Cyberconflicts and national security.

Author:Schneier, Bruce
Position:Essay
 
FREE EXCERPT

Whenever national cybersecurity policy is discussed, the same stories come up again and again. Whether the examples are called acts of cyberwar, cyberespionage, hacktivism, or cyberterrorism, they all affect national interest, and there is a corresponding call for some sort of national cyberdefence.

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Unfortunately, it is very difficult to identify attackers and their motivations in cyberspace. As a result, nations are classifying all serious cyberattacks as cyberwar. This perturbs national policy and fuels a cyberwar arms race, resulting in more instability and less security for everyone. We need to dampen our cyberwar rhetoric, even as we adopt stronger law enforcement policies towards cybersecurity, and work to demilitarize cyberspace.

Let us consider three specific cases:

In Estonia, in 2007, during a period of political tensions between the Russian Federation and Estonia, there were a series of denial-of-service cyberattacks against many Estonian websites, including those run by the Estonian Parliament, government ministries, banks, newspapers and television stations. Though Russia was blamed for these attacks based on circumstantial evidence, the Russian Government never admitted its involvement. An ethnic Russian living in Tallinn, who was upset by Estonia's actions and who had been acting alone, was convicted in an Estonian court for his part in these attacks.

In Dharamsala, India, in 2009, security researchers uncovered a sophisticated surveillance system in the Dalai Lama's computer network. Called GhostNet, further research found the same network had infiltrated political, economic and media targets in 103 countries. China was the presumed origin of this surveillance network, although the evidence was circumstantial. It was also unclear whether this network was run by an organization of the Chinese Government, or by Chinese nationals for either profit or nationalist reasons.

In Iran, in 2010, the Stuxnet computer worm severely damaged, and possibly destroyed, centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, in an effort to set back the Iranian nuclear programme. Subsequent analysis of the worm indicated that it was a well-designed and well-executed cyberweapon, requiring an engineering effort that implied a nation-state sponsor. Further investigative reporting pointed to the United States and Israel as designers and deployers of the worm, although neither country has officially taken credit for...

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