Certain aspects of the right to life in the cedo jurisprudence

• Author: Andra Dascalu - Lavinia Olah
• Position: Prep. Candidate to PhD, University of Pitesti, Faculty of Juridical and Administrative Sciences - Lecturer PhD, University of Pitesti, Faculty of Juridical and Administrative Sciences
• Pages: 75-80

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN

THE CEDO JURISPRUDENCE

Andra Dascălu

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Lavinia Olah

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Abstract

The right to life, the most natural of man’s rights, even though it is a classic subject

and analyzed for a long time by reputed authors, always stays current and gains new

meanings. The CEDO decisions regarding several aspects of European regulations on the

right to life are interesting to analyze.

Key words: right to life, CEDO, jurisprudence, right to die

Introduction

The right to life is one of the fundamental rights regulated by the European Human

Rights Convention. It is guaranteed to each person through the depositions of Art.2 of the

Convention. At the same time, these depositions provide certain exceptional cases, when

death is not a violation of this right. The provisions of Art.2 are made whole with those

stated in Protocol 6 of the Convention regarding the cancelation of the death penalty, and in

Protocol 13 regarding the cancelation of the death penalty in any circumstances.

The right to life seems as essential in the s ystem of laws and fundamental freedoms

defended through the European Convention in matter, because, without the consecration and

the effective protection of this right, the protection of the other rights would be pointless. It

is obvious that the right to life represents the essential condition of the possibility to exercise

all rights and fundamental freedoms. As often as the European Court has stated, among the

depositions of the Convention, which it considers as primary or pre-eminent, it also exists

the right to life, because, without the protection of this right, the exercise of any other rights

and guaranteed freedoms by the Convention would be false. Art.2 defines the limited

circumstances in which death can be caused intentionally and the European courts have

always enforced a strict control each time such exceptions have been brought forth by

governments of contracted states. The object and goal of the Convention, the protection

instruments of human beings, impose for Art.2 to be interpreted and explained in such a way

that its demands are to be concrete and effective.

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Also, even from the first case examined

through Art.2 of the Convention, the Court has stated that this text “guarantees not only the

right to life, but also provides the circumstances in which the cause of death can be justified;

from this point of view, it is placed among the fundamental texts of the Convention (…).

Along with the banning of degrading and inhuman treatments (Art.3), Art.2 establishes one

of the fundamental values of democratic society which forms the European Council”.

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Prep. Candidate to PhD, University of Piteşti, Faculty of Juridic al and Administrative Sciences

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Lecturer PhD, University of Piteşti, Faculty of Juridical and Administrative Sciences

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So, in Il han vs. Turkey, the Court sta ted in the sense that o nly in exceptional cases the acts of bodily violence

committed by an agent of the state can be analyzed as a violation of dispositions from Art.2 o f the Convention,

when the death of the victim was not produced.

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Corneliu Bârsan – Convenţia Europeană privind drepturile omului.Comentariu pe articole, Pub. All Beck,

Bucharest, 2005.