Dutertenomics: Populism, Progress, and Prospects

Published date01 July 2020
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/aepr.12296
AuthorJoseph J. Capuno
Date01 July 2020
Dutertenomics: Populism, Progress, and
Prospects
Joseph J. CAPUNO
University of the Philippines
ABSTRACT
In 2016, when Rodrigo Duterte was elected Philippine President the economy was growing
robustly. Despite the record growth, his election is considered a populist revolt of the middle-
and upper-class Filipinos. Yet, his economic policies from his initial 10-point agenda to the
laws he approved are liberal. This paper distinguishes and relates Dutertes authoritarian-
populist political style (Dutertismo) and his economic agenda (Dutertenomics). The distinc-
tion follows from his lack of interest in economic affairs, which he delegated to his team of
economic managers. This team ably pushes important economic reforms because of the presi-
dents style, which so far has earned him wide public approval. After slowing down during the
rst half of Dutertes term, growth has recently picked up. To keep the momentum and public
attention off human rights violations, Duterte needs to accomplish his economic agenda by mid-
2022. Drawing on his powers and popularity, he may yet be able to elicit the full support of
Congress.
Key words: economic policy, macroeconomic performance, Philippines, populism
JEL codes: E20, E60, O53
Accepted: 4 December 2019
1. Introduction
In 2017, the University of Munich polled over 900 economic experts from 120 coun-
tries on whether populism had inuenced their countrieseconomic policymaking in
the previous 5 years (Boumans, 2017). The results for Asian developing countries,
including the Philippines, are revealing: around half claimed that populism led to a
surge in redistributive policies, a rise in short-term spending, and a restructuring of
the economy; about one third declared tax cuts and trade restrictions; and one fth
said limits on migration are among the effects. Seemingly populism now has shaped
I gratefully acknowledge Emmanuel de Dios, Raul Fabella, and Hal Hill for their ideas and sug-
gestions that gave this paper its shape; Yurika Suzuki, Yusuke Takagi, the Editors, and the partic-
ipants at the AEPR conference in Tokyo on 14 September 2019 for their thoughtful comments
on an earlier version; and Julian Thomas Alvarez and Regina Beatrice Tuazon for their excellent
research assistance.
Correspondence: Joseph J. Capuno, School of Economics, University of the Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City 1101, Philippines. Email: jjcapuno@up.edu.ph
262 © 2020 Japan Center for Economic Research
doi: 10.1111/aepr.12296 Asian Economic Policy Review (2020) 15, 262279
more diverse policies than several decades ago when Dornbusch and Edwards (1991,
p. 1) noted about Latin America that:
populist regimes have historically tried to deal with income inequality problems
through the use of overly expansive macroeconomic policies. These policies, which have
relied on decit nancing, generalized controls, and a disregard for basic economic equi-
libria, have almost unavoidably resulted in major macroeconomic crises that have ended
up hurting the poorer segments of society.
In mid-2017, President Rodrigo Duterte was just over a year into his term. During the
previous 6 years, the economy grew robustly under President Benigno Aquino III
(Cabuay & Hill, 2019), whose policies were reformist and not populist. While Aquino
expanded the coverage of the pro-poor conditional cash transfer program initiated by
his predecessor (Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo), this program, like those in Latin America
and South Asia, is not populist. In fact, it is reformist and, like most of President
Aquinos economic policies, has a liberal economic orientation. For his own economic
agenda, Duterte said he would simply copy his predecessors agenda. Yet, Dutertes
election is seen as a populist revolt(Heydarian, 2018), and Duterte is seen as an
authoritarian populist(Juego, 2017b). Thus, it may be asked, which of the recent pol-
icies in the Philippines are populist and may eventually harm the poor? Which eco-
nomic policies will undermine recent growth?
Duterte is counted among the world leaders who are described as strongman,
including Orban of Hungary, Putin of Russia, Erdogan of Turkey, Maduro of Venezu-
ela, and Chan-ocha of Thailand (Juego, 2017a; Bremmer, 2018). Also, he is regarded as
a populist leader alongside Modi of India, Trump of the USA, and Bolsonaro of Brazil
(Heydarian, 2018; Inglehart and Norris, 2017). That Duterte is considered both a
strongman and a populist makes him unlike any other president since Marcos. To his
supporters, his campaign slogan Change is comingmust have rung true.
Jones and Olken (2005) present the case for why leaders like Duterte can impact,
independently from institutions, on a countrys economic growth. Elaborating on
Webers theory, Jones and Olken say that autocrats emerge when the institutional con-
straints (electoral competition, or an independent legislature or judiciary) are weak. To
be sure, the Philippines has been described as a state with weak institutional con-
straints especially against a strong executive and the elite (Teehankee, 2016a; Fabella,
2018). Then what factors, if any, may lead Duterte to steer the economy on its promis-
ing, if precarious, growth path? In the sense of Acemoglu and Robinson (2019), what
other Philippine political institutions are there that shape its economic institutions,
which in turn determine economic incentives and then the outcomes?
This paper rst distinguishes and then relates Dutertes authoritarian-populist
political style (Dutertismo) and his economic agenda (Dutertenomics). The distinc-
tion follows from Dutertes lack of interest in economic affairs, a task he has delegated
to his team of economic managers. That this team ably pushes, though not always suc-
cessfully, liberal economic reforms (the core of Dutertenomics) is due to the
Joseph J. Capuno Dutertenomics
© 2020 Japan Center for Economic Research 263

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