How Do China's Importing Firms Respond to Non‐tariff Measures?

Published date01 July 2021
AuthorXiaodan Hu,Yunhua Tian,Yanping Zhou,Lu Feng
Date01 July 2021
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/cwe.12379
©2021 Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
China & World Economy / 89–112, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2021 89
*Xiaodan Hu, Post-doctoral Researcher, Institute of Industrial Economics, Jinan University, China. Email:
huxiaodan2020@foxmail.com; Yunhua Tian (corresponding author), Associate Professor, School of Economics
and Trade, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, China. Email: breeze.yunhua@gdufs.edu.cn; Yanping Zhou
(joint corresponding author), Postgraduate, School of Economics and Trade, Guangdong University of Foreign
Studies, China. Email: yanping_zhou@foxmail.com; Lu Feng (joint corresponding author), PhD, School of
International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, China. Email: fenglu_
uibe@hotmail.com. The authors acknowledge fi nancial support from the National Natural Science Foundation
of China (No. 71903041), the Humanity and Social Science Youth Foundation (No. 17YJC790142), Key Project
of Ministry of Education of China (No. 16JZD018), the Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province
(No. 2021A1515012018), and the National Social Science Foundation (Nos. 21AZD064 and 19BJL074). We
thank the editors and anonymous referees for providing insightful suggestions.
How Do China’s Importing Firms Respond to
Non-tariff Measures?
Xiaodan Hu, Yunhua Tian, Yanping Zhou, Lu Feng*
Abstract
After the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, most countries
gradually reduced their import tariffs to a fairly low level. However, the reduced tariffs
could not be simply read as a reduction in trade barriers. Indeed, many suspect that
countries tend to use more non-tariff measures (NTMs), substituting them for tariff
barriers, to protect their domestic economies. This paper uses newly compiled and
detailed Chinese NTM data, together with highly disaggregated firm import data and
manufacturing fi rm operational data, to investigate the impact of China’s import-related
NTMs on firm imports. Th e main empirical results show that, as in the case of tariff
barriers, China’s trade policy NTMs mainly inhibit fi rms’ intermediate imports. In c ontrast,
China’s public policy NTMs signifi cantly improve the intensive and extensive margins of
rm’s intermediate imports and raise the prices and quality of imported inputs. The gr eater
the extent to which a fi rm engages in processing trade, the larger is the promoting effect of
public policy NTMs on the fi rm’s import margins for intermediate inputs, and the greater is
the restricting effect on the prices and the quality of the rm’s imported inputs.
Key words: extensive margin, intensive margin, intermediate inputs, non-tariff measures,
trade liberalization
JEL codes: F13, F14, F68
I. Introduction
Since the formation of World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, international trade
has become increasingly liberalized against the backdrop of the dramatic worldwide
Xiaodan Hu et al. / 89–112, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2021
©2021 Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
90
reduction in tariff barriers. Some free trade agreements (FTAs) have achieved zero
tariffs (Su and Zang, 2020). Nonetheless, the reduced tariff level cannot be simply
read as a reduction in trade barriers. When tariffs and other traditional non-tariff
barriers have become progressively unavailable to governments, it is suggested that
certain less effectively regulated new non-tariff measures (NTMs),1 such as technical
barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures for public policy
management, have been employed widely, and this may distort trade even more than
tariff barriers.
Research o n NTMs mostly focuses on certain specific sorts of traditional non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) used for trade policy objectives to protect domestic producers
from import competition. These include anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties,
and safeguard measures (Park, 2009; Bown and Tovar, 2011; Wang et al., 2019), and
quantitative restrictions such as quotas and licenses (Khandelwal et al., 2013; Imbruno,
2016), all of which play the same role as tariff barriers. However, with growing concerns
over health, sa fety, environmental quality, the well-being of consumers, and other social
considerations, NTMs are less about shielding domestic producers and more about
achieving legitimate public policy objectives (WTO, 2012). Empirical studies show
that new sorts of NTMs prompted by non-economic public policy objectives exert two
sorts of trade effects: favorable trade effects and adverse trade effects. On the one hand,
NTMs for public policy objectives can act as a sort of “certifi cation” to foster trade by
correcting market failures caused by information asymmetries or imperfect competition,
thus helping to build consumer confi dence in the quality, safety, and other health-related
attributes of imported products and to reduce the fi rm’s information costs for seeking
high-quality imported products (Moenius, 2004; Bao and Qiu, 2010, 2012; Bao and
Chen, 2013; Crivelli and Gröschl, 2016). On the other hand, public policy NTMs can
raise product standards which impose high compliance costs for producers in exporting
countries, thereby increasing trade costs and suppressing trade (Hoekman and Nicita,
2011; Fontagné and Orefi ce, 2018; Grundke and Moser, 2019; Hu et al., 2019; Singh and
Chanda, 2021). Thus, the trade effects of NTMs prompted by public policy objectives
remain to be disentangled.
The widespread use of NTMs, enforced mainly by developing economies, has
made it an interesting “South–South” phenomenon (WTO, 2010). China, the largest
developing economy, has implemented a great number of NTMs, much more than the
1Non-tariff measures are defi ned as all trade-related measures other than tariffs. They used to be called non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) in most literature, referring to the hidden protectionist measures that impede trade.
However, new trade measures, like TBT and SPS, can be either trade facilitating or trade restrictive. Thus,
NTMs include NTBs.

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