Extradition
| Pages | 80-81 |
80 Volume 17, October–December 2011 international law update
© 2012 Transnational Law Associates, LLC. All rights reserved. ISSN 1089-5450, ISSN 1943-1287 (on-line) | www.internationallawupdate.com
under Microsoft’s interpretation of “any person,”
it’s clear that the ECPA at least applies whenever
the requested documents are stored in the United
States.” [Slip op. 18687-88]
Suzlon attempted to argue that Congress failed
to discuss civil litigation in the legislative history
or text of the Act, thereby indicating that the Act
would only apply to government law enforcement.
However, the Court disagrees with this argument.
“As before, even if Congress’ most pressing concern
was law enforcement agencies issuing subpoenas,
that does not mean that Congress was not also
concerned about civil litigants issuing discovery
requests. Declaring an implicit exception to the
ECPA for civil litigation would erode the safety
of the stored electronic information and trigger
Congress’ privacy concerns.” [Slip op. 18688]
erefore, the Court concludes that the
legislative history also supports the inclusion of
foreign citizens under the protection of the ECPA.
: Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,
U.S. App. LEXIS 20018 (9th Cir., Oct. 3, 2011).
EXTRADITION
S C
Appellee Dimitrios Skaftouros, a Greek native,
was wanted in Greece on charges including direct
complicity in the murder of a minor and was
certied as extraditable despite his arguments he
made regarding Greece’s compliance with its own
criminal procedure. He petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus before the district court, arguing that
he was “in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3), because two requirements of the
Extradition Treaty between the United States and
Greece had not been met. e district court granted
habeas and dismissed the extradition proceedings
against him. e United States appeals the grant of
habeas.
e U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reverses the judgment and vacates the writ
of habeas corpus, holding that the district court
erred in nding that the United States had the
burden of proving that Greece failed to comply
with its own laws. e Court further holds that
Skaftouros did not and would not be able to carry
the burden of proving that the requirements of the
Treaty were not met.
e Court describes the legal standards
for reviewing extradition proceedings. “At an
extradition hearing, the ‘judicial ocer’s inquiry
is conned to the following: whether a valid treaty
exists; whether the crime charged is covered by the
relevant treaty; and whether the evidence marshaled
in support of the complaint for extradition is
sucient under the applicable standard of proof.’
Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir.
2000).” [Slip op. 16]
e Court nds that the district court erred in
applying the legal standards. Initially, the district
court erred by imposing the burden of proof on the
United States instead of Skaftouros. “[I]t was error
for the District Court to eectively impose on the
Government the burden of proving that Skaftouros
was not ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States.’ 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3).” [Slip op. 21]
It is important to keep in mind that a habeas
corpus proceeding is one that seeks to overturn
a presumptively valid judgment. “Because we
accord a presumption of validity to a judgment on
collateral review, it is the petitioner who bears the
burden of proving that he is being held contrary
to law; and because the habeas proceeding is civil
in nature, the petitioner must satisfy his burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” [Slip op.
21]
Since the Court does not nd any contrary
authority, it determined that this same burden
and standard of proof should be applied in
a habeas petition arising from international
extradition proceedings. “[C]ollateral review of an
international extradition order should begin with
To continue reading
Request your trial