Economic sanctions seldom work: only in rare cases are they powerful.

• Author: Bailey, Norman A.

The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly in the case of rogue countries such as North Korea and Iran, is a goal universally accepted by the international community. There is no such unanimity as to what to do to prevent it. Diplomatic pressure, economic measures, and military action are all in the menu of possibilities.

In the case of North Korea, all measures adopted were unsuccessful, and North Korea has constructed a full-fledged nuclear arsenal, which (along with increased Chinese assertion of various degrees of control over most of the East China and South China Seas), has resulted in increased military buildups in Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Why did the imposition of an extensive regime of economic sanctions, punctuated by periods of economic aid to North Korea in times of famine, fail to prevent its development of nuclear weapons capacity? Quite simply because the sanctions were never adopted universally or applied effectively, especially by China, which provided North Korea with the energy and food supplies needed to maintain a minimum level of societal functionality.

The case of Iran is different. North Korea is devoid of both natural resources and a private sector, and its industrial, scientific, and technological development have been stunted by the world's most repressive totalitarian regime, which aside from Chinese assistance sustains itself through such activities as smuggling, counterfeiting, and money-laundering. Iran, in contrast, is a resource-rich country with a well-developed economic infrastructure and a well-educated population, along with a private sector of some significance. Trade sanctions were applied first and then supplemented by financial sanctions. Both were relatively well-enforced, although sales of crude oil continued at a much lower level than historically through continued though reduced sales to South Korea, China, and India.

Despite the manifest success of the Iranian sanctions regime, in November of 2013 the six powers (five plus one) negotiations with Iran, based on secret contacts with the Iranians by the United States preceding the formal meetings, resulted in an agreement signed by the six powers and Iran on November 22, significantly relaxing the sanctions in return for little more than promises on the part of the Iranians. In perfectly predictable fashion, the sanctions regime proceeded to crumble, as countries and private companies...