Democracy, diversity and the margin of appreciation: a theoretical analysis from the perspective of the international and constitutional functions of the European Court of Human Rights

• Author: Francisco Javier Mena Parras
• Position: PhD Researcher, Institute for European Studies (Université libre de Bruxelles) & Research Group Fundamental Rights & Constitutionalism (Vrije Universiteit Brussel)
• Pages: 347-364

www.reei.org

DOI: 10.17103/reei.2

9

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DEMOCRACY, DIVERSITY AND THE MARGIN OF

APPRECIATION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS FROM

THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND

CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN

COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

DEMOCRACIA, DIVERSIDAD Y MARGEN DE

APRECIACIÓN: UN ANÁLISIS TEÓRICO DESDE LA

PERSPECTIVA DE LAS FUNCIONES INTERNACIONALES

Y CONSTITUCIONALES DEL TRIBUNAL EUROPEO DE

DERECHOS HUMANOS

Francisco Javier Mena Parras

∗

∗∗

∗

Summary: I.

I

NTRODUCTION

.

II.

T

HE

E

UROPEAN

C

OURT

O

F

H

UMAN

R

IGHTS

:

B

ETWEEN AN

I

NTERNATIONAL

C

OURT OF

H

UMAN

R

IGHTS AND A

C

ONSTITUTIONAL

C

OURT

.

III.

T

HE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION AS A RESULT OF

THE

ECTHR’

S STATUS

.

IV.

C

ONCLUSION

A

BSTRACT

: This article discusses whether the margin of appreciation, as a tool to accommodate diversity

and of respect of democratic choices adopted at the domestic level in the field of human rights, can b e

considered as the res ult of the co mbined roles of the European Court of Human Rights, both as an

international court of human rights and a constitutional court within the subsidiary nature of the European

Convention on Human Rights. From this perspective, and after an analysis of the ECtHR’s legal nature,

the main elements of the margin of appreciation doctrine and its impact on the Strasbourg court’s

legitimacy, as well as on the accommodation of diversity and the respect of decisions adopted by

democratically elected national bodies within the ECHR system are discussed. Particular attention is

given to the role of Europe an consensus as a key factor in the establishment of the margin of appreciation

that is given to states in the restriction of rights recognized by the Con vention.

Fecha de recepción del original: 18 de marzo de 2015. Fecha de aceptación de la versión final: 16 de abril

de 2015.

∗

PhD Researcher, Institute for European Studies (Université libre de Bruxelles) & Research Group

Fundamental Rights & Constitutionalism (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), fmenapar@ulb.ac.be. This research

has been funded by the Interuniversity Attraction Poles Programme initiated by the Belgian Science

Policy Office, more specifical ly the IAP “The Global Challenge of Human Rights Integration: Towards a

Users’ Perspective” (www.hrintegration.be), as well as by a doctoral research grant awarded by the

Philippe Wiener-Maurice An spach Foundation for a research stay at St John’s College, University of

Oxford during the academic y ear 2013-14. The author wishes to thank Eva Bre ms, Emmanuelle Bribosia,

Ellen Desmet and Paul de Hert for their helpf ul comments on an earlier draft. The usual disc laimers

apply.

[29]

R

EVISTA

E

LECTRÓNICA DE

E

STUDIOS

I

NTERNACIONALES

(2015)

- 2 -

DOI: 10.17103/reei.2

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RESUMEN: El presente artículo analiza en qué medida el margen de apreciación, en tanto que

herramienta de regulación de la diversidad y de respeto de las decisiones adoptadas democráticamente a

nivel nacional en materia de derechos hu manos, puede ser considerado como el resultado de los distintos

roles del Tribunal Europeo de Derech os Humanos; esto es, como un tribunal internacional de derechos

humanos y un tribun al constitucional, en el marco de la naturaleza subsidiaria del Conve nio Europeo de

Derechos Humanos. Desde esta

perspectiva, y tras un análisis de la naturaleza jurídica del TEDH, son

presentados los principales elementos de la doctrina del margen de apreciación y su impacto en la

legitimidad d el tribunal de Estrasburgo, así como en la regulación de la diversida d y el respeto de las

decisiones adoptadas por autoridades nacionales elegidas democráticamente en el sistema del CEDH. El

artículo presta una atención especial a l rol del consenso europeo como elemento clave en el

establecimiento del margen de apreciación que se otorga los Estados en el marco de las restricciones de

los derechos reconocidos por el Convenio.

K

EYWORDS

: Consensus, Democracy, Diversity, Europ ean Court of Hu man Rights, International

constitutionalism, Judicial review, Legitimacy, Margin of appreciation, Subsidiarity

P

ALABRAS

C

LAVE

: Consenso, Constitucionalismo internacional, Control jurisdiccional, Democracia,

Diversidad, Legitimidad, Margen de apreciación, Subsidiariedad, Tribunal Europeo de Derechos

Humanos

“Sólo en el desorden somos concebibles”

[“Only in chaos are we conceivable”]

Roberto Bolaño, 2666

[Translated by Natasha Wimmery]

I.

I

NTRODUCTION

Contrary to what is mentioned about the chaos of the universe and human beings’

conception in one of the notes that Hans Reiter (aka Benno von Archimboldi) finds in

Ansky’s notebook in 2666 - the unfinished masterpiece of Roberto Bolaño -, the

relationships between the national legal orders and the European Convention on Human

Rights (ECHR) cannot be conceived in chaos.

While it has been observed that the current multiplicity of overlapping legal orders and

lack of any coherent governance in the current transnational legal world lead to the rise

of divergences and contradictions (and to what, more generally, is considered as “the

era of great disorder”),

1

a certain degree of coherence is required at the ECHR level

within the context of the necessary equilibrium to be struck between uniformity and

diversity in the integration of human rights in Europe.

Indeed, as provided by one of the recitals of its preamble, “the aim of the Council of

Europe is the achievement of greater unity between its members and that one of the

methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of

1

DELMAS-MARTY, M., Ordering Pluralism: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the

Transnational Legal World (Oxford/Portland, Oregon: Hart P ublishing, 2009).