Frontline workers' performance in prosocial tasks: evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field in Western India

• Date: 28 August 2023
• Pages: 546-562
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPSM-01-2023-0027
• Published date: 28 August 2023
• Subject Matter: Public policy & environmental management,Politics,Public adminstration & management
• Author: Shuchi Srinivasan,Ankur Sarin

Frontline workers’performance

in prosocial tasks: evidence from

a Lab-in-the-Field in Western India

Shuchi Srinivasan

Oxford Policy Management, Delhi, India, and

Ankur Sarin

Public Systems Group, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad,

Ahmedabad, India

Abstract

Purpose –Frontline workers (FLWs) constitute a critical part of the implementation cadre within public

policies, serving a significant role in the last-mile delivery of public goods and services. FLWs under public

programs in low and middle-income countries like India are offered different compensation structures that

range from full-time salaries, piece rate honorariums, contractual engagements, to no remuneration. Whilst the

rationale for offering different compensations vary, are certain structures more successful in encouraging

FLWs to perform a prosocial task? Further, can certain structures encourage FLWs to perform beyond the

incentivized policy mandate?

Design/methodology/approach –Investigating workers’prosocialeffort within policy implementation, the

authors conducted a randomized lab-in-the-field inquiry with 344 Anganwadi-based workers (workers under

the nutrition policy) in western India. These FLWs were engaged to perform a novel real-effort task that was

tied to different incentive structures and their performance was adjudged based on measurable quantity, effort

and quality parameters.

Findings –Results demonstrate that uncompensated workers invest the greatest amount of effort whilst

compromising on task quality, and vice-versa for subjects receiving pay-for-performance compensation. Programs

must account for policy focus when offering compensations: volunteer engagement may be counterproductive for

quality focus and to the adherence to ancillarytask mandates like nature/quality of beneficiary interaction. On the

other hand, the distribution of products (like health goods) can rely on volunteer effort.

Originality/value –The study brings together various compensation schemes operating at the field level,

under one study using an LFE methodology within the context of policy implementation in India.

Keywords Frontline workers, Prosocial, Public programs, Incentives, Lab-in-the-field

Paper type Research paper

1. Background

Frontline workers (FLWs) perform a host of last-mile roles in the delivery of public goods to

beneficiary populations and affect the success of public programs (Polidori and Teobaldelli,

2013;Meyers et al., 1998;P

erez and Martinez, 2007;Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000).

The proximity to the beneficiary group simultaneously allows them to be well-informed

about the local norms and challenges whilst working in the interest of beneficiaries. Public

programs often capitalize on the workers’unique position within the implementation

infrastructure. The effectiveness of programmes too depends on FLWs’abilities to inform,

educate and assist disadvantaged populations in difficult circumstances. In this regard,

FLW’s prosocial motivation or their other benefitting motivations become critical in

determining FLW performance and successful program implementation (Batson, 1987;

Polidori and Teobaldelli, 2013). The work carried out by FLWs is marked by a high degree of

public interface due to the sensitive nature of service delivery. Further, these tasks aren’t

IJPSM

36,6/7

546

This study was partly funded by the research and publication unit at the Indian Institutue of

Management, Ahmedabad.

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:

https://www.emerald.com/insight/0951-3558.htm

Received 31 January 2023

Revised 30 April 2023

10 July 2023

Accepted 16 July 2023

International Journal of Public

Sector Management

Vol. 36 No. 6/7, 2023

pp. 546-562

© Emerald Publishing Limited

0951-3558

DOI 10.1108/IJPSM-01-2023-0027

limited to specified mandates; FLWs have been reported to go beyond them into a wider

range of care roles. Given the complexity of their role, the question of how to optimally

incentivize this cadre becomes important.

FLWs are offered compensations that range from full-time salaries to no incentives at all,

from piece rate to contractual engagements. Though the nature of the contracts and incentive

structures vary and often reflect the devaluation of gendered care work (Barria et al., 2018),

the motive behind the engagement of FLWs appears to be uniform –namely to ensure the

delivery of public goods and the creation of public benefit. However, are certain compensation

structures more successful in encouraging FLWs to perform prosocial tasks? Can certain

compensation structures encourage FLWs to perform beyond incentivized policy mandates?

In answering these questions, we experimentally investigate elements of different

compensation schemes (that exist in practice) in influencing FLWs’performance in a real-

effort task. In doing so, we attempt to isolate the effect of the nature of compensation and

make it independent of the task at hand; specifically, when the task in question is tied to a

prosocial impact that is uniform across different compensation schemes.

We employ a lab-in-the-field experimental (LFE) methodology (Bozeman and Scott, 1992)

that allows us to involve individuals directly related to the study’s research questions within

a controlled laboratory set-up. We enlist the participation of workers employed under a public

program in India, who represent the unique category of agents (assumed to be prosocially

motivated). Our experiment was undertaken with 344 workers affiliated with Anganwadi

centers, centers where FLWs under the nutrition programs in India are based.

As part of the experiment, workers were tasked with filling zip-lock bags with lentils

[adapted from (Dasgupta et al., 2015)], and their performance was measured on compensation-

linked parameters (Quantity filled),non-compensated parameters (Attention to Quality and

the Effort Expended). The four intervention arms represent to compensation schemes

commonly found in the context of FLWs incentivizing private and public motivations to

different degrees. These were: (1) full-time salary, (2) all-or-nothing contractual pay, (3) piece-

rate compensation and (4) no pay (volunteer).

Robust regression results suggest that while quantity or the compensation-linked

performance is not sensitive to the compensation scheme, the non-incentivized parameters

such as effort and quality of performance are affected. Volunteers are seen to expend the

highest effort, but this occurs at the risk of poorer task quality. The results are seen to reverse

with agents receiving a piece-rate (pay-for-performance) compensation. The results

contribute to the empirical literature on the effect of different compensation schemes

offered for prosocial frontline work.

The rest of the paperis organized into five sections.The first section discusses the relevant

literature on frontline performance in program implementation and the role of incentives in

motivating performance in the domain of community health systems (CHS). We discuss the

contextof our inquiry, followedby a description ofthe experiment. The fourthsection discusses

the results, a discussion of the limitation of the study followed by the conclusion.

2. Literature review

Agency theory argues that even if their objectives are not aligned, principals can potentially

induce agents to work towards goals desired by the principals with incentives, monitoring

and contracting (Jensen, 1994;Jensen and William, 1976). However, information asymmetries,

conflict of interests and inherent incompleteness of contracts implies that the design of

compensation structures significantly influences outcomes. FLWs or Street-level bureaucrats

(SLBs) are defined as –‘public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the

course of their jobs, and who are able to exercise substantial discretion in the execution of

their work’(Lipsky, 1980). SLBs are often understood as agents tasked with implementing

Frontline

workers’

performance in

prosocial tasks

547