American hýbris: US Democracy Promotion in Cuba after the Cold War — Part 2

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.13169/intejcubastud.7.1.0038
• Pages: 38-78
• Published date: 01 April 2015
• Date: 01 April 2015
• Author: Alessandro Badella
• Subject Matter: Cuba,US,Obama,democratisation,Cuban-Americans

I J  C S 7.1 S 2015

AMERICAN HÝBRIS:1 US DEMOCRACY

PROMOTION IN CUBA AFTER THE COLD WAR 

PART 2

Alessandro Badella

University of Genoa, Italy

Abstract

This second part of the article deals with the importance of democracy promotion towards

Cuba as an internal political issue in the US, the so-called ‘two-level game’. In the last

decade, democracy promotion has been receiving criticisms from the academic community

and policymakers. The backlash on democracy promotion, the unintended consequences

of democratic assistance in developing countries and the diff‌iculty of predicting outcomes

of democracy promotion in ‘transitional countries’ posed several questions to US foreign

democratic assistance. While at a theoretical level, these problems have helped to redef‌ine

US democratic efforts abroad, the Cuban case has been highly dominated by democracy

promotion as the cornerstone of US Cuba policy. Apart from Obama’s new course with

Cuba, which has not dramatically changed US goals on the island, US vision and strategy

for the Cuban democratic transition have survived: despite everything, the US has

continued to promote democracy in Cuba, with little or no change. In fact, despite Obama

not abandoning democratisation, it seems he is pursuing a more ‘teleological approach’ to

the matter.

Keywords: Cuba, US, Obama, democratisation, Cuban-Americans

Promoting Democracy and the ‘Two Level Game’

Another answer to our main question – Why is the US promoting democracy

abroad? – is based on the bi-univocal relationship between US foreign policy and

internal and electoral dynamics. After the Cold War, the collapse of a powerful

external enemy (the Soviet Union) brought a redef‌inition of the policy-making

process at an internal level: the mutated international scenario, public opinion,

Congress and the groups of pressure could now inf‌luence US policy in the global

arena (Maynes 1990). After 1989, the ‘costs’ promoting democracy ebbed:

during the Cold War, it was hazardous to abandon US-friendly authoritarian

IJCS 7_1 38 10/06/2015 04:19

US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN CUBA AFTER THE COLD WAR 39

IJCS Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals www.plutojournals.com/ijcs/

and military regimes in the name of human rights (with the risk of paying a

high prime in geopolitical terms). However, after the collapse of the Soviet

Union, those ‘costs’ could now be perceived as minimal. As Holsti (2000: 152)

pointed out,

not only were the potential costs associated with expanding democracy signif‌icantly

reduced, but this goal also seemed to offer a unifying focus for American foreign policy

... In short, this has appeared to be a foreign policy goal that not only promised a very

favourable risk-reward ratio abroad, but that also offered the promise of rich domestic

political dividends.

Actually, American public opinion never looked at democracy promotion with

interest and enthusiasm (Holsti 2000). In particular, after the invasion of Iraq,

the American people started to associate democracy promotion with the high

costs of the global war on terrorism and the ‘Bush doctrine’ in terms of economic

resources and lives lost (Tures 2007).

In the post-Cold War world, ethnic lobbying has become a distinguishing feature

in the construction of US foreign policy: ethnic or national groups could now

inf‌luence the foreign policy-making process (Shain 1995). The existing literature

about the condition of successful inf‌luence of ethnic groups presents several

factors: the organisational strength of the group, and the political unif‌ication,

and power of mobilisation (Ahrari 1987; Haney and Vanderbush 1999; Said

1981; Watanabe 1984); the numerical and electoral signif‌icance of the ethnic

group (Ambrosio 2002; Haney and Vanderbush 1999); the cultural aff‌inity with

the broader US population (Said 1981; Uslaner 2004; Watanabe 1984) and the

ideological and strategic compatibility and aff‌inity with US geopolitical views

(Arnson and Brenner 1993: 214; Dent 1995; Trice 1976; Watanabe 1984). The

Cuban community in the US had the possibility and the capability to develop all

the above-mentioned elements (Haney and Vanderbush 1999).

The results were a strong political inf‌luence over the process of foreign policy

making. Since the 1980s, Cuban-American constituencies in Florida, and partly

in New Jersey, became Cuban political citadels and ‘no aspirant for local, state or

national off‌ice could ignore the ethnic vote’ (Morley and McGillion 2002: 11).

In that decade, Cuban-Americans won important mayoral and representative

off‌ices in Miami and Florida (Pérez 1992: 102–103). As Portes (2005: 193)

pointed out, ‘many exiles ... seemingly believed that they had been elected in

Cuba and not in the US, and that they could behave accordingly’. In the 1990s,

the penetration into US institutions was successfully completed, and the Cuban

hardliners directly entered Congress, defying Clinton’s foreign policy over

Cuba (Haney and Vanderbush 1999: 345; Vanderbush 2009: 299–300). The

Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) expanded its lobby activities to

IJCS 7_1 39 10/06/2015 04:19

40 ACADEMIC ARTICLE  ALESSANDRO BADELLA

I J  C S 7.1 S 2015

non-Cuban Congresspeople too (Calvo and Delercq 2000: 69–70). The ‘Cuban

question’ came to represent a ‘two-level game’ (LeoGrande 1998), so that being

too soft with Castro meant being ‘punished’ by Cuban-American voters: in this

way, US–Cuba relations entered the national political competition (Eckstein

2009: 112–9; LeoGrande 1998).

The ‘symbiotic relationship’ and the ‘convergence of interest and world view’

(Fernández 1987: 116; Moore 2002: 86) between the White House and the

Cuban ethnic group, which was formed during the Cold War and maintained in

the 1990s, played a major role in the f‌ield of democracy promotion too. As Shain

(1995: 84) pointed out, ‘the more the diasporas are harnessed by the American

government to promote democracy abroad, the more likely they are to improve

their inf‌luence on US foreign policy’. In other words, the more the ethnic lobbies

sustain US efforts to promote democracy worldwide, the more they could gain

economic and political benef‌its, the more they could receive help for their cause

and the more US politicians could receive votes from the ethnic constituencies.

For these reasons, the Cuban lobby could expand its inf‌luence over the White

House by supporting the process of democratisation in Cuba and could benef‌it

from US projects of democracy promotion. In fact, since the 1980s, the CANF

has gained a relevant success in ‘inf‌iltrating’ in the management of the National

Endowment for Democracy (NED) and ‘Radio (and Television) Martí’ (Haney

and Vanderbush 1999: 350–3; Nichols 1988; Rothers 1992: A18). Moreover,

Cuban-American public opinion largely sustained US efforts to spread democracy

and the respect of human rights on the island (Table 1). In 1991, 69% of the

Cuban-American community was favourable to US support for human rights

activists on the island, while in 2007, the percentage grew to 86.3% (Florida

International University (FIU), 2007).

Table 1 Position of the Cuban-Americans of Florida on US support for human rights

activists on the island

1991

Mar

1991

Oct

1993 1995 1997 2000 2004 2007

Strongly

favour (%)

69 73.2 71.4 73.9 71.6 76.9 86.0 86.3

Mostly favour

(%)

14.5 15.1 15 13.5 17.8 14.1 7.9 9.9

Mostly oppose

(%)

2.2 2.0 2.3 2.2 3.1 1.8 1.8 1.2

Strongly

oppose (%)

4.8 3.8 4.7 3.6 4.4 4.3 4.3 2.6

Source: Florida International University (2007).

IJCS 7_1 40 10/06/2015 04:19