Free Speech by Design for the Copyright DSM Directive

Author:Maxime Lambrecht
Position:Maxime Lambrecht is a FNRS researcher at JurisLab ULB, invited lecturer at UCLouvain (Chaire Hoover) and at the Ecole de Recherche Graphique. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8909-7547>; The author wants to thank Julien Cabay, Andrée Puttemans, and the anonymous reviewers of this article for their very helpful feedback on this article.
Pages:68-94
SUMMARY

Article 17 of the Directive for Copyright in the Digital Single Market imposes on certain platforms an indirect obligation of algorithmic filtering, while providing a plethora of textual safeguards and guarantees for freedom of speech and legitimate uses. We argue however that this traditional approach of formal safeguards and procedural remedies has proved its inability to effectively protect... (see full summary)

 
FREE EXCERPT
2020
Maxime Lambrecht
68
1
Free Speech by Design
Algorithmic protection of exceptions and limitations in the
Copyright DSM directive
by Maxime Lambrecht*
© 2020 Maxime Lambrec ht
Everybody may disseminate this ar ticle by electronic m eans and make it available for downloa d under the terms and
conditions of the Digital P eer Publishing Licence (DPPL). A copy of the license text may be obta ined at http://nbn-resolving.
de/urn:nbn:de:0009-dppl-v3-en8.
Recommended citation: Ma xime Lambrecht, Free Spee ch by Design for the Copyright DSM D irective, 11 (2020) JIPIT EC 68
par a 1.
Keywords: Copyright; DSM Directive; Digital Single Market; Freedom of expression; exceptions and limitations;
by design; Fair balance; Fundamental rights; parody; quotation
ternative approach, “free speech by design”, aimed
at embedding a concern for freedom of expression in
the design of algorithmic copyright enforcement sys-
tems. Informed by CJEU case law (notably the recent
Spiegel Online, Funke Medien and Pelham trio), we
will assess how such approach can be leveraged to
include, in the implementation of the DSM directive,
an algorithmic protection for the exceptions for quo-
tation and parody, which are of particular importance
for the right to freedom of expression.
Abstract: Article 17 of the Directive for Copyright in
the Digital Single Market imposes on certain plat-
forms an indirect obligation of algorithmic filter-
ing, while providing a plethora of textual safeguards
and guarantees for freedom of speech and legiti-
mate uses. We argue however that this traditional
approach of formal safeguards and procedural reme-
dies has proved its inability to effectively protect us-
ers’ rights to benefit from exceptions and limitations
to copyright on digital platforms. We suggest an al-
A. Introduction
1 The recently adopted Directive for Copyright in the
 1,
and its controversial article 17, has triggered many
concerns about its impact on fundamental rights,
            
invited lecturer at UCLouvain (Chaire Hoover) and at the
Ecole de Recherche Graphique. ORCID: <https://orcid.
org/0000-0001-8909-7547>; The author wants to thank
Julien Cabay, Andrée Puttemans, and the anonymous
reviewers of this article for their very helpful feedback on
this article.
1 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights
in the Digital Single Market (hereafter DSM directive).
particularly freedom of speech. How can we ensure
that online content-sharing service providers, when
implementing (algorithmically assisted) preventive
measures imposed by article 17, will preserve the
   
and limitations on copyright?
2 While the directive provides safeguards to address
     
guarantees in earlier legislation provides reasons to
doubt their effectiveness. We will discuss the merits
of an alternative approach: free speech by design.
3 With the increasing reliance by private and public
actors on algorithmic decision systems2, a growing
2        
relying on the analysis of large amounts of data to infer
Free Speech by Design
2020
69
1
number of researchers, public servants, and
lawmakers have embraced the approach of

values such as fundamental rights in the design of
these systems
3
. There has been much interest in this

(privacy by design)4 and of nanotechnologies (safe
by design)
5
. Comparatively, it has received relatively

in the debate on anti-circumvention provisions6), but
interest in the idea has grown with the increasing
reliance by online platforms on automatic content
recognition technologies for algorithmic copyright
enforcement7.
4
    
DSM directive, we will argue that such algorithmic
guarantees of freedom of speech are the best way
for Online Content Sharing Providers (OCSSPs)8
correlations or, more generally, to derive information to
    
D. Le Métayer, Understanding algorithmic decision-making:
Opportunities and challenges (2019) Study for the European
Parliamentary Research Service.
3        
Principles. Implementation and Mapping of Fair
 <https://perma.
cc/CZ37-NZQT> 

4 Ibidem.
5           
   NanoEthics 11(3), p. 307; I.
        
Nanoethics, ,11(3), p. 297.
6 For a critique of this idea of algorithmic fair use in digital
right management systems, see D. L Burk & J. E. Cohen
      
(2001) Harv. JL Tech, 15      
        
(2003) Communications of the ACM , 46(4), p. 51. The title of
the present article is an homage to Dusollier’s article, as we
      
the InfoSoc directive in this regard, and will be especially
concerned attentive to the effectiveness of our proposals.
7         
Review 64. Contra Burk, D. L. (2019). Algorithmic Fair Use.
U. Chi. L. Rev. 86      

8 According to art. 2(6) of the directive, an online content-
      
society service of which the main or one of the main
purposes is to store and give the public access to a large
amount of copyright-protected works or other protected
to achieve the twofold obligation from article 17
   
of unauthorized works
9
while also not preventing

      
or limitation
10
. This interpretation derives from a
  
recent developments in the CJEU case law and
its central paradigm of the fair balance between
fundamental rights, which has gradually recognized
   
11
and that their effectiveness is especially crucial for
 
 12.
     
designed as built-in preservations for the right
of freedom of speech in our copyright law13, it is
especially important that preventive measures taken
under art. 17(4) do not systematically interfere with

balance between the fundamental rights at stake14.
5
Among commentators, it is commonly held that

subject matter uploaded by its users, which it organises and

9 DSM Directive, art. 17(4) b.
10 DSM Directive, art. 17(7) para 1; DSM Directive, art. 17(9),



11 CJEU, C117/13, Eugen Ulmer (11 September 2014) para 43;
CJEU, C-516/17, Spiegel Online v. Beck (29 July 2019), para 54,
CJEU, C-469/17, Funke Medien v. Germany (29 July 2019), para
70.
12 CJEU, C-516/17, Spiegel Online c. Beck (29 July 2019), para 57.
13 CJEU, C-145/10, Painer c. Standard VerlagsGmbH e.a. (1st
december 2011), para 134; CJEU, C-516/17, Spiegel Online
v. Beck, (29 July 2019), para 57. CJEU, C-201/13, Deckmyn v.
Vandersteen et al. (3 September 2014), para 27; DSM Directive,
recital 70.
14 For a discussion of the many links between the
      
        
     
      équilibre 
          Les
droits intellectuels, entre autres droits  
        
fair balance between copyright and fundamental rights in


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