Equality

• Published date: 01 March 2021
• Author: Gianfrancesco Zanetti
• Date: 01 March 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12307

Ratio Juris. Vol. 34 No. 1 March 2021 (45–56)

© (2021) The Authors. Ratio Juris published by the University of Bologna and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Equality

GIANFRANCESCO ZANETTI*

Abstract. “Equality” is a notion about which disagreement arises not simply due to lack of clar-

ity and precision (or intellectual dishonesty and bad faith). Rather, equality is an idea that im-

plies and implicates some form of disagreement as a constitutive possibility of its horizon of

discussion. This, in my view, is both a problem and an opportunity. I submit that equality is a

plural notion: There are only equalities, practices aimed at removing situated circumstances of

inequality and discrimination.

The Italian Constitution acknowledges equality as a fundamental value in Article

3. The structure of the Italian text seems to recognize a distinction between formal

equality— equality before the law regardless of sex, race, language, religion, and so

on— and the distinctly different idea of substantive equality, a notion that includes

social inequalities that may prevent citizens from enjoying “effective participation

[...] in the political, economic and social organization of the country”:

All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without distinction of sex,

race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and social conditions.

It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an economic or social nature

which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby impeding the full development of

the human person and the effective participation of all workers in the political, economic and

social organization of the country.

The chief distinction between formal and substantive conceptions of the concept of

equality is that the latter notion has to do with distributive justice, while the former

pertains principally to procedural justice.

As is well known, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

simply states that “everyone is equal before the law” (Art. 20 CFR), before turning

* I would like to thank Nicola Riva for some extremely useful suggestions in the matter of equal-

ity. His contributions in that regard (Riva 2011, 2017) are often a trove of ideas for anyone inter-

ested in the subject. While insightful, these books do not quite compare to an actual conversa-

tion with Nicola, always engaging and thought- provoking. Alessandra Facchi was the perfect

host at the NoVaMigra conference European values in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, held at

the University of Milan on September 9– 11, 2019. I am also deeply thankful to Hans Lindahl,

who invited me to discuss this paper at the seminar he hosted on November 14, 2019, at the

Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy section of Tilburg University: It was a pleasure for me to

participate in this seminar, taking questions at once challenging and inspiring. And, finally, I am

grateful to Kendall Thomas for his valuable help and feedback. This paper is here published

within the framework of the NoVaMigra project, which has received funding from the European

Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No. 770330.

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