Agreements and Decisions

Author:Evgeny Krasheninnikov - Julia Baigusheva
Position:Cande. of Sc. (Law), Assistant professor at the Department of Civil Law and Practice of the Yaroslavl Demidov State University of the International Academy of Business -Cand. of Sc. Senior lecturer at the Departmen of Legal Theory and Civil Law Disciplines and New Technologies
Pages:85-93
 
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JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL XX/2013
Evgeny Krasheninnikov † Julia Baigusheva
Cand. of Sc. (Law) Cand. of Sc. (Law)
Assistant professor at the Department Senior lecturer at the Department
of Civil Law and Practice of the Yaroslavl of Legal Theory and Civil Law Disciplines
Demidov State University of the International Academy of Business
and New Technologies
Agreements and Decisions
1. Introduction
The aim of this article is to nd an answer to the question of whether agreements and decisions as multi-
lateral transactions differ from one another and, if so, how they differ and what the legal meaning of those
differences is.
Agreements and decisions pertaining to the joinder of parties contain at least two declarations of will.
Unlike a decision, an agreement may include not declarations of will but will performances (Willensbetä-
tigungen)—that is, expression of will performed without the intention to tell anybody about one’s intention
to cause a legal consequence.*1 The standard example of such agreement is the agreement on transfer of
cash into ownership, as concluded by the representative who manages the cash account of a party, on his
behalf, with regard to himself, and which consists of two expressions of will that are not in pursuit of the
aim of communication, aimed at the transfer of the right of ownership for currency notes, and the real act
(of transfer of currency units from the cash account of the representative to the cash account of the party
he is representing).*2
Clause 154 of the Civil Code (CC) of the Russian Federation (RF) distinguishes between bilateral and
multilateral agreements (deals), not mentioning decisions as multilateral deals. Such differentiation, which
encourages jumping to an inappropriate conclusion with respect to multilateral deals being limited to
agreements entered into by three or more parties, is not justi ed, since a bilateral agreement is a type
of multilateral agreement.*3 As for decisions pertaining to the joinder of the parties, the omission of this
type of multilateral deal from clause 154 of the Civil Code of the RF does not change anything in the merits
of the case: since the decision consists of several expressions of will, aimed at causing legal consequences
that correspond to their contents, it cannot be anything else but a multilateral deal. To eliminate the short-
comings mentioned above from clause 154 of the CC of the RF, it should re ect the fact that multilateral
1 For discussion of will performance, see A. Manigk. Zum Begriff des Rechtsgeschäfts. – Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung 1902,
pp. 281–282; Idem. Das System der juristischen Handlungen im neuesten Schrifttum. – Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des
bürgerlichen Rechts 1933 (83), pp. 56 ff.; A. Tuhr. Der allgemeine Teil des deutschen bürgerlichen Rechts. Bd. 2. Hälfte 1.
Munich: Duncker & Humblot 1914, pp. 404–410; Idem. All gemeiner Teil des schweizerischen Obligationenrechts. Halbbd. 1.
Tübingen: Mohr 1924, pp. 137–138; K. Larenz. Vertrag und Unrecht. Hamburg. Teil 1. 1936, pp. 69–72; M. Keller, C. Schöbi.
Das schweizerische Schuldrecht. 3 Au . Bd. 1. Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn 1988, pp. 34–36; A. Koller. Schweizerisches
Obligationenrecht. Allgemeiner Teil: Grundriss des allgemeinen Schuldrechts ohne Deliktsrecht. Bd. 1. Bern: Stämp i 1996,
pp. 35–36; .. , .. .   . –  
   2012/7, pp. 30–31, 40.
2 A. Tuhr. Der allgemeine Teil des deutschen bürgerli chen Rechts. Bd. 2. Hälfte 2. Munich: Duncker und Humblot 1918, p. 362
and Note 180.
3 By answering the question about the ratio between twofold and multifold, which is identical to the ratio between bilateral
and multilateral, since both of them are derivatives of the ratio between ‘two’ and ‘many’, Aristotle states clearly that ‘two is
many’, which is why ‘two is multifold’ (Aristotle. Metaphysics. Vol. 1 of Works (4 volumes).  1975, p. 264.

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