CEO locality and audit fees

Published date01 January 2024
AuthorBatjargal Bolor‐Erdene,Keumah Jung,Woo‐Jong Lee,Sohee Park,Hee‐Yeon Sunwoo
Date01 January 2024
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12313
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
CEO locality and audit fees
Batjargal Bolor-Erdene
1
| Keumah Jung
1
| Woo-Jong Lee
1
| Sohee Park
1
|
Hee-Yeon Sunwoo
2
1
College of Business, Seoul National
University, Seoul, South Korea
2
Department of Business Administration,
Sejong University, Seoul, South Korea
Correspondence
Hee-Yeon Sunwoo, Department of Business
Administration, Sejong University,
209 Neungdong-ro, Gwangjin-gu, Seoul,
South Korea.
Email: hysunwoo@sejong.ac.kr
Funding information
This study was not funded by any source.
Recent literature suggests that compared to non-local CEOs, local CEOs care more
about reputation capital and hence exhibit a longer-term orientation. Building on this
literature, we address the audit pricing of CEO locality. Our empirical analyses reveal
that audit fees for firms with local CEOs are lower than those for firms without local
CEOs, suggesting a lower audit risk associated with local CEO clients. Seeking the
underlying reasons, we indeed find that both client business risk and misreporting
risk are lower for firms with local CEOs. Our results are robust to using the matched
sample, controlling for potentially correlated variables, change analyses and other
alternative specifications. We add to a maturing stream of auditing literature that
CEOs' individual traits affect audit pricing.
KEYWORDS
audit pricing, audit risk, local CEOs
JEL CLASSIFICATION
M41, M42
1|INTRODUCTION
In this study, we investigate the relation between CEO locality and
audit fees. Both the upper echelons theory and the place attachment
theory provide ground for our discussion. The former suggests that
CEOs' personal traits such as experience, value and personality collec-
tively determine managerial styles and hence corporate behaviours
(Hambrick, 2007). The latter states that place identity forms a key
element of an individual's personal identity (Proshansky, 1978) and
hence management styles vary according to CEOs' emotional bond
with a place (e.g., Lai et al., 2020; Lei et al., 2021; Yonker, 2017b). To
the extent that auditors assess the audit risk associated with CEO
traits in audit engagements, CEO locality is an important consideration
in audit pricing. We present such evidence.
We predict that CEO locality relates to audit risk in two opposing
ways. On the one hand, CEO locality lowers business risk as well as
misreporting risk. First, place identity motivates people to pursue the
interests of their community (Carrus et al., 2005; Twigger-Ross
et al., 2003). Therefore, local CEOs avoid endangering their firms'
perpetuity, which would otherwise adversely affect the local
economy, thus reducing business risk. Second, local CEOs'
reputational concerns also deter them from engaging in any fraudu-
lent action. Social trust with the community also reduces local CEOs'
pressure to meet the near-term performance targets (Lai et al., 2020).
As such, CEO locality can be negatively related to audit risk and hence
audit fees.
On the other hand, CEO locality may instead aggravate agency
problems if local CEOs make decisions for private gain by using their
local networks. A local CEO often executes a policy favourable to
community members merely to raise the company's popularity in the
hometown, without considering the financial consequences (Jiang
et al., 2019). A local CEO also has an incentive to transfer wealth from
shareholders to local employees (Yonker, 2017b). When these subop-
timal decisions impair financial performance, they in turn encourage
local CEOs to mask poor performance. Consequently, CEO locality
may increase audit risk and related fees. Given these scenarios, we
take it as an empirical question whether and how CEO locality is
related to audit risk and audit fees.
We appreciate the helpful comments from workshop participants at Seoul National
University. This project was initiated during Lee's visit to Deakin University. Lee appreciates
financial support from the Institute of Management Research at Seoul National University.
Received: 2 August 2022 Revised: 17 January 2023 Accepted: 25 March 2023
DOI: 10.1111/ijau.12313
44 © 2023 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Int J Audit. 2024;28:44–61.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/ijau
We analyse U.S. firms for the period 2000 to 2020. To tag local-
ity, we manually collect CEOs' birthplace information from diverse
sources including The Complete Marquis Who's Who Biographies and
match it with the headquarter location of the target firms. A set of
empirical analyses consistently enables a directional inference.
