Freedom of association in the Bangladeshi garment industry: A policy schizophrenia in labour regulation

• Published date: 01 September 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/ilr.12152
• Date: 01 September 2020

Copyright © The authors 2020

Journal compilation © International Labour Organization 2020

International Labour Review, Vol. 159 (2020), No. 3

Freedom of association in the

Bangladeshi garment industry:

A policy schizophrenia

in labour regulation

Mia Mahmudur RAHIM* and Sk Samidul ISLAM**

Abstract. The right to freedom of association is fundamental for the establish-

ment of labour unionism as an institution. While the Government of Bangladesh

requires enabling legal provisions for unionization in its garment industry, regu-

lation to ensure the right to freedom of association has proved ineective in up-

holding labour unionism. This article highlights the need for legislation capable

of drawing on the complementary skills and resources of the Government, factory

owners, labour unions and global brands to secure a sustained commitment and

contribution towards the socio-economic and political dimensions of labour rela-

tions in Bangladesh’s ready-made garment industry.

Keywords: freedom of association, labour rights, trade unionism, ready-made

garment industry, labour regulation, Bangladesh, labour-intensive countries.

1. Introduction

Since the fateful Rana Plaza collapse in 2013,1 the Government of Bangladesh,

factory owners, international organizations and global brands have launched

several programmes to improve workers’ “well-being” (Croucher et al., 2019;

Donaghey and Reinecke, 2018). However, other than ensuring workplace safety

in a handful of factories, these programmes have done little to help develop

basic labour institutions, such as labour unions, in the Bangladeshi ready-made

garment (RMG) industry (Khan and Wichterich, 2015; Sinkovics, Hoque and

Sinkovics, 2016; Zajak, 2017). This industry contributes approximately 80 per cent

of export earnings, with a workforce of 4 million in 5,00 0 factories (ILO, 2016).

Only 2–10 per cent of these factories have registered unions, and of these

* School of Law at the University of New England, email: miamahmud@gmail.com (correspond-

ing author). ** Bangladesh Judicial Service, email: sksami2003@gmail.com.

Responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles rests solely with their authors, and

publication does not constitute an endorsement by the ILO.

1 Rana Plaza was a garment factory building in Bangladesh that collapsed on 24 April 2013.

It was the most devastating industrial accident in the country’s history, killing 1,134 people and

injuring thousands more. For further details, see Gomes (2013) and Rahim (2017).

International Labour Review

424

registered unions, one in ten is active, and one in ve has been created by the

factory’s owners (ITUC, 2017; Moazzem, Ahmed and Islam, 2015).

As in other labour-intensive developing countries, the dire labour situ-

ation in the Bangladeshi RMG industry is the outcome of a market-controlled

labour regime where market conditions, even if they contravene basic labour

rights, control labour relationships.2 Under this market regime, Bangladeshi

workers have been put in a weak bargaining position, not only by the ever-

increasing unemployment rate, but also by the large number of young, female

workers, and the lack of alternative sources of income (Reinecke and Donaghey,

2015). In this setting, active participation in a labour union is risky, with

workers facing a potential loss of employment, prolonged unemployment and

underemployment (Anner, 2015). Such conditions enable employers and the

Government alike to control the exercise of freedom of association. RMG factory

owners are typically self-interested and have no regard for workers’ freedom of

association (Belal and Roberts, 2010; Anisul Huq, Stevenson and Zorzini, 2014),

actively blocking the formation of formal labour unions.3 Thus, while legal pro-

tection of the right to freedom of association and its exercise is crucial for the

unorganized working class, the Government’s stance on protecting freedom of

association in this industry remains vague (Locke, 2016; E. Hossain, 2013a and

2013b; F. Hossain, 2013). It appears that the Government is passive towards

unionization, always putting o moves to take adequate measures to control

the surge of “yellow unions”, which factory owners create in order to dilute the

capacity of unions.4 A recent amendment to the Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006 ,

fails to provide clear and compelling provisions regarding unionization. This Act

and the Bangladesh Labour Act Implementing Rules, 2015, contain many “ex-

cessive” and largely “unreasonable” provisions, moreover providing insucient

protection for the freedom of association of industrial workers. The Government

urgently needs to reform the regulatory framework on labour rights, increase

penalties for non-compliance, and harness resources from other agencies. This

article delves into these issues, seeking to provide an outline on how to develop

legal regulation for freedom of association in Bangladesh, with a focus on pro-

tecting this freedom in the country’s RMG industry, the second-largest garment

supply industry in the world (Fontana, 2017).

2 Anner divides the regulation of labour markets into: (a) authoritarian state labour control

regimes; (b) market labour control regimes; and (c) employer labour control regimes, putting the

labour market in Bangladesh under the “market labour control regime” (2015, p. 17). In general,

in this regime, “the market exercises its coercive power by disciplining workers to accept poor

working conditions under the threat of being easily replaceable” (Zajak, 2017, p. 1011). The labour

force in this country increased from 56.1 million in 2010 to 66.64 million in 2017, while the un-

employment rate was 3.37 per cent in 2010 and 4.37 per cent in 2017. For further details, see Anner

(2015) and Zajak (2017).

3 Examples of this strategy include the use of physical torture, short-term wage increases,

bonuses or overtime rates, and buying o union leaders by oering them bribes or promotions in

the workplace. For details, see ILO (2015a), Labowitz and Baumann-Pauly (2015), Welford and Frost

(2006) and Umar (200 4).

4 These unions, including workers’ committees backed by factory owners, do not receive ad-

equate support from workers. Hence their role in ensuring workers’ safety and well-being is not

only questionable but also negligible. For a detailed study on this matter, see Khan and Wichterich

(2015).