Common law environmental protection: the future of private nuisance, Part II
Author | Robert Charles Palmer |
Position | Bristol Law School, The University of the West of England, Bristol, UK |
This article is the second part of an analysis regarding the future potential of private nuisance as a mechanism for environmental protection. It is suggested that the English common law of nuisance has
The birth of modern environmentalism in the 1970s has seen a steady revival of nuisance law as a “tool” for environmental protection. But, some relatively new modifications to doctrine and borrowed principles have – in the meantime – become obstacles to establishing an actionable nuisance and apportioning liability whilst the statutory regime that exist alongside nuisance law is often being seen as unsatisfactory at regulating increasingly polluting domestic activities and corporate enterprises thus criticised for failing to deal effectively with environmental protection. Indeed, some have gone as far to say that modern-day statutory regime not only fails to solve the problem but have served to escalate matters ( Higgins, 2010 ).
It can be argued that the environmental legal regime is too convoluted to best serve the true interests of environmental protection making a common law alternative for redress somewhat more attractive to a number of potential litigants. Whilst some commentators have identified that private nuisance functions as an additional “access point” to the courts to challenge decision-makers, or as “reserve option” when statutory regulation fails to effect adequate environmental protection ( Steele, 1995 ; Lee, 2003 ), it is generally overlooked that nuisance law not only has a part to play amongst maligned environmental regulation but that can also have an exclusive role to play in environmental protection. Supreme Court intercession on the matters discussed over these articles could reinforce that role.
There have been concerns that private nuisance could theoretically be extinguished and some have predicted that private nuisance was going to be entirely “absorbed” by negligence ( Steele, 2007 ). There is no real evidence that private nuisance is going to entirely yield to its younger cousin, negligence, nevertheless negligence's doctrines are much more user-friendly and despite their conceptual independence decisions in the twentieth-century have assimilated a measure of negligence into nuisance doctrine. Unfortunately their conceptual independence has revealed doctrinal difficulties. Whilst some may believe that is part of a natural cycle of the common law evolving, sadly the conceptual disparities mean using negligence principles in nuisance is not so much changing the rules of the game but rather changing the game entirely.
This article offers an examination of the doctrinal problems associated with including the hegemonic language of negligence into the realms of nuisance doctrine, in particular reference to fault and reasonable foreseeability following the decision in
We next turn to the injunction. The issue of the public interest (or public utility) overriding private proprietary rights in private nuisance cases has been a temporary glitch on a number of occasions since the nineteenth-century. However, on each occasion the common law has reacted in a manner to ensure private interests prevail in this land-based tort.
It is somewhat thematic that Lord Goff's comments in leading private nuisance actions in the modern era cause controversy (and confusion) at the core of the tort. Arguably those can be attributed largely to a misunderstanding of its historical development; comments in
Palpably a parallel between the hypothetical reasonable man and reasonable user cannot be readily drawn because in negligence “fault of some kind is almost always necessary, and fault generally involves foreseeability”6 whereas something “may be done deliberately, and in good faith and in a genuine belief that it is justified”7 but still be construed a nuisance. This suggests a stricter form of liability
We can infer therefore that both liability and the test are exclusive but Lord Goff implies that reasonable user is a prerequisite of liability based on the conduct of the hypothetical reasonable man, rather than the consequences of the activities of known individuals in succinct circumstances. Traditionally the investigation into reasonable user is necessary to establish whether an alleged interference “surmounts the threshold of interference necessary to give rise to an action” ( Cross, 1995 ). In parallel with the notion of actionability discussed previously in part I, it is a case of balancing competing users of land, which is something entirely different to reasonable user containing a precondition of liability based on the foresight of damage to one's neighbour. In Carnwath LJ's words in
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