Summary
Appendix 1: Turkey-A Different Path For Legal and Judicial Reform. Appendix 2: The World Bank's Support for Judicial Reform in Transition Economies, (As of early 2005). Appendix 3: Methodology. Summary Figure 1. Sources: BEEPS1, BEEPS2. Description. Summary Figure 2.Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2004. Description. Summary Figure 3. Sources: BEEPS2, EBRD Transition Report, World Development Indicators. Description. Figure 1.1. Sources: BEEPS1, BEEPS2. Description. Figure 2.1.Source: World Values Survey. Description. Figure 2.2.Source: EBRD Legal Indicator Survey, 1999. Description. Figure 2.3. Source: EBRD Legal Indicator Survey, 1999. Description. Figure 2.4. Sources: Centre for the Study of Public Policy. Description. Figure 2.5. Sources: Centre for the Study of Public Policy. Description. Figure 3.1. Source:EBRD Legal Indicator Survey, 1999. Description. Figure 3.2. Source: EBRD Legal Indicator Survey, 1999 and 2002. Description. Figure 3.3. Source: ABA-CEELI Judicial Reform Index. Description. Figure 3.4. Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2004. Description. Figure 3.5. Source: ABA-CEELI Judicial Reform Index. Description. Figure 3.6. Sources: BEEPS1, BEEPS2. Description. Figures 3.7 and 3.8. Source: Doing Business database (2004). Description. Figure 3.9. Sources: BEEPS1, BEEPS2. Description. Figure 3.10. Source: ABA-CEELI Judicial Reform Index. Description. Figure 3.11. Sources: BEEPS1, BEEPS2. Description. Figure 3.12. Sources: BEEPS1, BEEPS2. Description. Figure 3.13. Sources: BEEPS1, BEEPS2. Description. Figure 3.14. Sources: EBRD Legal Indicator Survey, BEEPS2. Description. Figure 3.15. Sources: BEEPS1, BEEPS2. Description. Figure 3.16. Sources: BEEPS2 and Doing Business (2003). Description. Figure 3.17. Sources: BEEPS2, EBRD Transition Report, 2002. Description. Figure 3.18. Source: BEEPS2. Description. Figure 3.19. Source: BEEPS2. Description. Figure 3.20. Sources: BEEPS1, BEEPS2. Description. Figure 3.21. Source: BEEPS2. Description. Figure 3.22. Sources: BEEPS1, BEEPS2. Description. Figure 3.23. Sources: BEEPS2, EBRD Transition Report, World Development Indicators. Description. Figure 3.24. Sources: BEEPS2, EBRD Transition Report, World Development Indicators. Description. Figure A1.1. Source: Executive Opinion Survey. Description. Figure A1.2. Source: BEEPS2. Description. Figures A1.3 and A1.4.Source: Doing Business (2003). Description. Figure A1.5. Source: BEEPS2. Description. Figure A1.6. Source: BEEPS2. Description. Chapter 3, Endnote 13. Chapter 4, Endnote 2.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Turkey-A Different Path For Legal and Judicial Reform. The Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region in the World Bank comprises all former socialist countries in CEE and the CIS as well as Turkey. Turkey was not included in the analyses in the body of this report because of its very different history, having never been part of the communist world. With a population of 70 million people, however, Turkey is the second largest country in the ECA region. This appendix summarizes its legal and judicial reforms and compares its indicators with those of other ECA countries for readers who are interested in comparative analysis.1 The foundation of the modern legal and judicial system in Turkey was formed when the Shariah Courts were replaced with secular courts in accordance with the Judicial Organization Law passed shortly after the Republic was established in 1923, although the genesis of the secularization began decades earlier. The Hatt-i Sherif, considered one of the most important documents in modern Middle Eastern history, was written in 1839 by the Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire and includes an important affirmation of the rule of law: the declaration that laws must apply equally to all subjects, both Muslim and non-Muslim. Reform during the 19th century led to the creation of dual judicial systems with shariah and secular courts existing side-by-side. The modernization of the legal system that began in the 1920s drew heavily on continental approaches: the Turkish legal system was based on Swiss civil law and civil procedure; German commercial law, maritime law, and criminal procedure; Italian criminal law; and French administrative law. The different codes were chosen from what were considered to be the best in the field for various reasons, including prestige, efficiency, and chance. Choosing a number of different models may have given the borrowings "cultural legitimacy," in that the push to modernize and westernize would not be tied to any one dominant culture. The goal behind using foreign laws was to uproot the foundations of the old legal system by creating completely new laws. Importantly, these models were chosen by Turkey, not imposed, and then adapted and adjusted to fit the Turkish situation, often by Turkish academics trained in the universities of the model countries. According to the European Union's 2003 and 2004 Regular Reports, the main problem facing the Turkish legal and judicial system is the large backlog of cases and general inefficiency of the justice system.2 The ruling Justice and Development Party has acknowledged that the running of the legal system in Turkey has been slow and ineffective and that the problem is more one of inefficient implementation than the legislation itself. The system has also been criticized for the de facto lack of independence of judges, despite the de jure commitment to independence. The reform objectives set out in the EU Accession Partnership with Turkey emphasize streng...
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