We find that firms with local CEOs pay significantly lower audit
fees, suggesting that auditors perceive the presence of a local CEO as
lowering audit risk. We confirm the robustness of this baseline result
while controlling for local CEO selection, using the propensity-
matched sample, and exploiting a change specification. We further
show that, unlike firms with non-local CEOs, those with local CEOs
exhibit higher earnings quality and lower volatility in performance
measures. These findings imply that the lower audit fees for local
CEO firms are indeed attributable to lower misreporting risk and
business risk. In subsequent analyses, we show that our results are
not driven by auditor proximity and regional social capital, further
alleviating the concern about correlated omitted variables.
We extend the literature in a few important ways. First, we add
to the CEO locality research by documenting aspects related to finan-
cial reporting and auditing. Given that the pertinent literature primar-
ily addresses operating, investing, or financing activities of local CEO
firms (e.g., Yonker, 2017a,2017b), our focus on auditing is a natural
extension. Second, we add to the auditing literature by pinpointing
the risk profiles associated with CEO locality. Our results indicate that
auditors do consider the management styles associated with CEOs'
place identity in audit risk assessment. While the auditing standards
are at best implicit about identifying such risk, our findings provide an
important reference for auditors.
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics. Variable NMean Std. Min Q1 Med Q3 Max
LOCAL_CEO 9447 0.229 0.420 0 0 0 0 1
AUDIT_FEES 9447 14.649 1.239 11.661 13.814 14.648 15.513 17.330
LNASSETS 9447 8.288 1.744 4.282 7.018 8.252 9.583 12.360
DEBT 9447 0.563 0.225 0.111 0.410 0.565 0.708 1.252
ROA 9447 0.135 0.091 0.235 0.089 0.131 0.182 0.388
LOSS 9447 0.043 0.203 0 0 0 0 1
UNQ_OP 9447 0.590 0.492 0 0 1 1 1
G_CONCERN 9447 0.007 0.085 0 0 0 0 1
INH_RISK 9447 0.232 0.160 0.015 0.102 0.205 0.323 0.724
SEG 9447 2.675 1.885 1 1.414 2.236 3.464 9.950
BIG4 9447 0.920 0.271 0 1 1 1 1
FYEAR_END 9447 0.665 0.472 0 0 1 1 1
DAYS_TO_SIGN 9447 52.764 14.391 17 45 55 60 90
AU_CHANGE 9447 0.039 0.194 0 0 0 0 1
COUNTY_PRE 9447 17.713 1.708 13.142 16.729 17.845 18.927 21.081
LARGE_SCALE 9447 0.481 0.393 0.006 0.103 0.333 1 1
SPECIALIST 9447 0.425 0.494 0 0 0 1 1
AUD_COMP 9447 0.186 0.238 0.014 0.035 0.090 0.217 1
RURAL 9447 0.495 0.500 0 0 0 1 1
LOG_INC_PCI 9447 10.817 0.384 10.144 10.548 10.763 11.010 12.002
LNPOP 9447 13.765 1.053 10.803 13.216 13.757 14.377 16.117
POPG 9447 0.846 1.081 1.124 0.123 0.649 1.398 4.757
LITERACY 9447 38.193 10.540 14.421 31.450 37.920 46.063 59.835
Note: Table 2reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our main model Equation (1). The
summary statistics include the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum,
maximum, and the percentiles (25% and 75%) distribution of the variables. The sample period is from
2000 to 2020. All the variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The variable definitions
are given in Appendix A.
TABLE 1 Sample selection.
ExecuComp database with CEOann =“CEO”49,219
Less:
Observations without information on CEO birthplaces
or headquarter locations
29,981
Observations of financial firms 3097
Observations missing necessary control variables 6694
Final sample (2000–2020) 9447
Note: Table 1summarises the sample selection procedure for firm–year
observations.
BOLOR-ERDENE ET AL.45

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