Are US antidumping cases being
crowded out by other forms
Georgetown University, Washington, District of Columbia, USA, and
Robert M. Feinberg
Department of Economics, American University, Washington,
District of Columbia, USA
Purpose –The issue of substitutability betweenvarious modes of import protection has been studied by
economists in various ways. Since President Donald Trump came into ofﬁce and soon started imposing
tariffs, the need by US ﬁrms to ﬁle antidumping (AD) cases wouldseem to have been reduced. This study
aims to examinewhether such a reduction in AD cases has occurred.
Design/methodology/approach –Quarterly US AD ﬁlings via a negativebinomial regression analysis
are explained. Patterns based on data from 1995 through 2016 are obtained ﬁrst and then predict US AD
petitionsfor 2017 and 2018.
Findings –The authors reject a hypothesis of substitution away from AD in the Trump era of general
protectionism but do ﬁnd some support for the notionthat protection moves downstream, with greater than
predictedAD ﬁlings in downstream metals sectors.
Originality/value –This is the ﬁrst study to examine the possibilityof trade policy substitutability in the
Keywords Antidumping, Trade policy substitution, Trump tariffs
Paper type Research paper
The issue of substitutability between various modes of import protection has been studied
by economists in various ways. One concern with much of the empiricalwork has been the
endogeneity between alternative modes of protection; however, we now have a natural
experiment for the USA. SinceJanuary 2017, when President Donald Trump came into ofﬁce
and soon started imposing tariffs, the need by US ﬁrms to ﬁle antidumping (AD) cases
would seem to have been reduced. Arguably, these Trump tariffs are exogenous with
respect to AD petitions. In what follows,we explain quarterly US AD ﬁlings, based on data
from 1995 through 2016, and then –from this –predict US AD petitions for 2017 and 2018.
We compare our estimate to the actual number of petitions in those years and interpret the
difference as the “Trump effect”.
Consider the timeline of President Trump’s tariff policy. He had campaigned against
existing and potential future trade agreements) but it was not anticipated by most
economists that he would act –unilaterally –to impose large tariffs on taking ofﬁce.
Bloomberg News (2018) presents detailson trade actions under the Trump Administration,
JEL classiﬁcation –F1
Received16 September 2019
Revised19 November 2019
Accepted19 November 2019
Journalof International Trade
Vol.19 No. 1, 2020
© Emerald Publishing Limited
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at: