C

I (2012); Will Kymlicka, Multiculturalism in eory and Practice,

1 R C 3, 62 (2008) (Interview by Verena Risse & Martin Vezér);

W K, M: S, F,   F

(2012); T A R C  M (Duncan

The Indonesian Journal of International & Comparative Law Volume II Issue 3 (2015) at 522–54

Mazzuoli & Ribeiro

524

In the area of public policy, this topic bears considerable importance.

States and the international community as a whole look to better

accommodate national minorities and foreign individuals. Yet, they

face a modern world where technology facilitates immigration and with

territories that are occupied, peacefully or not, by peoples with diverse

cultural characteristics. ese characteristics go beyond the territorial

boundaries where these individuals reside and include a mosaic of features,

such as language, religion, philosophical views, and social conditions, that

constitute an intrinsic part of these individuals. Accordingly, this reality

generates heated public debates that are part of states’ political agenda,

especially after the Second World War.2

Due to its practical, political, legal and philosophical relevance,

multiculturalism is in a central stage in many dierent areas of study, such

as education, philosophy and political science. Furthermore, it is a key

aspect in debates concerning minorities, foreign population, immigration

and diversity in general.3 But paradoxically, multiculturalism is not a

Ivinson ed., 2010); W K, M C: A L

T  M R (1996); Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and

the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. M. J. L. R 751 (1992); Michael

McDonald, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, 42 U. T L. J. 113 (1992);

Will Kymlicka, e Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas, 20 P. T

140 (1992); Chandran Kukathas, Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka, 20

P. T 674 (1992); and C T, M: E

 P  R (1994).

2. Ideas about the accommodation of minorities in multiethnic, multinational

states have been part of policies for more than forty years. For a general view

on the debate on multiculturalism and human rights or public policy, see

M K, T P  I: L P T 

 D  D (2004); S S, J, G 

 P  M (2007); Will Kymlicka, L P

V: N, M Y C [P 

 V: N, M,  C] 30

(2003) [hereinafter K, L P]; S B, T C 

C: E  D   G E 59-67 (2002) [herein

after B, T C  C]; C J, M

 L 263-79 (Shabani Omid Payrow ed., 2007); Melissa Williams, Justice

Towards Groups: Political not Juridical, 23 P. T 75 (1995); and Michael

Murphy, e Limits of Culture in the Politics of Self-Determination, 1 E

367 (2001).

3. See supra note 2. See also J S-H, S D: R

 D C (2000); K. A A  A G,

C C: T P M  R (1998); A P,