Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War.

• Author: Clarke, Ben
• Position: Book review

Gary D Solis, Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge University Press, 2010) ISBN 978-0-521-87088-7, 350 pages

Until recently, military officers often regarded the battlefield as no place for lawyers. Today, few would be brave enough to plan or conduct military operations without legal advice. (1) Solis's text demonstrates why this revolution in military practice has taken place. Drawing upon decades of academic and military experience, the author offers straightforward explanations of how essential norms of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) operate on the battlefield. The book also offers guidance on a range of contemporary IHL controversies. However, it is the abundance of practical illustrations that make Solis's book compelling reading. Through battlefield examples, Solis demystifies the process of interpreting and applying IHL during armed conflict. For this reason alone, the book is an invaluable resource for military officers of all ranks.

With an index longer than this review, only a few aspects of Solis's work can be discussed here. The first section of the book deals with the rules of war. Chapter 1 provides an interesting historical survey of military case studies drawn from: the Peloponnesian War (380BC); the Breisach Trial (1474); the trial of Plenty Horses (1891) that followed the massacre at Wounded Knee (1890); the trial of Goring and Others (Nuremberg, 1946); and the trial of Kupreskic and others (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 2000). Collectively, these case examples refute the notion that battlefield rules of conduct are a modern development. They also lay the foundation for Solis's discussion of the perennial question: 'Why Regulate Battlefield Conduct?' After addressing that issue, Solis critiques the emergence and development of international instruments on the laws of war (Chapter 2) and armed conflict (Chapter 3).

In Chapter 4, Solis considers the normative impact of the 1977 Additional Protocols. (2) Of particular interest is the author's perspective on the new rules on guerrilla warfare. Solis acknowledges that the four standard requirements for lawful combatancy are 'a recipe for guerrilla suicide'. He emphasises the point by asking 'has any guerrilla group ever complied with the four requirements?' Yet Solis is no fan of the more flexible rules under Article 44.3, Additional Protocol I (API). While acknowledging they are an attempt to 'protect...